Brevard | Case 25-2922 | 2026-01-30
Florida special education due-process decision
- Case number
- 25-2922
- Date
- 1/30/26
- Parties / district (official listing)
- Brevard
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Decision text
Page 1
STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
**,
Petitioner,
vs. Case No. 25-2922E
BREVARD COUNTY SCHOOL
BOARD,
Respondent.
/
FINAL ORDER
The due process hearing was held, by agreement of the parties, via Zoom
conferencing on December 4 and 5, 2025. Jessica E. Varn, an Administrative
Law Judge with the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH), presided
over the hearing.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Krista Ann Barth, Qualified Representative
My Educational Solutions
3475 Sheridan Street, Suite 215B
Hollywood, Florida 33021
For Respondent: Amy J. Pitsch, Esquire
Sniffen & Harmon, P.A.
123 North Monroe Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
(1) Whether the School Board’s recommended placement for this student
is the least restrictive environment (LRE), within the meaning of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA);1 and
1 Based on the stay-put injunction provided by the IDEA, during the pendency of this case,
the student has remained in the last agreed upon placement.
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(2) Whether the School Board has discriminated against the student
based on his disability, in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.2
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Petitioner filed a request for a due process hearing (Complaint) on or
about May 28, 2025. The School Board promptly referred the Complaint to
DOAH. On June 6, 2025, the School Board filed a Notice of Insufficiency. On
June 9, 2025, the undersigned issued an Order on Notice of Insufficiency,
finding the Complaint insufficient, and allowing Petitioner to amend the
Complaint by June 18, 2025.
On June 10, 2025, Petitioner filed a Response to Notice of Insufficiency,
amending the Complaint. On that same day, an Amended Case Management
Order was issued, with amended deadlines. On June 20, 2025, the School
Board filed its Response to the Complaint. A resolution session was held on
July 3, 2025. At the resolution session, the parties agreed to place the case in
abeyance. The parties agreed to convene the student’s individualized
education plan (IEP) team in mid-August, and agreed to include the student’s
physician and private Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA) therapist at the next
IEP meeting. The case was placed in abeyance until August 20, 2025.
On August 21, 2025, the School Board filed a Status Report. In it, the
Sch
ool Board explained that the parties did not hold the IEP meeting because
the student’s physician conveyed that XX does not participate in IEP
meetings. The School Board was, based on this development, prepared to
schedule the due process hearing, and conduct discovery.
2 The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 795, et seq. (Section 504).
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After consultation with the parties, the undersigned scheduled a pre-
hearing conference for September 19, 2025. Unfortunately, only the School
Board appeared for the pre-hearing conference. A second attempt was made
to secure Petitioner’s attendance, and the parties agreed to reschedule the
pre-hearing conference for October 3, 2025.
At the pre-hearing conference, the parties agreed to schedule the due
process hearing on December 4 and 5, 2025, via Zoom conferencing. Discovery
ensued, and Petitioner, on October 24, 2025, filed a “Motion to Require
Comprehensive and Independent Mold Assessment and Environmental
Testing” on DOAH’s docket, but the pleading was intended for the Eighteenth
Judicial Circuit Court for Brevard County.
On November 19, 2025, the School Board filed a Motion to Submit
Deposition Transcript in Lieu of Live Appearance. On November 21, 2025,
Petitioner filed a Motion to Recognize XXXXXXXX as Petitioner's Qualified
Representation, which the undersigned granted. On November 25, 2025, on
the eve of the five-day disclosure deadline, Petitioner filed a Motion for
Continuance, seeking an eight-week continuance, to provide more time for
the Qualified Representative to prepare for the due process hearing.
On December 1, 2025, the School Board filed an objection to Petitioner’s
request for a continuance of the due process hearing. On the next day, the
undersigned held a motion hearing. Although the time and date for the
motion hearing was mutually agreed to by the parties, Petitioner failed to
appear for the motion hearing. The undersigned issued an Order on Pending
Motions that same day, granting the admission of a deposition in lieu of live
testimony, and stating, in part:
Third, Petitioner filed a Motion for Continuance on
November 25, 2025, seeking to reschedule the due
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process hearing that the parties had mutually
agreed to schedule on December 4 and 5, 2025. The
explanation for this request was that XXXXXX, who
had been working with the family for months,
needed additional time to prepare for the due
process hearing. Based on XXXXXXXX Qualified
Representative affidavit, XX has worked as an
advocate for the student for months; therefore,
Petitioner has not established good cause to continue
this matter. The School Board has objected to the
Motion for Continuance. The part ies were notified
on December 1, 2025, that the Motion for
Continuance is DENIED, and this Order
memorializes the decision.
