Sarasota | Case 18-1840 | 2019-01-04

STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS **, Petitioner, vs. Case No. 18-1840E SARASOTA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, Respondent. _______________________________/ FINAL ORDER A final hearing was held in this case before Todd P. Resavage, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH), on xxxxxxxx xx, xxxx, by video teleconference at sites in Sarasota and Tallahassee, Florida. APPEARANCES For Petitioner: Petitioner, pro se (Address of Record) For Respondent: x xxxxx xxxxxx, Esquire Matthews EastmOore 1626 Ringling Boulevard, Suite 300 Sarasota, Florida 34236-6815 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES Whether Respondent failed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., by modifying Petitioner’s Individualized Education Plan (IEP) without convening the full IEP team; failed to properly implement Petitioner’s IEP as it relates to xxxxxxxxx issues; and failed to

2 properly address Petitioner’s educational placement; and, if so, to what remedy is Petitioner entitled. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT On xxxxx x, xxxx, Respondent received Petitioner’s Request for Due Process Hearing (Complaint). Petitioner’s Complaint was forwarded to DOAH on xxxxx x, xxxx, and assigned to the undersigned for all further proceedings. On xxxxx xx, xxxx, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was construed as a Notice of Insufficiency. On xxxxx xx, xxxx, the undersigned issued an Order of Insufficiency, with leave for Petitioner to amend. Petitioner filed an Amended Request for Due Process Hearing (Amended Complaint) on xxxxx xx, xxxx. Thereafter, on xxx x, xxxx, Respondent again filed a Motion to Dismiss, which the undersigned construed as a Notice of Insufficiency. On xxx x, xxxx, the undersigned issued an Order of Sufficiency, specifically delineating those claims which met the minimal IDEA pleading requirements. Said Order was never challenged and Petitioner did not file an amended complaint thereafter. Said claims are set forth immediately above in the Statement of the Issues. On xxx xx, xxxx, Respondent filed a Notice of Waiver of Resolution Session. On xxx xx, xxxx, a telephonic hearing was conducted, wherein the parties advised that they wished to engage in mediation. On xxx xx, xxxx, the undersigned issued an Order

3 granting the waiver of the resolution session and ordered that the timeline for conducting the due process hearing shall be extended pending mediation. On xxxx xx, xxxx, Respondent filed a Status Report, wherein it was indicated that mediation was scheduled for xxxx xx, xxxx. The mediation date was rescheduled on several occasions and was ultimately conducted on xxxxxxxxx xx, xxxx. As mediation was unsuccessful, a telephonic status conference was conducted on xxxxxxx x, xxxx. During the telephonic conference, Petitioner advised the undersigned that, due to xxx employment-leave availability, xxx preferred to conduct the final hearing at least 30 days from the date of the conference. Petitioner was advised that setting the final hearing at that time would be outside of the timelines for conducting the due process hearing, pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-6.03311(9). Petitioner acknowledged the same and agreed to extend the timelines for conducting the final hearing and for the issuance of the undersigned’s final order. The final hearing was scheduled for xxxxxxxx xx and xx, xxxx, and proceeded as scheduled. Despite the undersigned’s Amended Case Management Order and Notice of Hearing, Petitioner failed to disclose or provide Respondent and the undersigned with copies of proposed exhibits. During the final hearing, Petitioner was directed to provide the undersigned with several

