Highlands | Case 24-2768 | 2024-11-01
Florida special education due-process decision
- Case number
- 24-2768
- Date
- 11/1/2024
- Parties / district (official listing)
- Highlands
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Decision text
Page 1
STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
**,
Petitioner,
vs.
HIGHLANDS COUNTY SCHOOL
BOARD,
Respondent.
/
Case No. 24-2768E
FINAL ORDER
This case came before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Sara Marken of
the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) for a final hearing held via
Zoom conference on September 12 and 13, 2024.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Petitioner, pro se
(Address of Record)
For Respondent: Amy J. Pitsch, Esquire
Sniffen & Spellman, P.A.
123 North Monroe Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Whether the District failed to implement the student’s Behavior
Intervention Plan (BIP);
Whether that failure resulted in a denial of a free and appropriate public
education (FAPE); and
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Whether the student requires residential placement to receive FAPE.1
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
A request for a due process hearing by Petitioner was filed with DOAH on
July 25, 2024, and a Case Management Order was issued on the same date. A
telephonic scheduling conference was held on August 8, 2024. The parties
agreed to schedule the hearing on September 12 and 13, 2024. On August 2,
2024, the School Board filed a Motion to Dismiss in Part and Response to Due
Process Request. The School Board moved to dismiss portions of the
complaint because the complaint sought redress for allegations made in a
previous case, allegations that the parties resolved through a settlement
agreement. On August 16, 2024, the undersigned issued an Order
determining that the issues for the final hearing would not include
allegations previously addressed and resolved in a separate matter.
The final hearing was held on September 12 and 13, 2024, by Zoom
conference. Petitioner presented the testimony of these witnesses: XXXX
XXXXXXXX; Petitioner’s mother; XXXXXXXX, Exceptional Student
Education (ESE) Teacher; and XXXXXXX, ESE Teacher. The School Board
presented the testimony of these witnesses: XXXXXXXXXXXX, Board-
Certified Behavior Analyst; XXXXXXXXXXXXXX, Occupational Therapist;
XXXXXXXXXX, Occupational Therapist; XXXXXXXXX, Principal; XXXXX
XXXXX, Speech-language Pathologist; XXXXXXXX, Physical Education
Teacher; XXXXXXXXXX, Program Staffing Specialist; and XXXXXXXX, ESE
Director. Petitioner’s Exhibits 21 through 30 and 33 through 41 were
admitted into evidence. The School Board’s Exhibits A through J were also
admitted.
1 In its proposed final order, Petitioner addressed additional issues beyond those noticed for
final hearing. These issues are not addressed in this Final Order.
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The final hearing Transcript was filed at DOAH on September 30, 2024.
An Order Extending Deadline for Final Order was issued on October 1, 2024,
indicating that the proposed final orders were due by October 14, 2024, and
the Final Order would be entered no later than October 28, 2024. On
October 14, 2024, Petitioner requested to extend the proposed final order
deadline to October 21, 2024. On the same day, the undersigned issued an
Order granting Petitioner’s request and extending the final order deadline
to November 4, 2024. Both parties filed timely proposed orders, which were
considered in preparing this Final Order.
Unless otherwise indicated, all rule and statutory references are to the
version in effect at the time of the challenge to the continued placement. For
stylistic convenience, the undersigned will use male pronouns in this Final
Order when referring to the student. The male pronouns are neither
intended nor should be interpreted as a reference to the student’s actual
gender.
FINDINGS OF FACT
2
1. At the time of the due process hearing, the student was a XXXXXXXX
at School B, a school within the Highlands County School Board. During the
XXXXXXX school year, the student was a XXXXXXXX at School A, an
XXXXXXXX school within the Highlands County School Board.
2. The student is eligible for ESE in the categories of Autism Spectrum
Disorder (ASD) and Language Impairment (LI). He accesses his education on
a modified curriculum, Access Points.
3. The student is very quiet and observant. He enjoys nature and being
outdoors.
2 The Findings of Fact do not refer to every witness who testified, but all testimony and all
exhibits entered into the record were considered.
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4. The student’s disability affects his behavior. When exposed to loud
noises or prompted to complete academic demands, he engages in
maladaptive behaviors. The student has a BIP to assist with his behaviors.
His current educational placement is an ESE classroom for students with
intellectual disabilities.
5. Along with his individualized education plan (IEP) and BIP, the
student has a sensory plan to teach him how to use sensory techniques to
improve his self-regulation skills. The student also receives occupational and
language therapies as related services.
6. On August 14, XXX, the school district contracted XXXXXXXX and XX
company, XXXXXXXXXXX, to develop the student’s BIP. The plan focuses
on reducing five maladaptive behaviors: physical aggression, inappropriate
behavior, property destruction, classroom disruptions, and non-compliance.
In April XXX, the IEP team added spitting as a target behavior for
intervention.