The due process hearing was held as scheduled. Petitioner called the
student’s XXXX to testify on behalf of XX son. The School Board presented
the testimony of XXXXXXXXX, Assistant Director of Student Services;
XXXXXXXXXXXX, Board Certified Behavior Analyst (BCBA); XXXXXXXXX,
Supervisor for Environmental Health and Safety; XXXXXXXX, Exceptional
Student Education (ESE) teacher; XXXXXXXXX, Speech Language
Pathologist (SLP); XXXXXXXXXX, Occupational Therapist (OT); XXXXXX
XXXX, ESE teacher; XXXXXXXXX, SLP; and XXXXXXXXXXXX, ESE
teacher. The School Board also introduced the sworn testimony of
XXXXXXXXXXXXXX, a Board Certified Allergist and Immunologist, via
deposition.
Petitioner’s Exhibit 1 was stipulated into evidence as a Joint Exhibit.
School Board Exhibits A, C through L, and N through P were admitted into
the evidentiary record.
At the end of the due process hearing, the parties agreed to file proposed
final orders 14 days after the Transcript was filed with DOAH. The parties
also agreed to extend the final order deadline to 14 days after the proposed
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final order deadline. The Transcript was filed on January 5, 2026.
Accordingly, the deadline for the proposed final orders was January 20, 2026,
and the Final Order is due on February 3, 2026.
Both parties filed proposed final orders, which were considered in
preparing this Final Order. All of the witnesses’ testimony was considered
and all exhibits were reviewed, although they may not be referred to in the
Findings of Fact below.
Unless otherwise indicated, all rule and statutory references are to the
versions in effect during the relevant period. For stylistic convenience, the
undersigned uses male pronouns when referring to the student. The male
pronouns are neither intended, nor should be interpreted, as a reference to
the student’s actual gender.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The student is an XXX-year-old, XXXXX grade student, who is eligible
for ESE services under the eligibility categories of Other Health Impaired
(OHI) and Hospital/Homebound. He also receives related services in
occupational and language therapy. He receives instruction in the general
education curriculum and communicates using an augmentative and
alternative communication device, an iPad.
2. The student has been diagnosed with autism, attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), depressive disorder, and an
immunodeficiency disorder. He has a significant communication impairment,
difficulty with self-regulation, pronounced challenges with transitions and
environmental change, and complex, ongoing medical needs.
3. Since he entered XXXXXXXXX, he has received all instruction in the
home setting. The condition that required home instruction was the
immunodeficiency disorder. According to XXXXXXXX, the student has a
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decreased IgG1 level, which places him at a higher risk than his peers for
bacterial or viral illnesses such as viral infections, respiratory infections,
bacterial ear infections, sinus infections, and pulmonary infections such as
bronchitis or pneumonia.
4. In November XXX, when the student was in XXXX grade, the student’s
mother submitted a new Hospital/Homebound medical form, signed by
XXXXXXXX. The next month, the IEP team convened to discuss reevaluation
and to review the Hospital/Homebound eligibility. The school-based IEP team
members proposed to continue the student’s two eligibilities for OHI and
Hospital/Homebound until May XXX. During the remaining period of
eligibility, the school-based IEP team members sought to obtain additional
information from the student’s physician regarding his medical condition and
his instructional needs. Second, the school-based team members proposed an
amendment to the IEP dated May XXX, to change the location of services to a
private, dedicated classroom at XXXXXXXXXXXX School.
5. During his home-based instruction, the student never received
instruction from teachers or therapists while in his home. He had received
the instruction and therapies in shared spaces, such as areas described as a
clubhouse, a shared lobby space at his apartment complex, or in a separate
“therapy” apartment that the student’s XXXX had provided for the services.
Since the student was not confined to his home or a hospital, the school-based
team members sought more information from XXXXXXXX, to see if the
student could access his education in a less restrictive environment.
6. The student’s XXXX consented to the school team conferring with
XXXXXXX. On March 7, XXX, a Program Specialist/Nurse Liaison sent an
email to XXXXXXXX. XX inquired (1) whether the student could receive
services in any shared spaces and (2) whether he could receive services in a
dedicated space on campus that is not shared by other students at all during
the day.
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7. XXXXXXXX sent a reply the same day answering these two questions.
