Hillsborough | Case 22-3347 | 2023-03-30
Florida special education due-process decision
- Case number
- 22-3347
- Date
- 3/30/2023
- Parties / district (official listing)
- Hillsborough
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Decision text
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STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
**,
Petitioner,
vs. Case No. 22-3347E
HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,
Respondent.
/
FINAL ORDER
A due process hearing was held on January 30, 2023, before
Administrative Law Judge Brittany O. Finkbeiner of the Division of
Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”) via Zoom conference.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Petitioner, pro se
(Address of Record)
For Respondent: LaKisha M. Kinsey-Sallis, Esquire
Fisher & Phillips, LLP
101 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 2350
Tampa, Florida 33602
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated the law with
respect to reevaluating Petitioner; and whether Petitioner’s individualized
education plan (“IEP”) was reasonably calculated to provide Petitioner with a
free appropriate public education (“FAPE”).
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This matter is before DOAH on Petitioner’s Request for Due Process
H
earing, filed on October 26, 2022. At the final hearing, Petitioner presented
the testimony of his parent and Linda Montalbano. Petitioner’s Exhibits 1
through 25 were admitted into evidence. Respondent presented the testimony
of XXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX,
XXXXXXXXXXX, and XXXXXXXXXXXX. Respondent’s Exhibits 4, 6, and 8
through 15 were admitted into evidence. Both parties submitted proposed
final orders, which were duly considered in the preparation of this Final
Order.
Statutory references are to the 2021 codification in place at the time this
cause arose. For stylistic convenience, the undersigned will use male
pronouns in this Final Order when referring to Petitioner. The male
pronouns are neither intended, nor should be interpreted, as a reference to
Petitioner’s actual gender.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Petitioner is a XXX-grade student at School A in Respondent’s school
district. He is a student with a disability and is receiving Exceptional
Student Education (“ESE”) services under the Language Impaired (“LI”)
eligibility category.
2. Petitioner was evaluated on October 9, XXX, for initial eligibility for
ESE services.
3. On May 13, XXX, Petitioner was reevaluated for the purpose of
determining his present level of performance as he prepared to transition
from XXXXXXXXXXX to XXXXXXXXXX.
4. On January 19, XXX, Petitioner’s IEP team removed Petitioner’s then-
existing disability category of Developmentally Delayed, and the primary
exceptionality was listed as LI. Petitioner was XX years old at that time.
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5. In the classroom, Petitioner is a happy child with a lot of friends.
Petitioner has a great memory and is able to remember sight words easily.
He is in the highest-level reading group among his same-grade peers, and
scored within the top three in the district on the i-Ready reading assessment.
His i-Ready reading assessment scoring shows that he is at or above grade
level in all areas tested and ranks in the 79th percentile of students tested
nationwide. Petitioner scored lower on the Renaissance reading assessment,
in the 36th percentile and 57th percentile based, respectively, on two
different administrations of the test, but still on grade level.
6. Petitioner’s parent reported that Petitioner finds reading difficult and
that the words move on the page when Petitioner reads. However, the weight
of the evidence in the record shows that Petitioner reads at or above grade
level based on standardized assessments.
7. Petitioner does well in math and is able to reteach lessons and explain
problems to other students. He performed on a high level on the Star
diagnostic report for math—scoring between 80 and 100 percent in all areas.
On his i-Ready math assessment, Petitioner tested on grade level in all areas
and ranked in the 88th percentile of students tested nationwide. Petitioner
also took the Renaissance assessment for math on two occasions, scoring in
the 98th percentile both times.
8. Based on Petitioner’s assessment at the beginning of his XXX-grade
year, his teacher determined that he was eligible for gifted testing.
Accordingly, she sent a request for consent to Petitioner’s parent for him to be
tested for gifted eligibility, which the parent signed. Petitioner passed the
initial gifted screening.
9. Petitioner’s parent submitted a request for a “complete” reevaluation of
Petitioner to Respondent, dated September 23, XXX. The request further
specifies that the parent does not “agree with the past evaluations and
want[s] a more extensive evaluation done.” The parent’s request contained a
great deal of extraneous and confusing information, making its exact intent
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difficult to discern. The undersigned, however, finds that it is most accurately
categorized as a request for reevaluation.
