Palm Beach | Case 26-1278E | 2026-07-13
Florida special education due-process decision
- Case number
- 26-1278E
- Date
- 7/13/26
- Parties / district (official listing)
- Palm Beach
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Decision text
Page 1
STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
**,
Petitioner,
vs.
PALM BEACH COUNTY SCHOOL
BOARD,
Respondent,
and
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXX,
Intervenor.
/
Case No. 26-1278E
FINAL ORDER
This case came before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Sara Marken of
the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) for final hearing via Zoom
conference on May 26, 2026.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Petitioner, pro se
(Address of Record)
For Respondent: Laura E. Pincus, Esquire
School Board of Palm Beach County, Florida
3318 Forest Hill Boulevard, Suite C-331
West Palm Beach, Florida 33406
For Intervenor: John P. Leombruno, Esquire
Arnold Law Firm, LLC
3840 Crown Point Road, Suite B
Jacksonville, Florida 32257
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Whether the student’s individualized education plan (IEP) enables the
student to make progress in light of his circumstances;
Whether the student’s IEP appropriately considered the use of positive
behavioral interventions and supports, and other strategies, to address
behavior; and
Whether the student’s proposed educational placement provides the
student with a free and appropriate public education (FAPE).
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Petitioner filed a request for due process hearing (Complaint) with the
Palm Beach County School Board (School Board) on March 6, 2026, and the
School Board forwarded the Complaint to DOAH on March 9, 2026. The
undersigned issued a Case Management Order on March 10, 2026. On
March 24, 2026, Respondent filed a Response to the Complaint, and
Mr. Leombruno filed a notice of appearance on behalf of Intervenor,
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX. The parties mutually agreed to
attend a pre-hearing conference on April 6, 2026. The undersigned issued a
Notice of Hearing by Zoom Conference on April 8, 2026, and scheduled the
final hearing for May 26 through 28, 2026.
The und ersigned conducted the final hearing on May 26, 2026. Petitioner
presented the testimony of XXXXXXXXXXXXXX, Board-Certified Behavior
Analyst (BCBA), and Petitioner’s parent. Respondent presented the
testimony of XXXXXXXXX, teacher; XXXXXXXXXXXX, Principal;
XXXXXXX, psychologist; and XXXXXXXXX, South Regional Exceptional
Student Education (ESE) Coordinator. The undersigned admitted Petitioner’s
Exhibits 1 and 2 and Respondent’s Exhibits 1, 2, 4, 7, and 10 into evidence.
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At the conclusion of the due process hearing, the parties agreed to file
proposed final orders no later than ten business days after the transcript was
filed, and that the undersigned would issue the Final Order ten business
days after the proposed final orders were filed. The Transcript of the due
process hearing was filed on June 10, 2026. Accordingly, the proposed final
orders were due by June 24, 2026, and this Final Order is due by July 13,
2026, because of the extended Fourth of July holiday. Both parties timely
filed proposed final orders, and the undersigned considered each in drafting
this Final Order.
Unless otherwise indicated, all rule and statutory references refer to the
version in effect at the time of the alleged violations. For stylistic
convenience, the undersigned uses male pronouns in this Final Order when
referring to Petitioner. The male pronouns neither intend, nor should anyone
interpret them, as a reference to Petitioner’s actual gender.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. At the time of the due process hearing, the student was a XXXXXXXX
student at XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX.
He is eligible for ESE services in the category of Language Impaired (LI).
2. XXXXXXXXXXX is a XXXXXXXX through XXXXXXXX school. The
school offers some ESE services, but it does not have a separate ESE
classroom. XXXXXXXXXXX staff described its service delivery model as an
80/20 model, under which students receiving ESE services spent no more
than 20% of their instructional time outside the general education classroom.
3. The student began XXXXXXXXX at XXXXXXXXXXX on August 10,
XXX. He enrolled with an IEP that had been developed while he attended
XXXXXXXXXX, before he withdrew from the public school system. By the
time he enrolled at XXXXXXXX, the IEP was no longer current, and the IEP
team convened on September 16, XXX, to develop a new IEP.
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4. From the student’s enrollment through the September IEP meeting, the
student exhibited behavioral concerns that impeded his education. These
included aggression, tantrums, off-task behavior, difficulty maintaining
attention, impulsivity, refusal to participate in classroom activities, difficulty
transitioning between activities, and disruptive classroom behaviors.