XX stated:
Even in a clean facility, respiratory viral pathogen
exposure will be inevitable, most commonly from
exposure to classmates, sharing spaces would not
work. Could [**] receive services in a dedicated space
that is not shared by other students, yes, but [**] is
best going to be served in a homebound learning
environment.
8. During XX deposition, XXXXXXX confirmed that, in XX medical
opinion, the student could receive instruction and services in a dedicated
classroom on the school campus, if he was the only student in the classroom.
9. Throughout XXXXXXXXX, XX grade, and XXXXX grade, Registered
Behavior Technicians (RBTs), employed by a private company called
XXXXXX, provided behavioral services to the student. XXXXXX provides
services to Brevard County School students. Unfortunately, due to the
XXXXX interference and XX critiques of the RBTs, four of seven RBTs
asked to be removed from the student’s case. Ultimately, XXXXXX informed
the parent and school that they would only provide services at the student’s
XXXXX house or at their own site. They refused to continue the services at
the student’s “therapy” apartment.
10. School-based teachers and therapists reported that the XXXX would
interfere with their lessons or therapies, and they found that the student has
a difficult time focusing when his XXXX is present.
11. On May 15, XXX, the IEP team convened an annual review and
developed a new IEP for the student. At this meeting, the school-based team
members proposed to deliver the student’s services in a clean, dedicated
classroom, which he could access without walking through the school. Their
reasoning was multi-faceted. First, XXXXXXXX had stated that the student
could access his education safely in this way. Second, the student had never
been confined to his home or a hospital. Third, coming onto campus is less
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restrictive than receiving services in a “therapy” apartment. Fourth, they
believed that receiving on-campus services would enhance the student’s social
skills, promote independence, help him generalize learned skills in real-world
situations, and provide opportunities to practice transitions. The student’s
XXXX disagreed with this proposal, but the student’s XXXX agreed with the
rest of the IEP team.
12. XXXXXXXXXXXX is five minutes away from the student’s home. The
dedicated classroom has its own bathroom, its own entrance, and it is near
the bus loop. The student would see, from a safe distance, many more
individuals, both peers, and faculty moving around the campus.
13. Although XXXXXXXX expressed no concerns about the student’s
exposure to mold, the School Board commissioned an environmental health
and safety evaluation of the proposed, dedicated classroom. In September
XXX, the School Board completed a Phase 2 indoor air quality analysis of the
proposed classroom for the student, at the XXXXX request. The result of the
inspection, which was undertaken by appropriately qualified assessors and
laboratory personnel, indicates the proposed classroom is a clean room with
no air quality concerns, fit for occupancy.
14. W ithout exception, the student’s current teachers and therapists
persuasively testified that the student will benefit from instruction at a
school campus, and they believe that he will make more progress on his
educational, social, communication, and behavioral IEP goals if he is on the
school campus—in a safe classroom.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
15. DOAH has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this
proceeding under sections 1003.57(1)(b) and 1003.5715(5), Florida Statutes,
and Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-6.03311(9)(u).
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16. The burden of proof is on Petitioner, to prove the claim by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005);
Devine v. Indian River Cnty. Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2001).
17. Congress passed the IDEA “to ensure that all children with disabilities
have available to them a free appropriate public education [FAPE] that
emphasize[s] special education and related services designed to meet their
unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and
independent living.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A); Phillip C. ex rel. A.C. v.
Jefferson Cnty Bd. of Educ., 701 F.3d 691, 694 (11th Cir. 2012).
18. In enacting the IDEA, Congress intended to address inadequate
educational services offered to children with disabilities and to combat the
exclusion of such children from the public education system. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1400(c)(2)(A)-(B). To achieve these aims, Congress provides funding to
participating state and local educational agencies and requires such agencies
to comply with the IDEA’s procedural and substantive requirements. Doe v.
Ala. State Dep’t of Educ., 915 F.2d 651, 654 (11th Cir. 1990).
19. The School Board, a local educational agency under 20 U.S.C.
§ 1401(19)(A), receives federal IDEA funds, and is thus, required to comply
with certain provisions of that Act. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401, et seq.
20. The IDEA provides parents and children with disabilities with
substantial procedural safeguards. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,
205-06 (1982). Among other protections, parents can examine their child’s
records and participate in meetings concerning their child’s education;
receive written notice before any proposed change in the educational
placement of their child; and file an administrative due process complaint
about any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational
placement of their child, or the provision of FAPE. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1),
(b)(3), & (b)(6).