10. Following the reevaluation request, Respondent attempted to work
with Petitioner to discuss the matter. Petitioner’s parent, however, declined
to meet further on the topic and opted to proceed with the present case.
11. Petitioner’s annual IEP meeting was held on December 1, XXX. As
reflected on the IEP that was developed at the meeting, all of the following
issues were discussed and are an accurate reflection of Petitioner’s current
functioning:
a. [Petitioner] did not exhibit behaviors that
impede his learning or that of others;
b. [Petitioner] is not blind or visually impaired;
c. [Petitioner] is not deaf or hard-of-hearing;
d. [Petitioner] does have communication needs that
are addressed on the IEP;
e. [Petitioner] does not require assistive technology;
f. [Petitioner] does not require instruction or the
provision of information in the areas of self-
determination and/or self-advocacy;
g. [Petitioner] is a hard worker who is kind and
respectful to adults as well as his peers;
h. in the curriculum and learning domain,
[Petitioner] is performing on or above grade level in
both Math and English/Language Arts;
i. in the social or emotional domain, [Petitioner] has
lots of friends in his class; is usually happy and is
able to work independently in class; is always willing
to help other students; and is playful with peers and
is able to initiate/reciprocate conversation with
them;
j. in the independent functioning domain,
[Petitioner] is independent with all tasks in the
classroom and is able to follow classroom procedures
and rules, navigate the school campus, open and use
school/lunch items, participate in classroom
activities appropriately, and to ask for help at times
when needed/advocate for himself in the classroom;
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k. in the healthcare domain, [Petitioner] is healthy
and requires no assistance beyond that which is
normally available to all students; and
l. in the communication domain, [Petitioner] has
made progress towards his language goal and is
recommended to continue receiving weekly language
therapy services to help improve overall language
skills.
12. In terms of ESE services, Petitioner’s IEP reflects the following:
a. [Petitioner]’s priority education needs are to
increase his social/emotional skills and improve
communication skills;
b. a communication goal that will increase his
understanding of wh- questions and vocabulary
while using complete sentences, given fading verbal
cues and/or prompts with 80% accuracy over a nine-
week period by (1) using age-appropriate
grammatical markers; (2) describing a given
object/picture; (3) sorting familiar objects and/or
pictures of items; and (4) answering whquestions
related to short stories and/or language-based
activities;
c. a social/emotional and communication goal that
will increase his production of basic sentences with
correct vocabulary to express his thoughts and
feelings to peers and adults in 8 out of 10
opportunities with 80% accuracy over the duration
of the IEP by (1) creating conversation with same
age peers; (2) participating in classroom discussions
with no more than 2 prompts; (3) producing 5-8 word
sentences for a variety of purposes; and (4)
expressing his needs/wants given fading cues;
d. specially designed instruction in the areas of
language therapy services for 120 minutes monthly
on the school campus, communication skills daily on
the school campus, and social skills daily on the
school campus;
e. classroom accommodations of verbal
encouragement and testing accommodations of
increased wait time and extended time; and
f. behavioral supports in the form of a behavior
management system.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
13. DOAH has jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject matter of
this proceeding. §§ 1003.57(1)(a) and 1003.5715(5), Fla. Stat.; Fla. Admin.
Code R. 6A-6.03311(9)(u).
14. Petitioner bears the burden of proof with respect to each of the issues
raised herein. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005).
15. Respondent is a local educational agency (“LEA”), as defined under
20 U.S.C. § 1401(19)(A). By virtue of receipt of federal funding, Respondent is
required to comply with certain provisions of the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1401, et seq. As an LEA, under the
IDEA, Respondent was required to make FAPE available to Petitioner. Sch.
Bd. of Lee Cnty. v. E.S., 561 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1291 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (citing
M.M. v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 437 F.3d 1085, 1095 (11th Cir. 2006));
M.H. v. Nassau Cnty. Sch. Bd., 918 So. 2d 316, 318 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).
16. Petitioner’s eligibility category of Developmentally Delayed was
removed by operation of law when he turned six, pursuant to section
1003.21(1)(e), Florida Statutes.
