Marion | Case 08-0096E | 2008-08-06
Florida special education due-process decision
- Case number
- 08-0096E
- Date
- August 6, 2008
- Parties / district (official listing)
- Marion
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Decision text
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Marion County School District
No. 08-0096e
Initiated By: Parent
Hearing Officer: T. Kent Wetherell, II
Date Of Final Order: August 6, 2008
STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
***,
Petitioner,
vs.
MARION COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,
Respondent.
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Case No. 08-0096E
FINAL ORDER
A duly-noticed due process hearing was held in this case by
Administrative Law Judge T. Kent Wetherell, II, on July 7 and 8,
2008, in Ocala, Florida.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: ***
Address of record
For Respondent: Andrew B. Thomas, Esquire
1625 Lakeside Drive
Deland, Florida 32720-3037
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The issues are (1) whether Petitioner should be placed in a
full-time gifted program, and (2) whether Petitioner should be
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evaluated and classified under the "other health impairment”
disability category.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On or about January 2, 2008, Petitioner filed a due process
hearing request with the Marion County School Board (School
Board). On January 7, 2008, the School Board referred the
request to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH). The
case was initially assigned to Administrative Law Judge
Don W. Davis.
A telephonic pre-hearing conference was held on January 14,
2008. The following day, Judge Davis issued a Notice of Hearing
scheduling the due process hearing for March 12 and 13, 2008.
The Notice of Hearing framed the issues for the hearing as
follows: “(A) Should Petitioner be included in the Millennium
program, a full-time gifted program, at the elementary school
level; and (B) should diagnosis, evaluation and accommodation be
afforded to Petitioner for learning disabilities or handicap?”
On March 5, 2008, the final hearing was cancelled by
Judge Davis based upon the School Board’s motion because
Petitioner’s mother, ***, refused to make herself available for
deposition. The Order Granting Continuance entered by Judge
Davis gave *** until April 6, 2008, to make herself available
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for deposition, and directed the School Board to file a status
report on April 15, 2008.
The Status Report filed on April 15, 2008, identified
several “mutually-acceptable dates” for the final hearing,
including June 4, 2008. The Status Report also quoted an e-mail
from *** stating that she did not intend to present any
witnesses or evidence on the issues framed by the Notice of
Hearing issued by Judge Davis.
On May 5, 2008, the case was transferred to the undersigned
due to Judge Davis’ impending retirement. The following day,
May 6, 2008, the undersigned entered an Order to Show Cause
directing Petitioner to “advise the undersigned in writing as to
why DOAH’s file in this case should not be closed based upon
[***’s] stated intent not to present any evidence on the issues
in the due process hearing request over which DOAH has
jurisdiction.” The Order also directed the parties to reserve
June 4, 2008, on their calendars for the hearing.
On May 12, 2008, Petitioner filed a response to the Order
to Show Cause. The response expressed a desire to proceed to
hearing, but indicated that Petitioner was no longer available
for hearing on June 4, 2008. Therefore, on May 13, 2008, the
undersigned entered an Order directing the parties to confer as
to the length of time needed for the final hearing. The Order
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identified several dates that the undersigned was available for
the hearing during the periods proposed by Petitioner.
Based upon the parties’ responses to the Order, the hearing
was scheduled for July 7 and 8, 2008. The Notice of Hearing
framed the issues for the hearing as set forth above in the
Statement of the Issues. See Order entered May 13, 2008, at
page 2.
At the hearing, *** testified on behalf of Petitioner, and
the School Board presented the testimony of John McCollum.
Exhibits P1 through P24, P29, and P30, and R1 through R3, were
received into evidence. Exhibits P25 through P28, P31, and P32
were offered but not received.
*** represented Petitioner at the hearing. She was
accompanied and advised throughout the hearing by Linda D.
Montalbano, a non-lawyer. *** sought to have Ms. Montalbano
represent Petitioner at the hearing, but Ms. Montalbano was not
permitted to do so because she refused to comply with Florida
Administrative Code Rules 6A-6.03311(11)(e)1.a. and 28-106.106
concerning qualified representatives. Absent compliance with
those rules, Ms. Montalbano’s representation of Petitioner would
have constituted the unauthorized practice of law. See
In re
Arons, 756 A.2d 867 (Del. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1065
(2001); Victoria L. v. District School Bd. of Lee County, 741 F.