4 exhibits during a break, at lunch, or following the conclusion of the hearing. Petitioner failed to do so. On xxxxxxxx xx, xxxx, Respondent forwarded the same to the undersigned. Petitioner’s Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 were admitted. Respondent’s Exhibits 2 through 7 were admitted. The identity of the witnesses and exhibits and rulings regarding each are as set forth in the Transcript. Based on the parties’ stipulation at the conclusion of the hearing, the parties’ proposed final orders were to be submitted on or before xxxxxxxx xx, xxxx, and the undersigned’s final order would issue on or before xxxxxxxx xx, xxxx. On xxxxxxxx xx, xxxx, Petitioner filed a Motion to Extend Time to File Proposed Order. On xxxxxxxx xx, xxxx, the undersigned granted the motion and extended the deadline to file proposed final orders to xxxxxxxx xx, xxxx, and the final order deadline was extended to xxxxxxx x, xxxx. Petitioner timely submitted a Proposed Final Order. Respondent filed an untimely Proposed Final Order. Both orders have been considered in issuing this Final Order. Unless otherwise indicated, all rule and statutory references are to the version in effect at the time of the alleged violations. For stylistic convenience, the undersigned will use xxxx pronouns in the Final Order when referring to Petitioner. The xxxx pronouns are neither intended, nor should be interpreted, as a reference to Petitioner’s actual gender.

5 FINDINGS OF FACT 1. In the xxxx-xxxx school year, Petitioner attended a xxxxxxx school in either Pinellas or Manatee County, Florida. An IEP had been previously developed for Petitioner.1/ 2. For the xxxx-xxxx school year, Petitioner transferred to Respondent’s school district and was enrolled in School A, a public xxxxxxxxxx school in xxxxxxxx County, Florida. At that time, Petitioner was xxxx years old and in xxxxxx grade. 3. The xxxx-xxxx school year began on xxxxxx xx, xxxx. Based upon the prior IEP, Respondent was aware that Petitioner had been previously determined, at some point, to be eligible for exceptional student education (ESE) services under the eligibility category of xxxxxxxxx/xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx(xxx). It is also undisputed that Petitioner has a medical diagnosis of xxxxxx. 4. On the first day of school, Respondent obtained consent from Petitioner’s xxxxxx to utilize special classroom tools (xxxxxx xxxxx, xxxxxxx xxxx, xxxxx-xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx, and a xxxx xxxxx) to address Petitioner’s xxxxxxx issues. 5. As Petitioner had not been in public school for the prior year, and did not have a current IEP, Respondent desired to convene an IEP meeting to address Petitioner’s xxxxxx needs. On xxxxxx xx, xxxx, xxxxxx xxxxx, Respondent’s ESE Liaison, contacted Petitioner’s xxxxxx by telephone and requested that xxx

6 participate in an IEP meeting on xxxxxxxxx x, xxxx. Petitioner’s xxxxxx advised that xxx would attend the meeting at the scheduled time and date. Respondent also sent home, with Petitioner, a written notice of the meeting. 6. The IEP meeting convened on xxxxxxxxx x, xxxx, as scheduled and agreed upon by Petitioner and Respondent, however, Petitioner’s xxxxxx did not appear. The school-based members of the IEP team proceeded with the meeting and an IEP was developed for Petitioner. No evidence was presented that Petitioner’s xxxxxx objected to the IEP, as drafted, or that xxx requested to reconvene the IEP due to xxx absence. 7. The xxxxxxxxx x, xxxx, IEP (xxxxxxxxx IEP) noted that Petitioner has a need for xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx interventions or xxxxxxxxxx and noted that, due to xxx disability, xx “demonstrates xxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx which impacts xxx ability to xxxxxxxxxx without xxxxxxxx within xxxxxxxxx and xxxxxx setting.” It was further noted that Petitioner “requires a xxxxx xxxxx setting with xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxx infused throughout the school day.” 8. Accordingly, Petitioner was assigned to a xxxxxxxx-xxxxx placement wherein xx would spend xxxx than xx percent of the xxxxxx week with xxx-xxxxxxxx peers. Pertinent to the issues in this matter, xxxxxxxxxx goals were documented and said goals were to be monitored by xxx xxx teacher and, at times, a xxxxxxxx