17. In enacting the IDEA, Congress sought to “ensure that all children
with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education
that emphasized special education and related services designed to meet
their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and
independent living.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A); See Phillip C. v. Jefferson
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 701 F.3d 691, 694 (11th. Cir. 2012). The statute was
intended to address the inadequate educational services offered to children
with disabilities and to combat the exclusion of such children from the public
school system. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2)(A)-(B). To accomplish these objectives,
the federal government provides funding to participating state and local
educational agencies, which is contingent on the agency’s compliance with the
IDEA’s procedural and substantive requirements. Doe v. Ala. State Dep’t of
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Educ., 915 F.2d 651, 654 (11th Cir. 1990); See also Endrew F. v. Douglas
Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017).
18. Local school systems must also satisfy the IDEA’s substantive
requirements by providing all eligible students with FAPE, which is defined
as:
Special education and related services that—
(A) have been provided at public expense, under
public supervision and direction, and without
charge;
(B) meet the standards of the State educational
agency;
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary
school, or secondary school education in the State
involved; and
(D) are provided in conformity with the
individualized education program required under
[20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)].
20 U.S.C. § 1401(9).
19. The components of FAPE are recorded in an IEP, which, among other
things, identifies the child’s present levels of academic achievement and
functional performance, establishes measurable annual goals, addresses the
services and accommodations to be provided to the child and whether the
child will attend mainstream classes, and specifies the measurement tools,
and periodic reports, that will be used to evaluate the child’s progress.
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i); 34 C.F.R. § 300.320.
20. “The IEP is the centerpiece of the statute’s education delivery system
for disabled children.” Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 994 (quoting Honig v. Doe,
484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988)). “The IEP is the means by which special education
and related services are ‘tailored to the unique needs’ of a particular child.”
Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley,
458 U.S. 176, 181 (1982)).
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21. In Rowley, the Supreme Court held that a two-part inquiry must be
undertaken in determining whether a local school system has provided a
student with FAPE. As an initial matter, it is necessary to examine whether
the school district has complied with the IDEA’s procedural requirements.
Petitioner’s parent alleges a procedural violation with respect to
Respondent’s failure to reevaluate Petitioner. The undersigned finds that
Petitioner did not prove that any procedural violation occurred, as
Respondent attempted to follow the proper protocols to work with the parent
with respect to the request for reevaluation.
22. Turning to the second step of the Rowley test, it must be determined if
the IEP developed pursuant to the IDEA is reasonably calculated to enable
the child to receive educational benefits. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-207. In
Endrew F., the Supreme Court held that, “[t]o meet its substantive obligation
under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a
child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.” 137
S. Ct. at 999. As discussed in Endrew F., “[t]he ‘reasonably calculated’
qualification reflects a recognition that crafting an appropriate program of
education requires a prospective judgment by school officials,” and that “[a]ny
review of an IEP must appreciate that the question is whether the IEP is
reasonable, not whether the court regards it as ideal.” Id.
23. The undersigned, based on a full review of the record, finds no defect
with the design of the IEP and that the IEP afforded Petitioner a FAPE.
Deference should be accorded to the reasonable opinions of the professional
educators who helped develop an IEP. Id. at 1001. In the present case,
Petitioner’s classroom teacher who testified did so reasonably and credibly as
to how Petitioner is excelling academically and even stands out as especially
capable among his peers. Further, Petitioner’s standardized assessments
show that he is performing at or above grade level in all areas tested.
24. Turning to the issue of implementation, in L.J. v. School Board of
Broward County, 927 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2019), the Eleventh Circuit Court
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of Appeals articulated the standard for claimants to prevail in a “failure-to-
implement case.” The court concluded that “a material deviation from the
plan violates the [IDEA].” L.J., 927 F.3d at 1206. The L.J. court expanded
upon this conclusion as follows:
Confronting this issue for the first time ourselves,
we concluded that to prevail in a failure-to-
implement case, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
the school has materially failed to implement a
child’s IEP. And to do that, the plaintiff must prove
more than a minor or technical gap between the plan
and reality; de minimis shortfalls are not enough. A
material implementation failure occurs only when a
school has failed to implement substantial or
significant provisions of a child’s IEP.
Id. at 1211.