2d 369, 373 (11th Cir 1984), disapproved on other grounds, Honig
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v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988). And cf. Federal Register, Vol. 73,
No. 93, at 27692-93 (May 13, 2008) (proposing amendments to 34
C.F.R. Section 300.512 to codify the principle that non-lawyer
representation at due process hearings is not authorized by
IDEA, but rather is governed by state law).
The parties agreed to the following deadlines at the
conclusion of the due process hearing: transmittal of the
Transcript to the parties by the court reporter by July 18,
2008; filing of Proposed Final Orders (PFOs) no later than
July 28, 2008; and issuance of the Final Order on or before
August 6, 2008.
The two-volume Transcript of the due process hearing was
filed with DOAH on July 21, 2008. The School Board filed a PFO
on July 29, 2008, and Petitioner filed a “Legal Brief” on that
same date. The parties’ post-hearing filings have been given
due consideration.
1/
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Petitioner is almost *** years old and will be in the
seventh grade in the upcoming 2008-09 school year.
2. Petitioner had fever-induced seizures on two prior
occasions. The first occurred when Petitioner was nine months
old, and the second, and most recent, occurred more than five
years ago, when Petitioner was seven years old. Neither of the
seizures occurred in a school environment.
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3. Petitioner presented no credible evidence that children
who have experienced fever-induced seizures typically require
special accommodations in school. Indeed, although hearsay, one
of the documents from the Internet presented by Petitioner
discussing febrile illness states that “[c]hildren who
experience febrile seizures have no related difficulties with
their performance at school . . . .”
4. Petitioner has been in the public school system in
Marion County since at least the first grade.
5. Petitioner’s mother, ***, did not have any issues with
how the school system treated Petitioner until the Petitioner
was in the fourth grade at *** Elementary School.
6. Petitioner’s fourth grade teacher kept the temperature
in the classroom elevated and refused to allow the students to
drink water during class, which, according to ***, put
Petitioner at risk of having a fever-induced seizure.
7. After *** complained to the school principal about the
situation, the teacher adjusted the classroom temperature to a
cooler setting and allowed the students to get water from the
fountain in her classroom and from water bottles that the
students brought to class.
8. Petitioner did not have any seizures during fourth
grade, but according to ***, Petitioner suffered headaches,
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emotional injuries, and cognitive decline as a result of the
teaching style of the fourth grade teacher.
9. No credible evidence was presented to support ***’s
claim that Petitioner was adversely affected by experiences in
fourth grade.2/
10. Petitioner performed well academically in the fourth
grade, scoring at the highest level -- a five -- on the reading
and math portions of the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test
(FCAT) and receiving A’s in Language Arts, Math, Science, and
Social Studies and a B in Reading.
11. Petitioner was accused of cheating during fifth
grade.3/ The elementary school principal summarized the incident
as follows in Petitioner’s student record:
[Petitioner] wrote the process for how to
solve a problem on an [exam] and passed it
to another student. [Petitioner] did not
receive answers to put on the test for
[Petitioner]. I feel [Petitioner] has
learned from this unfortunate incident and
will be extremely surprised if this will
ever occur again. This is a fine [student]
that has not had a history of prior
referrals.
12. Cheating is considered a “Level 2 disciplinary
referral” under the school system’s student conduct code.
13. Petitioner was given a one-day in-school suspension
for the incident, and the note quoted above was put into the
Petitioner’s student record. Also, according to ***, Petitioner
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was not allowed to go on the fifth grade field trip and did not
receive academic and attendance awards that year that had been
earned.
14. Petitioner performed well academically in the fifth
grade, scoring a five on the math portion of the FCAT and a four
on the reading portion, and receiving A’s in all core academic
courses.