7 xxxxxxxxxx. Xx was also to receive xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxx in xxxxxx and xxxxxxxxxx skills on a xxxxx basis in xxx classroom. To facilitate the desired xxxxxxxxx, the IEP also provided accommodations and modifications such as several brief sessions; repeat, simplify, summarize, or clarify directions or instructions; xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; xx percent extended time for assignments; and frequent breaks. 9. On or about xxxxxxxxx x, xxxx, Petitioner’s xxxxxx advised xx xxxxx that the xxxxx-xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx Petitioner used were not working properly. Although the xxxxxxxxxx were the same as provided to other students with xxxxxxx issues, xx xxxxx proceeded to obtain a different set of xxxxxxxxxx from the xxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx. After this set was determined satisfactory, a separate set was ordered specifically for Petitioner. 10. On xxxxxxx x, xxxx, a parent-teacher meeting was conducted wherein Petitioner’s xxxxxx expressed concerns that Petitioner needed xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxx for xxx to complete xxx assignments and further advised that xx had been placed on a xxx xxxxxxxxxx. On this date, Petitioner’s xxxxxx advised that the xxxxx-xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx “seem to be working fine for [Petitioner].” 11. On xxxxxxx xx, xxxx, Respondent received, from Petitioner’s xxxxxx, a previously drafted xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxx

8 xxxx (xxx). On that date, Respondent requested, and Petitioner’s xxxxxx provided, consent to incorporate the xxx into the xxxxxxxxx IEP. 12. On xxxxxxx xx, xxxx, another parent-teacher conference was conducted. This conference was initiated due to an incident the prior day. On that occasion, Petitioner’s teacher had provided xxx with an academic task that Petitioner refused. Petitioner’s xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx to the point of xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx and xxxxx xxxxxxx the room and xxxxxxx. Ultimately, the room had to be xxxxxxx of other xxxxxxxx, and Petitioner was sent to the xxxxxx. 13. Various evaluations were conducted in October and November xxxx. Said evaluations included the xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx, 4th Edition, and a xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx. Also during this time period, staff at School A were compiling data to be utilized in a xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx (xxx). The unrefuted testimony established that the xxx process began at the beginning of school. 14. The data collected as part of the xxx process demonstrated that Petitioner’s xxxxxxxxx were not xxxxxx during the beginning of the year. Pursuant to the record evidence, during August, September, and part of October xxxx, Petitioner was xxxxx xx percent in all areas for xxx xxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx and xxx than xx percent for xxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx. Xxxxxx xxxx,

9 School A’s xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx, credibly testified that, initially, Petitioner had so few xxxxxxxxxx issues that xxx questioned xxx placement in a xxxxxxxx-xxxxx setting. 15. A slight increase in xxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx began at the end of October xxxx and significantly increased the first week of November xxxx. Of note, on xxxxxxxx x, xxxx, Petitioner’s xxxxxx took xxx xxx xxx xxxxxxxxxx. The undisputed evidence established that Petitioner’s xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx spiked in November and early December xxxx, resulting in xxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx. The collected data demonstrated that xxx xxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx from xxx percent to xx percent; xxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx from x percent to xx percent; xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx from xx percent to xxx percent; and xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx from x percent to x percent. From the evidence presented, it does not appear that any of the xxxxxxxxx resulted in xxxxxxxxxxx that would individually or in combination be construed as a change in Petitioner’s placement. 16. The xxx process was completed on or about xxxxxxxx xx, xxxx. After the xxx was completed, a new xxx was drafted to address Petitioner’s xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx. Petitioner’s xxxxxx testified that xxx input was not utilized in either the xxx process or the xxxxxxxx of the xxx at School A. xxx testimony is not credited. Xx xxxx credibly testified that there were multiple interactions with Petitioner’s xxxxxx throughout the xxx