7. Throughout the XXXXXXX school year, XXXXXXXX worked directly
with the student to implement the BIP and provided training and modeling
techniques for the staff at School A. A registered behavior technician from
XXXXXXXXXXX supported the student with plan implementation and
helped train school staff. During this period, his teachers effectively managed
his behaviors in the classroom and consistently implemented the BIP.
8. In the fall semester of XXX, XXXXXXXX gradually reduced his hands-
on involvement because of the plan's success up to that point. However, in
January XXX, the student’s behaviors increased in response to staff changes
in his classroom and greater academic demands. XXXXXXXX and his
company took a more hands-on approach and began monitoring maladaptive
behaviors in February XXX through the end of the extended school year
(ESY) in June XXX.
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9. From February to June XXX, staff documented a decrease in all
targeted behaviors. The student’s mother also reported a decrease in the
student’s physical aggression at home.
10. T he student has also exhibited increased replacement behaviors, such
as requesting breaks rather than engaging in maladaptive behaviors.
Overall, the student’s behavior improved during the XXXXXXX school year.
11. Additionally, the student made academic progress. By April XXX, he
had mastered two of his three curriculum and learning goals from his XXX
IEP. This prompted his teacher to increase the number of goals and their
difficulty in the XXX IEP.
12. The preponderance of the evidence establishes that the student has
made adequate progress in light of his circumstances. Thus, the student is
mainstreamed to the maximum extent appropriate, and a more restrictive
setting is unwarranted.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
13. DOAH has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this
proceeding pursuant to sections 1003.57(1)(c) and 1003.5715(5), Florida
Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-6.03311(9)(u).
14. The burden of proof is on Petitioner to prove the claims by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005);
Loren F. v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 349 F.3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 2003);
Devine v. Indian River Cnty. Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2001).
15. In enacting the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),
Congress sought to “ensure that all children with disabilities have available
to them a free appropriate public education that emphasized special
education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and
prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living.”
20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A); Phillip C. v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 701 F.3d
691, 694 (11th Cir. 2012). The statute was intended to address the
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inadequate educational services offered to children with disabilities and to
combat the exclusion of such children from the public-school system. 20
U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2)(A)-(B). To accomplish these objectives, the federal
government provides funding to participating state and local educational
agencies, contingent on each agency’s compliance with the IDEA’s procedural
and substantive requirements. Doe v. Ala. State Dep’t of Educ., 915 F.2d 651,
654 (11th Cir. 1990).
16. To satisfy the IDEA’s substantive requirements, school districts must
provide all eligible students with FAPE, which is defined as:
[S]pecial education services that –
(A) have been provided at public expense, under
public supervision and direction, and without
charge; (B) meet the standards of the State
educational agency; (C) include an appropriate
preschool, elementary school, or secondary school
education in the State involved; and (D) are provided
in conformity with the individualized education
program required under [20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)].
20 U.S.C. § 1401(9).
17. The components of FAPE are recorded in an IEP, which, among other
things, identifies the child’s present levels of academic achievement and
functional performance; establishes measurable annual goals; addresses the
services and accommodations to be provided to the child, and whether the
child will attend mainstream classes; and specifies the measurement tools
and periodic reports to be used to evaluate the child’s progress. 20 U.S.C. §
1414(d)(1)(A)(i); 34 C.F.R. § 300.320. “The IEP is the centerpiece of the
statute’s education delivery system for disabled children.” Endrew F. v.
Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 994 (2017)(quoting Honig v.
Doe, 108 S. Ct. 592 (1988)). “The IEP is the means by which special education
and related services are ‘tailored to the unique needs’ of a particular child.”
Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 181).
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18. Additionally, “in the case of a child whose behavior impedes the child's
learning or that of others, [the IEP must] consider the use of positive
behavioral interventions and supports, and other strategies, to address that
behavior.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.324.
19. In this case, these interventions, and supports are recorded in the
student’s BIP. Petitioner alleges that the School Board failed to implement
the BIP with fidelity during the XXXXXXX school year.
20. In L.J. v. School Board, 927 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2019), the Eleventh
Circuit confronted, for the first time, the standard for claimants to prevail in
a “failure-to-implement case.” The court concluded that “a material deviation
from the plan violates the [IDEA].” L.J., 927 F.3d at 1206. The L.J. court
expanded upon this conclusion as follows:
Confronting this issue for the first time ourselves,
we concluded that to prevail in a failure -to-
implement case, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
the school has materially failed to implement a
child’s IEP. And to do that, the plaintiff must prove
more than a minor or technical gap between the plan
and reality; de minimis shortfalls are not enough. A
material implementation failure occurs only when a
school has failed to implement substantial or
significant provisions of a child’s IEP.
Id. at 1211.
21. While declining to map out every detail of the implementation
standard, the court provided a few principles to guide the analysis. Id. at
1214. To begin, the court stated that the focus in implementation cases
should be on the proportion of services mandated to those actually provided,
viewed in the context of the goal and import of the specific service withheld.