21. In the Complaint, Petitioner asserts that the School Board failed to
provide him with an appropriate location, or placement, in the LRE. Put
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differently, Petitioner argues that the recommended location, a private
dedicated classroom, in the May XXX IEP cannot meet his needs, and is not
safe for him due to his complex medical conditions.
22. The IDEA provides directives on students’ placements or educational
environments in the school system. Title 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) provides:
Least Restrictive Environment.
In general. To the maximum extent appropriate,
children with disabilities, including children in
public or private institutions or other care facilities,
are educated with children who are not disabled,
and special classes, separate schooling, or other
removal of children with disabilities from the
regular educational environment occurs only when
the nature or severity of the disability of a child is
such that education in regular classes with the use
of supplementary aids and services cannot be
achieved satisfactorily.
23. Under the IDEA’s implementing regulations, states must have in
effect policies and procedures to ensure that public agencies in the state
meet the LRE requirements. 34 C.F.R. § 300.114(a). Additionally, each
public agency must have a continuum of alternative placements available
to meet the needs of children with disabilities for special education and
related services. 34 C.F.R. § 300.115. Florida’s Department of Education
has enacted rules to comply with the LRE mandate. See Fla. Admin. Code
R. 6A-6.03028(3)(i) and 6A-6.0311(1).
24. In determining the educational placement of a child with a disability,
each public agency must ensure that the placement decision is made by a
group of persons, including the parent(s), and other persons knowledgeable
about the child; the meaning of the evaluation data; and the placement
options. 34 C.F.R. § 300.116(a)(1). Additionally, the child’s placement must be
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determined at least annually, based on the child’s IEP, and as close as
possible to the child’s home. 34 C.F.R. § 300.116(b).
25. With the LRE directive, “Congress created a statutory preference
for educating [disabled] children with [nondisabled] children.” Greer v. Rome
City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 695 (11th Cir. 1991). “By creating a statutory
preference for mainstreaming, Congress also created a tension between two
provisions of the [IDEA], school districts must both seek to mainstream
[disabled] children and, at the same time, must tailor each child’s educational
placement and program to his special needs.” Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of
Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added).
26. In Daniel, the Fifth Circuit set forth a two-part test for determining
compliance with the mainstreaming requirement:
First, we ask whether education in the regular
classroom, with the use of supplemental aids and
services, can be achieved satisfactorily for a given
child. See § 1412(5)(B). If it cannot and the school
intends to provide special education or to remove the
child from regular education, we ask, second,
whether the school has mainstreamed the child to
the maximum extent appropriate.
Id. at 1048.
27. The Eleventh Circuit has adopted the Daniel two-part inquiry. See
Greer, 950 F.2d at 697.
In determining the first step, whether a school
district can satisfactorily educate a student in the
regular classroom, several factors are to be
considered, including a comparison of the
educational benefits the student would receive in a
regular classroo m, supplemented by aids and
services; what effect the presence of the student in a
regular classroom would have on the education of
other students in that classroom; and the cost of the
supplemental aids and services that will be
necessary to achieve a satisfactory education for the
student in a regular classroom.
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Id.
28. Moreover, deference should be paid to those involved in education and
administration of the school system. A.K. v. Gwinnett Cnty. Sch. Dist., 556
Fed. Appx. 790, 792 (11th Cir. 2014) (“In determining whether the IEP is
substantively adequate, we ‘pay great deference to the educators who develop
the IEP.’”) (quoting Todd D. v. Andrews, 933 F.2d 1576, 1581 (11th Cir.
1991)). As noted in Daniel, “[the undersigned’s] task is not to second guess
state and local policy decisions; rather, it is the narrow one of determining
whether state and local officials have complied with the [IDEA].” Daniel, 874
F.2d at 1048.
29. In Florida, a homebound or hospitalized student is defined as:
a student who has a medically diagnosed physical or
psychiatric condition that is acute or catastrophic in
nature, a chronic illness, or a repeated intermittent
illness due to a persisting medical problem and
which confines the student to home or hospital, and
restricts activities for an extended period of time.
See Fla. Admin. Code R. 6A-6.03020.
30. The rule states the following with respect to how homebound students
may access instructional services:
(5) Instructional services. The following settings and
instructional modes, or a combination thereof, are
appropriate methods for providing instruction to
students determined eligible for these services:
(a) Instruction in a home. The parent, guardian or
primary caregiver shall provide a quiet, clean and
well-ventilated setting where the teacher and
student will work; ensure that a responsible adult is
present; and establish a schedule for student study
between teacher visits that takes into account the
student’s medical condition and the requirements of
the student’s coursework.