10 process, and xxx testimony is corroborated inter alia by the parent-teacher conference notes. Xx xxxx further credibly testified that the xxx was in draft form as of xxxxxxxx x, xxxx; however, the meeting was not concluded. Xx xxxx credibly explained that Petitioner’s xxxxxxx opinions and information would be considered in drafting the final xxx; however, that did not occur as the meeting was not concluded. 17. For all that appears, Petitioner’s xxxxxx withdrew xxx from School A on or after xxxxxxxx xx, xxxx. It is undisputed that Petitioner and Respondent agreed to transfer Petitioner to School B, another public xxxxxxxxxx school in Respondent’s school district. Petitioner has been attending School B since January xxxx, and it is undisputed that xx is “doing well and is progressing at the current school.” 18. No evidence was presented by Petitioner to establish that the xxxxxxxxx IEP was inappropriate. Similarly, no evidence was presented by Petitioner to establish that Respondent was not implementing the xxxxxxxxx IEP while Petitioner attended School A. Petitioner also failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that the xxx was inappropriately conducted or that the xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxx employed by Respondent were inappropriate or not employed with fidelity. To the contrary, the better evidence establishes that Respondent’s implementation

11 of the xxxxxxxxxxx supports was effective in reducing Petitioner’s xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 19. DOAH has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this proceeding and the parties thereto pursuant to sections 1003.57(1)(b) and 1003.5715(5), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-6.03311(9)(u). 20. Petitioner bears the burden of proof with respect to each of the claims raised in the Complaint. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005). 21. In enacting the IDEA, Congress sought to “ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education (FAPE) that emphasized special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A); Phillip C. v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 701 F.3d 691, 694 (11th. Cir. 2012). The statute was intended to address the inadequate educational services offered to children with disabilities and to combat the exclusion of such children from the public school system. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2)(A)-(B). To accomplish these objectives, the federal government provides funding to participating state and local educational agencies, which is contingent on the agency’s compliance with the IDEA’s procedural

12 and substantive requirements. Doe v. Alabama State Dep’t of Educ., 915 F.2d 651, 654 (11th Cir. 1990). 22. Parents and children with disabilities are accorded substantial procedural safeguards to ensure that the purposes of the IDEA are fully realized. See Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205-06 (1982). Among other protections, parents are entitled to examine their child’s records and participate in meetings concerning their child’s education; receive written notice prior to any proposed change in the educational placement of their child; and file an administrative due process complaint “with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of [their] child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to such child.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6). 23. Local school systems must satisfy the IDEA’s substantive requirements by providing all eligible students with FAPE, which is defined as: Special education services that--(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) are provided in conformity

13 with the individualized education program required under [20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)]. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9). 24. “Special education,” as that term is used in the IDEA, is defined as: [S]pecially designed instruction, at no cost to parents, to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability, including–- (A) instruction conducted in the classroom, in the home, in hospitals and institutions, and in other settings . . . . 20 U.S.C. § 1401(29). 25. The components of FAPE are recorded in an IEP, which, among other things, identifies the child’s “present levels of academic achievement and functional performance”; establishes measurable annual goals; addresses the services and accommodations to be provided to the child, and whether the child will attend mainstream classes; and specifies the measurement tools and periodic reports that will be used to evaluate the child’s progress. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i); 34 C.F.R. § 300.320. “Not less frequently than annually,” the IEP team must review and, as appropriate, revise the IEP. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(i). 26. “The IEP is ‘the centerpiece of the statute’s education delivery system for disabled children.’” Endrew F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 994 (2017) (quoting Honig

14 v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 592 (1988)). “The IEP is the means by which special education and related services are ‘tailored to the unique needs’ of a particular child.” Id. (quoting Rowley, 102 S. Ct. at 3034). 27. The IDEA further provides that, in developing each child’s IEP, the IEP team must, “[i]n the case of a child whose behavior impedes the child’s learning or that of others, consider the use of positive behavioral interventions and supports, and other strategies, to address that behavior.” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i); 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(2)(i)(emphasis added). 28. In Rowley, the Supreme Court held that a two-part inquiry must be undertaken in determining whether a local school system has provided a child with FAPE. As an initial matter, it is necessary to examine whether the school system has complied with the IDEA’s procedural requirements. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-207. A procedural error does not automatically result in a denial of FAPE. See G.C. v. Muscogee Cnty. Sch. Dist., 668 F.3d 1258, 1270 (11th Cir. 2012). Instead, FAPE is denied only if the procedural flaw impeded the child’s right to FAPE, significantly infringed the parents’ opportunity to participate in the decision-making process, or caused an actual deprivation of educational benefits. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 525-26 (2007).