5. During the IEP meeting, the team continued the student’s eligibility
under the LI category and developed new annual goals. The team discussed
the student’s language, academic, and behavioral needs, including
maladaptive behaviors that interfered with his ability to function successfully
in the classroom. To address the student’s behavioral needs, the IEP added
behavioral interventions targeting the student’s ability to remain in
designated areas and follow one-step directions, as well as support
facilitation to improve his independent functioning and social skills. The IEP
also included 90 minutes of language therapy per week.
6. Despite the services and interventions included in the September IEP
meeting, the student continued to exhibit maladaptive behaviors. The
student’s behavior led to several disciplinary referrals, including one that
resulted in a one-day out-of-school suspension.
7. T
he school held a Manifestation Determination Review (MDR) meeting
on November 13, XXX. The MDR team reviewed the multiple disciplinary
referrals and considered whether the conduct resulted from his language
disability. The parent maintained that the conduct resulted from the
student’s language impairment. XX expressed that XX was working toward
obtaining a Registered Behavior Technician (RBT) to assist the student at
school. The school-based team disagreed with the parent and concluded that
the conduct was not a manifestation of the student’s disability.
8. T
he following month, the school convened a reevaluation meeting to
consider additional assessments based on the student’s continued behavioral
concerns. During the meeting, the school sought the parent’s consent to
evaluate the student for Emotional/Behavioral Disability (EBD) and
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Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), as well as to conduct a Functional
Behavioral Assessment (FBA). The parent requested an opportunity to
review the evaluation documents before providing consent and ultimately did
not provide written consent for the proposed evaluations.
9. At the meeting, the parent expressed XX willingness to consent only to
the FBA. Still, school personnel explained that the School Board was
required to evaluate the student in all areas of suspected disability and,
therefore, could not proceed with only part of the proposed evaluations.
School personnel subsequently attempted to obtain the parent’s written
consent on multiple occasions via email, telephone, and in person, but the
parent never provided it.
10. On March 2, XXX, the school convened an IEP meeting. Before the
meeting, XXXXX, an ESE resource teacher, and other members of the IEP
team conducted classroom observations of the student. XXXXXXXX
observed that the student struggled to follow directions, initiate academic
tasks, remain on task, and stay in his assigned area. XX further observed
that he repeatedly called out during instruction and frequently wandered
throughout the classroom. The remaining observers reported substantially
similar behaviors.
11. D
uring the IEP meeting, the team reviewed the student’s present
levels of academic achievement and functional performance based on
classroom observations, Response to Intervention (RtI) data, academic
progress, and behavioral data. The team discussed the student’s needs and
developed annual goals addressing his academic, social, communication, and
independent functioning skills. The team also reviewed and revised the
student’s accommodations on his IEP.
12. The IEP team further discussed the student’s continued behavioral
difficulties in the general education classroom. Based on the student’s
ongoing need for behavioral and academic support, the team determined that
the student required increased ESE services and a smaller, more supportive
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educational setting. Under the proposed IEP, the student would receive the
majority of his instruction in an ESE classroom.
13. T he IEP team therefore recommended placement at
XXXXXXXXXXXX, a School Board-operated school capable of implementing
the March 2, XXX, IEP. The parent participated in the meeting virtually and
agreed with the student’s present levels of performance, annual goals,
accommodations, and proposed services. However, after the team
recommended changing the student’s placement from XXXXXXXXXXX to
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX, the parent objected to the proposed placement.
The parent expressed concern about removing the student from XXXXXX
XXXXX, where he had established relationships with his peers and teachers,
and declined to consent to the proposed change in placement.
14. The better evidence did not establish that the student’s March XXX
was inappropriate, that the IEP failed to consider positive behavioral
supports and interventions, or that the proposed placement at XXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX denied the student FAPE.
C
ONCLUSIONS OF LAW
15. DOAH has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this
proceeding pursuant to sections 1003.57(1)(c) and 1003.5715(5), Florida
Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-6.03311(9)(u).
16. The burden of proof is on Petitioner to prove the claims by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005);
Loren F. v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 349 F.3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 2003);
Devine v. Indian River Cnty. Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2001).
17. Congress passed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA) “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a
free appropriate public education [FAPE] that emphasize[s] special education
and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare
them for further education, employment, and independent living.” 20 U.S.C.
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§ 1400(d)(1)(A); Phillip C. ex rel. A.C. v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 701 F.3d
691, 694 (11th Cir. 2012).
18. In enacting the IDEA, Congress sought to “ensure that all children
with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education
that emphasized special education and related services designed to meet
their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment,
and independent living.” Id. The statute was intended to address the
inadequate educational services offered to children with disabilities and
to combat the exclusion of such children from the public-school system.