15. Petitioner applied for admission into the “magnet
program” at *** Middle School (***) for sixth grade. One of the
requirements for admission into the program was that the student
has had “no previous level 2 or 3 disciplinary referrals.”
16. Petitioner’s application for the *** program was
denied based, at least in part, on the disciplinary referral
from cheating incident in fifth grade.
17. Petitioner attended *** Middle School (***) starting
in sixth grade. *** is the middle school that Petitioner is
zoned to attend.
18. Petitioner was in the gifted program in elementary
school and was placed in the gifted program at ***.
19. It is undisputed that Petitioner meets the eligibility
criteria for the gifted program.
20. A Gifted Education Plan (GEP) was prepared for
Petitioner in October 2007 to cover Petitioner’s middle school
years. The GEP is valid through October 2010.
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21. *** was fully involved in the preparation of the GEP,
notwithstanding her claims that she has been “blacklisted” by
the school district.4/ She and Petitioner both signed the GEP.
22. The GEP requires Petitioner to be placed in regular
education classes “which may or may not be advanced level
classes,” and also requires Petitioner to receive specialized
instruction in a gifted classroom on a daily basis.
23. *** does not have a “full-time” gifted program. The
school offers a number of advanced and honors courses, but the
only gifted class offered is Language Arts.
24. *** does not have a “full-time” gifted program either,
as *** seems to believe.5/ Indeed, the more persuasive evidence
presented at the due process hearing establishes that the only
material difference in the gifted programs at *** and *** is
that the gifted class offered at *** is Social Studies, rather
than Language Arts.
25. As required by the GEP, Petitioner was placed in the
gifted Language Arts class in sixth grade, and the *** principal
credibly testified that Petitioner will be placed in the gifted
Language Arts class in seventh grade. The remainder of
Petitioner’s seventh grade schedule consists of an honors class
(high school level Algebra I), advanced classes (Social Studies
and Science), and two electives.
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26. Petitioner performed well academically at *** in sixth
grade, and received A’s in every course, except for Language
Arts in which Petitioner received a B, and scored a five on both
the math and reading portions of the FCAT.
27. Petitioner presented no persuasive evidence of any
deficiencies in the GEP or Petitioner’s current placement at
***.
28. The disciplinary referral resulting from the cheating
incident in fifth grade will not affect Petitioner’s future
educational opportunities and placements, as *** seems to
believe.
29. Petitioner has been allowed to participate in all
extracurricular activities at *** despite the disciplinary
referral. Moreover, the *** principal credibly testified that
he does not normally look at a student’s disciplinary history at
previous schools and that he would not have even known about the
cheating incident if *** had not told him about it.
30. Petitioner has had very few absences over the past
several school years, and a history of fever-induced seizures
has not prevented Petitioner from running track and cross-
country at *** or playing in the school’s marching band.
31. Petitioner is clearly making meaningful educational
progress in the current educational placement. Not only is
Petitioner advancing from grade to grade, but is doing so with
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A’s and B’s in gifted and advanced-level classes and is scoring
well above grade level on the FCAT.
32. There is no reason to suspect that Petitioner has any
disability or condition adversely affecting Petitioner’s
educational performance. Indeed, although hearsay, the May 2008
report from Shands Children’s Hospital states that the
“available data shows [Petitioner’s] performance in fine motor
area to be above average,” which would suggest that Petitioner
does not have a handwriting disorder such as dysgraphia as ***
contends. See also Endnote 2.
33. Petitioner does not need any special interventions,
accommodations, or services to make meaningful educational
progress.
34. The School Board, through counsel, agreed at the due
process hearing to convene a meeting prior to the upcoming 2008-
09 school year between *** and the teachers and staff at *** who
will have contact with Petitioner to discuss ***’s concerns
about Petitioner’s fever-induced seizure condition. For this
meeting to be productive, and to be sure that the school knows
precisely what to do for Petitioner, *** should bring a current
diagnosis from Petitioner’s doctor explaining what specific
precautions and treatments he recommends based upon Petitioner’s
fever-induced seizure condition.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Jurisdiction and Burden of Proof
35. DOAH has jurisdiction over the parties to and subject
matter of this proceeding as described below.