15 29. Here, Petitioner appears to advance two procedural claims. In a light most favorable to Petitioner, the Amended Complaint is construed as alleging that Petitioner’s IEP was modified without convening the full IEP team. Specifically, Petitioner alleges that, “I was denied involvement in [Petitioner’s] xxx evaluation and changes were made to xxx xxx reports without parent notification.” As discussed in the Findings of Fact above, Petitioner failed to present competent evidence to support said claim. 30. To the extent Petitioner is also alleging that Respondent committed a procedural violation in conducting the xxxxxxxxx IEP meeting in xxx absence, that claim is denied. Respondent has a duty to “take steps to ensure that one or both of the parents of a child with a disability are present at each IEP Team meeting or are afforded the opportunity to participate.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.321(a)(1). Respondent took the appropriate steps to notify Petitioner verbally and in writing of the purpose, time, and location of the IEP meeting, and Petitioner agreed to attend the same. Petitioner failed to present any evidence that Petitioner’s parent requested that the IEP meeting not proceed or be rescheduled due to xxx absence. Additionally, no evidence was presented that Petitioner objected, in any way, to the xxxxxxxxx IEP. Indeed, Petitioner agreed to subsequently incorporate the previous xxx into the xxxxxxxxx IEP. Accordingly, to the extent

16 said claim was a technical procedural violation, Petitioner failed to establish that the same impeded xxx right to FAPE, significantly infringed Petitioner’s xxxxxxx opportunity to participate in the decision-making process, or caused an actual deprivation of educational benefits. 31. Pursuant to the second step of the Rowley test, it must be determined if the IEP developed pursuant to the IDEA is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive “educational benefits.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07. Recently, in Endrew F., the Supreme Court addressed the “more difficult problem” of determining a standard for “when handicapped children are receiving sufficient educational benefits to satisfy the requirements of the Act.” Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 993. In doing so, the Court held that, “[t]o meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.” Id. at 999. As discussed in Endrew F., “[t]he ‘reasonably calculated’ qualification reflects a recognition that crafting an appropriate program of education requires a prospective judgment by school officials,” and that “[a]ny review of an IEP must appreciate that the question is whether the IEP is reasonable, not whether the court regards it as ideal.” Id.

17 32. The determination of whether an IEP is sufficient to meet this standard differs according to the individual circumstances of each student. For a student who is “fully integrated in the regular classroom,” an IEP should be “reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade.” Id. (quoting Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034). For a student not fully integrated in the regular classroom, an IEP must aim for progress that is “appropriately ambitious in light of [the student’s] circumstances, just as advancement from grade to grade is appropriately ambitious for most children in the regular classroom. The goals may differ, but every child should have the chance to meet challenging objectives.” Id. at 1000. 33. Here, Petitioner has not raised any claim as to the substantive propriety of the xxxxxxxxx IEP. Petitioner’s Amended Complaint is construed, however, to assert that Respondent failed to properly implement Petitioner’s IEP as it relates to xxxxxxxxxx issues. In determining whether the failure to comply with the terms of the IEP constitutes a denial of FAPE, two primary standards have been articulated. In Houston Independent School District v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 349 (5th Cir. 2000), the following standard was set forth: [A] party challenging the implementation of an IEP must show more than a de minimis failure to implement all elements of that

18 IEP, and, instead, must demonstrate that the school board or other authorities failed to implement substantial or significant provisions of the IEP. This approach affords local agencies some flexibility in implementing IEP’s, but it still holds those agencies accountable for material failure and for providing the disabled child a meaningful educational benefit. 34. Utilizing the foregoing standard, which requires proof of “substantial or significant” implementation failures, the court in Bobby R. held that the school district’s failure to provide speech services for four months——among other implementation deficiencies——did not constitute a denial of FAPE. 200 F.3d at 348-49. 35. A competing standard was set forth in Van Duyn v. Baker School District 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2007). In Van Duyn, the Ninth Circuit articulated a standard that, similar to Bobby R., requires proof of a material failure to implement the child’s IEP—that is, something more than a “minor discrepancy” between the services a school district provides and the services required by the IEP. However, in contrast to Bobby R., the court in Van Duyn held that its materiality standard “does not require that the child suffer demonstrable educational harm in order to prevail.” Id. at 822 (emphasis added). Thus, under the Van Duyn standard, a material failure to implement an IEP could constitute a FAPE denial even if, despite the failure, the child received non-trivial educational benefits.