20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2)(A)-(B). To accomplish these objectives, the federal
government provides funding to participating state and local educational
agencies, contingent on each agency’s compliance with the IDEA’s procedural
and substantive requirements. Doe v. Ala. State Dep’t of Educ., 915 F.2d 651,
654 (11th Cir. 1990).
19. The IDEA provides parents and children with disabilities with
substantial procedural safeguards. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,
205-06 (1982). Among other protections, parents can examine their child’s
records and participate in meetings concerning their child’s education;
receive written notice before any proposed change in the educational
placement of their child; and file an administrative due process complaint
about any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational
placement of their child, or the provision of FAPE. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1),
(b)(3), & (b)(6).
20. To satisfy the IDEA’s substantive requirements, school districts must
provide all eligible students with FAPE, which is defined as:
[S]pecial education services and related services
that –
(A) have been provided at public expense, under
public supervision and direction, and without
charge; (B) meet the standards of the State
educational agency; (C) include an appropriate
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preschool, elementary school, or secondary school
education in the State involved; and (D) are provided
in conformity with the individualized education
program required under [20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)].
20 U.S.C. § 1401(9).
21. The components of FAPE are recorded in an IEP, which, among other
things, identifies the child’s present levels of academic achievement and
functional performance; establishes measurable annual goals; addresses
the services and accommodations to be provided to the child and whether the
child will attend mainstream classes; and specifies the measurement tools
and periodic reports to be used to evaluate the child’s progress. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i); 34 C.F.R. § 300.320. “The IEP is the centerpiece of the
statute’s education delivery system for disabled children.” Endrew F. v.
Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 994 (2017) (quoting Honig v.
Doe, 108 S. Ct. 592 (1988)). “The IEP is the means by which special education
and related services are ‘tailored to the unique needs’ of a particular child.”
Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 181).
22. In Endrew F., the Supreme Court held that “[t]o meet its substantive
obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated
to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s
circumstances.” Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999. As discussed in Endrew F.,
“[t]he ‘reasonably calculated’ qualification reflects a recognition that crafting
an appropriate program of education requires a prospective judgment by
school officials,” and that “[a]ny review of an IEP must appreciate that the
question is whether the IEP is reasonable, not whether the court regards it as
ideal.” Id.
23. Most importantly, the IDEA provides that an IEP must be
individualized to the student and include measurable annual goals and
services designed to meet each of the educational needs that result from the
student’s disability. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II); Alex R. v. Forrestville
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Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. #221, 375 F.3d 603, 613 (7th Cir. 2004)
(explaining that an IEP must respond to all significant facets of the student’s
disability, both academic and behavioral); CJN v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs.,
323 F.3d 630, 642 (8th Cir. 2003) (“We believe, as the district court did, that
the student’s IEP must be responsive to the student’s specific disabilities.”).
24. In this case, the March XXX IEP included all of the required
components— present levels of academic achievement performance,
measurable annual goals, specially designed instruction, related services, and
a placement determination. The evidence further established that the IEP
appropriately increased the student’s behavioral supports in response to his
continued difficulties in the general education setting. Accordingly, the
March XXX IEP was reasonably calculated to allow the student to make
progress in light of his circumstances.
25. Petitioner also alleges that the March XXX IEP failed to appropriately
consider the use of positive behavioral interventions, supports, and other
strategies to address the student’s behavior. The IDEA provides that, “[i]n
the case of a child whose behavior impedes the child’s learning or that of
others, [the IEP must] consider the use of positive behavioral interventions
and supports, and other strategies, to address that behavior.” 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.324. It is undisputed that the student’s behavior impeded his learning.
T
o address those needs, the IEP team recommended a more supportive
educational setting that offered increased ESE services, additional behavioral
interventions and supports, and a smaller classroom environment.
26. F inally, Petitioner alleges that the proposed placement does not
provide the student with a FAPE. Because the undersigned has already
concluded that the March XXX IEP is reasonably calculated to provide the
student with FAPE, and because it is undisputed that XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXX can implement the IEP as written, the remaining issue is whether the
proposed placement satisfies the IDEA’s least restrictive environment (LRE)
requirement.
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27. The IDEA provides directives on students’ placements or education
environments in the school system. Specifically, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A)
provides, as follows:
Least restrictive environment.
(A) In general. To the maximum extent appropriate,
children with disabilities, including children in
public or private institutions or other care facilities,
are educated with children who are not disabled, and
special classes, separate schooling, or other removal
of children with disabilities from the regular
educational environment occurs only when the
nature or severity of the disability of a child is such
that education in regular classes with the use of
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved
satisfactorily.