36. DOAH has jurisdiction to consider claims concerning
the “identification, evaluation, and placement, or lack
thereof,” of exceptional students, as well as related claims
arising under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA). See
§ 1003.57(1)(e), Fla. Stat. 6/; Fla. Admin. Code R.
6A-6.03311(11), 6A-6.03313(7); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.503(a)(1) and
(2), 300.507(a), 300.511.
37. DOAH also has jurisdiction to consider claims
concerning the discipline of students with disabilities. See
Fla. Admin. Code R. 6A-6.03312(1)(k). However, the discipline
imposed on Petitioner for the cheating incident in fifth grade
does not implicate this jurisdiction because the one-day in-
school suspension did not result in a “change of placement” as a
matter of law. See
Fla. Admin. Code R. 6A-6.03312(1)(a)1.,
(1)(l), (3) (manifestation determination is only required if the
student is being removed from his current educational placement
for more than 10 days); 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(b), (c), (e) (same).
Moreover, at the time of the cheating incident, Petitioner was
only classified as a gifted student, not a “student with a
disability” or “child with a disability,” which are the terms
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used in the rules giving DOAH jurisdiction over discipline
claims. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 6A-6.03312; 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.530.
38. DOAH does not have jurisdiction to consider claims
arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, or the Family
Education Records and Privacy Act. Petitioner’s claims under
those laws were expressly not considered in this proceeding.
See
Orders entered May 6 and May 9, 2008; Notice of Hearing
dated May 28, 2008.
39. Petitioner, as the party seeking relief in this
proceeding, has the burden of proof. See Schaffer v. Weast, 546
U.S. 49, 62 (2005); M. M. v. School Board of Miami-Dade County,
437 F. 3d 1085, 1097 n.8 (11th Cir. 2006).
B. Eligibility for a Gifted Program
40. Section 1003.01(3)(a), Florida Statutes, defines
"exceptional student" to include “students who are gifted.”
41. There is no corresponding inclusion of gifted students
in the IDEA and, therefore, the determination as to whether
Petitioner is eligible for special education services as a
gifted student is determined by Florida law, not the IDEA.
42. A “gifted” student is one who has superior
intellectual development and is capable of high performance.
See Fla. Admin. Code R. 6A-6.03019(1), (2)(a).
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43. It is undisputed that Petitioner meets the criteria
for classification as a gifted student.
44. The school district is required to develop and
implement a GEP for each gifted student. See Fla. Admin. Code
R. 6A-6.030191.
45. Petitioner has a GEP. Petitioner and *** participated
in the development of the GEP, and no credible evidence was
presented concerning any deficiencies in the GEP.
46. The GEP was properly implemented by *** during
Petitioner’s sixth grade year, and the *** principal credibly
testified that the GEP will be implemented in accordance with
its terms in the upcoming seventh grade school year.
C. Evaluation for an Other Health Impairment
47. Petitioner contends that the School Board violated
“child find” by not evaluating Petitioner for a disability, and
that Petitioner should be classified as a child with a
disability under “other health impairment” category based upon
Petitioner’s history of fever-induced seizures and/or
handwriting problems.
48. “Child find” does not require school districts to
evaluate every child for a disability; it only requires
evaluation of children who are suspected having a disability
that requires special education services. See 20 U.S.C.
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§ 1412(a)(3); 34 C.F.R. § 300.311; Fla. Admin. Code R. 6A-
6.0331.
49. If there is no reason to suspect that a student is a
“child with a disability” under the IDEA or an “exceptional
student” under Florida law, there is no need for the school
district to evaluate the child. See, e.g., Hoffman v. East Troy
Community School District, 38 F. Supp. 2d 750, 766 (E.D. Wisc.
1999) (citing cases); McMullen County Independent School
District, 49 IDELR 118 (Texas SEA 2007) (“The IDEA requires a
two-prong analysis for determining whether a child should be
identified and referred for special education services. First,
the student must have a specific physical or mental impairment
identified through an appropriate evaluation. Identifying an
impairment does not alone satisfy the eligibility test under
Part B of the IDEA. Second, the district must have reason to
suspect the student is in need of special education services.