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(b) Instruction in a hospital. The hospital
administrator or designee shall provide appropriate
space for the teacher and student to work and allow
for the establishment of a schedule for student study
between teacher visits.
(c) Instruction through telecommunications or
electronic devices. When the IEP or IFSP team
determines that instruction is by
telecommunications or electronic devices, an open,
uninterrupted telecommunication link shall be
provided at no additional cost to the parent, during
the instructional period. The parent shall ensure
that the student is prepared to actively participate
in learning.
(d) Instruction in other specified settings. The IEP
or IFSP team may determine that instruction would
be best delivered in a mutually agreed upon
alternate setting other than the home, hospital or
through telecommunications or electronic devices.
(e) Instruction in a school setting on a part -time
basis may be appropriate as the student transitions
back to the student’s regular class schedule, if the
IEP or IFSP team determines this meets the
student’s needs.
31. A
s noted in subsection (d), students eligible under this section may
access instruction in an alternate setting other than the home, hospital, or
through telecommunications or electronic devices. Subsection (e)
contemplates that some students may benefit from instruction in a school
setting on a part-time basis, if appropriate.
32. The Eleventh Circuit has held that school districts need not provide
homebound instruction where the evidence shows that a student can receive
educational services in a less restrictive setting, even when parents present
medical concerns. In Stamps v. Gwinnett County School District, the court
upheld a district’s decision to educate children with immune and neurological
disorders in public school rather than at home, emphasizing that the doctor’s
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testimony did not establish a medical necessity for homebound instruction
and that the school could maintain an educational environment in a manner
that was safe and clean. 481 F. App’x 470 (11th Cir. 2012).
33. Applying these principles here, the more persuasive evidence
establishes that the School Board’s recommended placement and location, a
dedicated and safe classroom on the school campus, does comply with the
LRE mandate. The School Board’s recommended change in placement is
tailored to meet the student’s special needs because it provides more
opportunity for the student to separate home from school, and, as all his
teachers and therapists opined, will meet his educational, communication,
social, and behavioral needs.
34. Lastly, Petitioner asserts that the School Board discriminated against
him based on his disability, in violation of Section 504. To establish a prima
facie case under Section 504, Petitioner must prove that he: (1) had an actual
or perceived disability; (2) qualified for participation in the subject program;
(3) was discriminated against only because of his disability; and
(4) the relevant program is receiving federal financial assistance. Moore v.
Chilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 936 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1313 (M.D. Ala.
2013)(citing L.M.P. v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 516 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1301
(S.D. Fla. 2007)); see also J.P.M. v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sch. Bd., 916 F. Supp.
2d 1314, 1320 (S.D. Fla. 2013).
35. Though unclear, Petitioner appears to base his Section 504 claim on
the recommendation made by the school-based IEP team members on the
placement issue. Petitioner presented no evidence that the School Board’s
actions discriminated against Petitioner. Thus, this claim fails.
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ORDER
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
ORDERED that Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof, and all requests
for relief are DENIED. The School Board’s recommended placement is
appropriate for the student, and does comply with the LRE mandate in the
IDEA.
DONE AND ORDERED this 30th day of January, 2026, in Tallahassee,
Leon County, Florida.
SCase No. 25-2922E
JESSICA E. VARN
A
dministrative Law Judge
DOAH Tallahassee Office
Division of Administrative Hearings
2001 Drayton Drive
Tallahassee, Florida 32311
(850) 488-9675
www.doah.state.fl.us
Filed with the Clerk of the
Division of Administrative Hearings
this 30th day of January, 2026.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Bryce D. Milton, Educational Program Director Amy J. Pitsch, Esquire
(eServed) (eServed)
William D. Chappell, General Counsel Amy D. Envall, Senior Counsel
(eServed) (eServed)
Dr. Mark Rendell, Superintendent Krista Ann Barth
(eServed) (eServed)
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NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
This decision is final unless, within 90 days after the date of this decision, an
adversely affected party:
a) brings a civil action in the appropriate state
circuit court pursuant to section 1003.57(1)(c),
Florida Statutes (2014), and Florida Administrative
Code Rule 6A-6.03311(9)(w); or
b) brings a civil action in the appropriate district
court of the United States pursuant to 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(2), 34 C.F.R. § 300.516, and Florida
Administrative Code Rule 6A-6.03311(9)(w).