28. With the LRE directive, “Congress created a statutory preference for
educating [disabled] children with [nondisabled] children.” Greer v. Rome
City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 695 (11th Cir. 1991). “By creating a statutory
preference for mainstreaming, Congress also created a tension between two
provisions of the [IDEA], school districts must both seek to mainstream
[disabled] children and, at the same time, must tailor each child’s educational
placement and program to his special needs.” Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of
Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1989).
29. In Daniel, the fifth circuit set forth a two-part test for determining
compliance with the mainstreaming requirement:
First, we ask whether education in the regular
classroom, with the use of supplemental aids and
services, can be achieved satisfactorily for a given
child. See § 1412(5)(B). If it cannot and the school
intends to provide special education or to remove the
child from regular education, we ask, second,
whether the school has mainstreamed the child to
the maximum extent appropriate.
Daniel, 874 F.2d at 1048.
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30. In Greer, the eleventh circuit adopted the Daniel two-part inquiry. In
determining the first step, whether a school district can satisfactorily
educate a student in the regular classroom, several factors are to be
considered: (1) a comparison of the educational benefits the student would
receive in a regular classroom, supplemented by aids and services, with the
benefits he will receive in a self-contained special education environment;
(2) what effect the presence of the student in a regular classroom would have
on the education of other students in that classroom; and (3) the cost of
the supplemental aids and services that will be necessary to achieve a
satisfactory education for the student in a regular classroom. Greer, 950 F.2d
at 697.
31. T
he preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the student’s
maladaptive behaviors impeded his ability to access instruction in the
general education classroom and disrupted the learning environment of his
peers. Despite the implementation of behavioral interventions, support
facilitation, and accommodations, the student continued to struggle with
aggression, tantrums, impulsivity, off-task behavior, refusal to participate in
classroom activities, and difficulty following directions and remaining in his
assigned area. The March XXX IEP team, therefore, reasonably concluded
that the student required a smaller educational setting with an ESE-certified
teacher and increased specialized instruction to address his academic and
behavioral needs. Accordingly, the School Board determined that the student
could not be satisfactorily educated in the general education classroom with
supplementary aids and services alone.
32. A
dditionally, deference should be paid to the educators involved in
education and administration of the school system. A.K. v. Gwinnett Cnty.
Sch. Dist., 556 Fed. Appx. 790, 792 (11th Cir. 2014) (“In determining whether
the IEP is substantively adequate, we ‘pay great deference to the educators
who develop the IEP.’”) (quoting Todd D. v. Andrews, 933 F.2d 1576, 1581
(11th Cir. 1991)). As noted in Daniel, “[the undersigned’s] task is not to
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second-guess state and local policy decisions; rather, it is the narrow one of
determining whether state and local officials have complied with the [IDEA].”
Daniel, 874 F.2d at 1048. The credible testimony of School Board staff
established that the student’s IEP cannot be implemented at XXXXXX
XXXXX.
33. Based on the foregoing, Petitioner failed to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the March XXX IEP was not reasonably
calculated to enable the student to make progress appropriate in light of his
circumstances, that the IEP failed to consider the use of positive behavioral
interventions and supports to address the student’s behavior, or that the
proposed placement at XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX denied the student a
FAPE.
O
RDER
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
ORDERED that Petitioner failed to satisfy his burden of proof related to the
claims asserted in Petitioner’s Complaint. The requested relief is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED this 13th day of July, 2026, in Miami, Dade
County, Florida.
SCase No. 26-1278E
SARA M. MARKEN
Administrative Law Judge
DOAH Miami Office
Division of Administrative Hearings
2001 Drayton Drive
Tallahassee, Florida 32311
(850) 488-9675
www.doah.state.fl.us
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COPIES FURNISHED:
Filed with the Clerk of the
Division of Administrative Hearings
this 13th day of July, 2026.
David Chappell, General Counsel
(eServed)
Bryce D. Milton, Educational Program Director
(eServed)
Michael J. Burke, Superintendent
(eServed)
Laura E. Pincus, Esquire
(eServed)
John P. Leombruno, Esquire
(eServed)
Petitioner
(eServed)
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
This decision is final unless, within 90 days after the date of this decision, an
adversely affected party:
a) brings a civil action in the appropriate state
circuit court pursuant to section 1003.57(1)(c),
Florida Statutes (2014), and Florida Administrative
Code Rule 6A-6.03311(9)(w); or
b) brings a civil action in the appropriate district
court of the United States pursuant to 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(2), 34 C.F.R. § 300.516, and Florida
Administrative Code Rule 6A-6.03311(9)(w).