This is usually determined by the student's inability to
progress in a regular education program.”); Fla. Admin. Code R.
6A-6.0331(2) (requiring school district to attempt to address
any areas of concern in the general educational environment
before evaluating the student for a disability).
50. Section 300.8 of the IDEA regulations define “child
with a disability” to mean a child manifesting one or more
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specifically listed impairments who, by reason of the
impairment, needs special education and related services.
51. One of the impairments listed in Section 300.8 of the
IDEA regulations is “other health impairment,” which is defined
to mean:
having limited strength, vitality, or
alertness, including a heightened alertness
to environmental stimuli, that results in
limited alertness with respect to the
educational environment, that
(i) Is due to chronic or acute health
problems such as asthma, attention deficit
disorder or attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder, diabetes, epilepsy, a heart
condition, hemophilia, lead poising,
leukemia, nephritis, rheumatic fever, sickle
cell anemia, and Tourrette syndrome; and
(ii) Adversely affects a child’s
educational performance.
34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(9) (emphasis supplied).
52. Florida law includes a similar definition of “other
health impaired”:
Other health imparied means having limited
strength, vitality or alertness due to
chronic or acute health problems such as a
heart condition, tuberculosis, rheumatic
fever, nephritis, asthma, sickle cell
anemia, hemophilia, epilepsy, lead
poisoning, leukemia, or diabetes that
adversely affect a child’s educational
performance.
Fla. Admin. Code R. 6A-6.03015(3) (empahasis supplied).
53. In Ashli v. Hawaii , 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4927, at
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** 24-25 (D. Hawaii 2007), the court explained that
whether a student's disability ‘adversely
affects’ his ‘educational performance’
refers to the student's ability to perform
in a regular classroom designed for non-
handicapped students. If a student is able
to learn and perform in the regular
classroom taking into account his particular
learning style without specially designed
instruction, the fact that his health
impairment may have a minimal adverse effect
does not render him eligible for special
education services.
54. Similarly, in Katherine S. v. Umbach , 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2523, at *38 (M.D. Ala. 2002), the court explained that
“the IDEA generally requires a showing of ‘actual impact of the
disabling condition on any area of education as expected to be
provided within a public school context.’ The law does not
permit a finding of entitlement to special education and related
services when the student has not demonstrated an inability to
learn in the public school context.”
55. These decisions are consistent with the general
principles announced in Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176 (1985), that the purpose of the IDEA is to provide a “basic
floor of opportunity,” not “potential-maximizing education”;
that “meaningful educational benefit” must be provided to the
child; and that the child’s ability to advance from grade to
grade in the regular curriculum is “an important factor in
determining educational benefit.” Accord
School Board of Martin
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County v. A.S., 727 So. 2d 1071,1074 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
56. No credible evidence was presented to show that
Petitioner has a health impairment that adversely affects
Petitioner’s educational performance. There is no credible
evidence that Petitioner has a handwriting disorder such as
dysgraphia, and to the extent that the history of fever-induced
seizures is a qualifying medical condition under the “other
health impaired” category, there is no evidence whatsoever that
the condition adversely affects Petitioner’s educational
performance. To the contrary, the more persuasive evidence
presented at the hearing establishes that Petitioner is
performing exceptionally well in school.
57. In sum, there was no reason to suspect that Petitioner
is a child with a disability (under the IDEA) or an exceptional
student (under Florida law) by virtue of an “other health
impairment,” and there is no reason for the School Board to
evaluate Petitioner for classification under that disability
category.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, it is
ORDERED that:
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1. Petitioner shall continue to be classified as gifted
and receive the services reflected in the current Gifted
Education Plan at *** Middle School.
2. Respondent shall convene a meeting between *** and the
appropriate teachers and staff at *** Middle School prior to the
upcoming 2008-09 school year as it agreed to do at the due
process hearing (See
Finding of Fact ¶34).
3. All other relief sought in the due process hearing
request -- including the evaluation and classification of
Petitioner as “other health impaired” -- is denied.