25. Here, the record does not reflect a material failure to implement
Petitioner’s IEP.
26. A student’s IEP is based, in significant part, on the results of
statutorily mandated evaluations of the child. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414(b)(2)(A)(ii), (c)(1)–(2), (d)(3)(A), (d)(4)(A). Under the IDEA, a student
with a suspected disability must receive a “full and individual initial
evaluation” to determine the existence and extent of his disability and
whether he is entitled to special education and related services under the
IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1). The student is further entitled to a
“reevaluation” at least once every three years for the purpose of updating his
IEP. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2), (d)(4)(a).
27. The IDEA requires that a student’s initial evaluation and
reevaluations be comprehensive, meaning the evaluations must “use a
variety of assessment tools and strategies to gather relevant functional,
developmental, and academic information,” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2)(A), and the
school must assess the student in “all areas of suspected disability,” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414(b)(3)(B). The student’s IEP team takes the results of these evaluations
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and regularly collaborates to develop, maintain, and update the child's IEP
over the course of his education. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(A).
28. At issue here is not the initial evaluation, but rather, reevaluation.
Reevaluation requirements are set forth in Florida Administrative Code Rule
6A-6.0331(7), which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(7) Reevaluation Requirements.
(a) A school district must ensure that a
reevaluation of each student with a disability is
conducted in accordance with rules 6A-6.03011-
.0361, F.A.C., if the school district determines that
the educational or related services needs, including
improved academic achievement and functional
performance, of the student warrant a reevaluation
or if the student’s parent or teacher requests a
reevaluation.
(b) A reevaluation may occur not more than once a
year, unless the parent and the school district agree
otherwise and must occur at least once every three
(3) years, unless the parent and the school district
agree that a reevaluation is unnecessary.
(c) Each school district must obtain informed
parental consent prior to conducting any
reevaluation of a student with a disability.
29. “Consent” for purposes of a reevaluation means:
(a) the parent has been fully informed of all
information relevant to the activity for which
consent is sought, in his or her native language, or
through another mode of communication;
(b) the parent understands and agrees in writing to
the carrying out of the activity for which his or her
consent is sought, and the consent describes that
activity and lists the records (if any) that will be
released and to whom; and
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(c)(1) the parent understands that the granting of
consent is voluntary on the part of the parent and
may be revoked at any time.
34 C.F.R. § 300.9.
30. Throughout the hearing, it was apparent that Petitioner was
conflating the request for reevaluation with “consent” as defined above.
Although it is clear that the request for reevaluation was made, Petitioner
did not show that consent, as defined by law, was ever provided, making it
impossible for Respondent to move forward with reevaluation procedures. In
other words, Respondent never had the opportunity to meet with the parent
to provide the required information as to how a potential reevaluation would
be conducted so that legally sufficient consent could be provided.
31. Here, Petitioner contends that Respondent failed to appropriately
evaluate him. However, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner failed to
meet his burden of proof in establishing the same. Although Petitioner
requested to be reevaluated, the evidence in this case established that the
parent never provided consent for the reevaluation.
ORDER
Based on the for egoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
ORDERED that that all requests for relief are DENIED.
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S
DONE AND ORDERED this 30th day of March, 2023, in Tallahassee, Leon
County, Florida.
BRITTANY O. FINKBEINER
Administrative Law Judge
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060
(850) 488-9675
www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the
Division of Administrative Hearings
this 30th day of March, 2023.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Julie Illari LaKisha M. Kinsey-Sallis, Esquire
(eServed) (eServed)
Amanda W. Gay, Esquire Michael Newsome, M.Ed.
(eServed) (eServed)
Petitioner Andrew King, General Counsel
(eServed) (eServed)
Addison Davis, Superintendent
(eServed)
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
This decision is final unless, within 90 days after the date of this decision, an
adversely affected party:
a) brings a civil action in the appropriate state
circuit court pursuant to section 1003.57(1)(c),
Florida Statutes (2014), and Florida Administrative
Code Rule 6A-6.03311(9)(w); or
b) brings a civil action in the appropriate district
court of the United States pursuant to 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(2), 34 C.F.R. § 300.516, and Florida
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Administrative Code Rule 6A-6.03311(9)(w).
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