In other words, the task is to compare the services that are actually delivered
to the services described in the IEP itself. In turn, “courts must consider
implementation failures quantitatively and qualitatively to determine how
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much was withheld and how important the withheld services were in view of
the IEP as a whole.” Id.
22. Additionally, the L.J. court noted that the analysis must consider
implementation as a whole:
We also note that courts should consider
implementation as a whole in light of the IEP’s
overall goals. That means that reviewing courts
must consider the cumulative impact of multiple
implementation failures when those failures, though
minor in isolation, conspire to amount to something
more. In an implementation case, the question is not
whether the school has materially failed to
implement an individual provision in isolation, but
rather whether the school has materially failed to
implement the IEP as a whole.
23. Guided by these principles, the record in this case shows the student’s
BIP was implemented during the school year. Staff applied the interventions
outlined in the plan to decrease maladaptive behaviors, as shown by the
student’s academic and behavior progress over the school year.
24. In sum, Petitioner failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the School Board denied the student FAPE during the XXXXXXX school
year.
25. Turning now to the issue of placement, the IDEA provides directives
on students’ placements or education environments in the school system.
Specifically, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) provides, as follows:
Least restrictive environment.
(A) In general. To the maximum extent appropriate,
children with disabilities, including children in
public or private institutions or other care facilities,
are educated with children who are not disabled, and
special classes, separate schooling, or other removal
of children with disabilities from the regular
educational environment occurs only when the
nature or severity of the disability of a child is such
that education in regular classes with the use of
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supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved
satisfactorily.
26. With the LRE directive, “Congress created a statutory preference for
educating handicapped children with nonhandicapped children.” Greer v.
Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 695 (11th Cir. 1991). “By creating a
statutory preference for mainstreaming, Congress also created a tension
between two provisions of the Act, school districts must both seek to
mainstream handicapped children and, at the same time, must tailor each
child’s educational placement and program to his special needs.” Daniel R.R.
v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1989).
27. In Daniel, the Fifth Circuit set forth a two-part test for determining
compliance with the mainstreaming requirement:
First, we ask whether education in the regular
classroom, with the use of supplemental aids and
services, can be achieved satisfactorily for a given
child. See § 1412(5)(B). If it cannot and the school
intends to provide special education or to remove the
child from regular education, we ask, second,
whether the school has mainstreamed the child to
the maximum extent appropriate.
Daniel, 874 F.2d at 1048.
28. In Greer, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the Daniel two-part inquiry. In
determining the first step, whether a school district can satisfactorily educate
a student in the regular classroom, several factors are to be considered: (1) a
comparison of the educational benefits the student would receive in a regular
classroom, supplemented by aids and services, with the benefits he will
receive in a self-contained special education environment; (2) what effect the
presence of the student in a regular classroom would have on the education of
other students in that classroom; and (3) the cost of the supplemental aids
and services that will be necessary to achieve a satisfactory education for the
student in a regular classroom. Greer, 950 F.2d at 697.
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29. In this matter, Petitioner argues that a more restrictive placement,
residential placement, is required to provide FAPE and meet the LRE
directive. The preponderance of the evidence, however, demonstrated that
the student is accessing his education in his current setting.
30. Petitioner’s mother argues that the student requires residential
placement due to his dangerous behavior and fears the student will be
arrested at school if he continues to exhibit maladaptive behaviors. The
better evidence is that the mother’s fears are unwarranted and that the
student is making adequate progress in light of his circumstances.
31. Here, Petitioner presented no evidence establishing that placement
at the student’s current placement violates the LRE mandate. Instead, the
School Board presented persuasive evidence that the placement was
appropriate and mainstreamed the student to the maximum extent possible.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
ORDERED that the request for relief is denied, and the Complaint is
dismissed.
DONE AND ORDERED this 1st day of November, 2024, in Miami, Dade
County, Florida.
SCase No. 24-2768E
SARA M. MARKEN
Administrative Law Judge
DOAH Miami Office
Division of Administrative Hearings
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32301-3060
(850) 488-9675
www.doah.state.fl.us
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Filed with the Clerk of the
Division of Administrative Hearings
this 1st day of November, 2024.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Amanda W. Gay, Esquire
(eServed)
Petitioner
(eServed)
Amy D. Envall, Esquire
(eServed)
Amy J. Pitsch, Esquire
(eServed)
Bryce D. Milton, Educational Program Director
(eServed)
William D. Chappell, Acting General Counsel
(eServed)
Brenda Longshore, Superintendent
(eServed)
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
This decision is final unless, within 90 days after the date of this decision, an
adversely affected party:
a) brings a civil action in the appropriate state
circuit court pursuant to section 1003.57(1)(c),
Florida Statutes (2014), and Florida Administrative
Code Rule 6A-6.03311(9)(w); or
b) brings a civil action in the appropriate district
court of the United States pursuant to 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(2), 34 C.F.R. § 300.516, and Florida
Administrative Code Rule 6A-6.03311(9)(w).