DONE AND ORDERED this 6th day of August, 2008, in
Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
S
______________________________________________________________________________
T. KENT WETHERELL, II
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Administrative Hearings
The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060
(850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675
Fax Filing (850) 921-6847
www.doah.state.fl.us
Filed with the Clerk of the
Division of Administrative Hearings
this 6th day of August, 2008.
1/ Petitioner’s “Legal Brief” includes information that was not
presented as evidence at the due process hearing. None of that
information has been considered because the undersigned’s
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decision must be based “solely on information presented during
the hearing.” See Fla. Admin. Code R. 6A-6.03311(11)(i)10.
2/ Although the medical reports presented by Petitioner were
hearsay that cannot support a finding of fact, it is noteworthy
that the reports contradict ***’s claims. For example, the May
2006 report from Shands HealthCare (Exhibit P11) noted that a
CAT scan of Petitioner done in late 2005 was normal and the
report recommended no further investigation or treatment of
Petitioner; a March 2008 report (Exhibit P12) stated that no
significant abnormalities were identified in an MRI scan of
Petitioner; and the May 2008 report from Shands Children’s
Hospital (Exhibit P13) states that no significant decline in
Petitioner’s cognitive abilities were shown in the current
testing and that Petitioner did not need any more medical
investigation.
3/ *** contends that Petitioner was falsely accused and unfairly
disciplined for the incident even though, according to a
subsequent review of the incident, Petitioner admitted to the
misconduct and *** was given the opportunity to draft a
“rebuttal” to be included with the disciplinary referral in
Petitioner’s student record. See
Exhibit P7, at 5. The
justification for, and reasonableness of the discipline imposed
on Petitioner are beyond the scope of this proceeding. See
Conclusion of Law ¶37. The incident is discussed in this Final
Order simply to provide context for other claims raised by
Petitioner.
4/ *** presented significant testimony at the hearing regarding
the procedures that the school district requires her to follow
in communicating with school officials, which according to ***,
make it difficult for her to participate in her children’s
education. The September 2007 letter from the Superintendent
outlining the procedures –- which *** refers to as the
“blacklisting letter” –- states in part:
I regret that these measures are necessary;
however occasionally we have to utilize such
procedures when a person’s interaction with
the school system presents a significant
interruption to personnel, students and
parents. . . . .
During the past, we have made a sincere
effort to address your concerns, but to no
avail. Your increasingly frequent visits to
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School Board offices and schools, with the
resulting interruption of personnel, gives
us no choice. These provisions are in
effect until further notice. I will review
the issue periodically to determine if the
procedures should be modified based upon
your interim behavior. . . . . .
Exhibit P18, at 3. The justification for, and reasonableness of
the procedures imposed on *** by the school district is beyond
the scope of the undersigned’s jurisdiction.
5/ See, e.g., Petitioner’s “Legal Brief,” at 14-15. It is also
interesting to note that although *** apparently wants
Petitioner to have a choice of attending ***, she never gave a
straight answer when she was asked at the due process hearing
whether she wants Petitioner to be placed in the gifted program
at *** rather than ***. See Transcript, at 129-37.
6/ All statutory references are to the 2007 version of the
Florida Statutes, unless otherwise indicated.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Andrew B. Thomas, Esquire
1625 Lakeside Drive
Deland, Florida 32720-3037
Kim C. Komisar, Section Administrator
Bureau of Exceptional Education
and Student Services
Department of Education
325 West Gaines Street, Suite 614
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
***
(Address of record)
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
This decision is final unless an adversely affected party:
a) brings a civil action within 90 days in
the appropriate federal district court
pursuant to Section 1415(i)(2) of the
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Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA); [Federal court relief is not
available under IDEA for students whose only
exceptionality is "gifted"] or
b) brings a civil action within 90 days in
the appropriate state circuit court pursuant
to Section 1415(i)(2) of the IDEA and
Section 1003.57(1)(e), Florida Statutes; or
c) files an appeal within 30 days in the
appropriate state district court of appeal
pursuant to Sections 120.68 and
1003.57(1)(e), Florida Statutes.
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