19 36. Petitioner avers that Respondent wrote “xxxxxxxxx instead of trying to make reasonable adjustments and accommodation services to meet [Petitioner’s] disability needs.” Petitioner further avers that xx was “removed from xxx classroom into a xxxxxxx and xxxxxxxx for weeks away from xxx peers and missed countless time away from school.” Aside from the bald allegations of the Amended Complaint, Petitioner failed to present evidence of any specificity to support said claims. Under either of the above-articulated standards, the undersigned determines Petitioner did not establish a material failure to implement the IEP. 37. Finally, Petitioner’s Amended Complaint was construed as asserting that Respondent failed to properly address Petitioner’s educational placement. In addition to requiring that school districts provide students with FAPE, the IDEA further gives directives on students’ placements or education environment in the school system. Specifically, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A), provides as follows: Least restrictive environment. (A) In general. To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities, including children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of

20 the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily. 38. Pursuant to the IDEA’s implementing regulations, states must have in effect policies and procedures to ensure that public agencies in the state meet the LRE requirements. 34 C.F.R. § 300.114(a). Additionally, each public agency must ensure that a continuum of alternative placements is available to meet the needs of children with disabilities for special education and related services. 34 C.F.R. § 300.115. In turn, the Florida Department of Education has enacted rules to comply with the above-referenced mandates concerning LRE and providing a continuum of alternative placements. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 6A- 6.03028(3)(i) and 6A-6.0311(1). 39. In determining the educational placement of a child with a disability, each public agency must ensure that the placement decision is made by a group of persons, including the parents, and other persons knowledgeable about the child, the meaning of the evaluation data, and the placement options. 34 C.F.R. § 300.116(a)(1). Additionally, the child’s placement must be determined at least annually, based on the child’s IEP, and as close as possible to the child’s home. 34 C.F.R. § 300.116(b).

21 40. The evidence established at hearing clearly demonstrates that Petitioner is not challenging the educational placement as described above, but rather, the alleged delay in changing physical school locations from School A to B. Indeed, Petitioner remains in a xxxxxxxx-xxxxx placement at School B. Petitioner failed to provide any evidence that Respondent violated the IDEA in not acquiescing to a change of school location prior to January xxxx. ORDER Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is ORDERED that Petitioner’s Amended Complaint is denied in all respects. DONE AND ORDERED this 4th day of January, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S TODD P. RESAVAGE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of January, 2019.

22 ENDNOTE 1/ The IEP was not presented during the final hearing. Based on the evidentiary presentation, the xxxxxxxxx x, xxxx, IEP references both Pinellas and Manatee County, Florida. The undersigned has no knowledge of when the IEP was developed, the IEP’s contents, which school district drafted the IEP, or the IEP’s duration. COPIES FURNISHED: Petitioner (Address of Record) X xxxxx xxxxxx, Esquire Matthews Eastmoore Suite 300 1626 Ringling Boulevard Sarasota, Florida 34236-6815 (eServed) Xxxxxx xxxxxxx Florida Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32317 (eServed) Xxxxxxx xxxxx, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 (eServed) Xx xxxx xxxxxx Superintendent of Schools Sarasota County Schools Green 3rd Floor 1960 Landings Boulevard Sarasota, Florida 34231

23 NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW This decision is final unless, within 90 days after the date of this decision, an adversely affected party: a) brings a civil action in the appropriate state circuit court pursuant to section 1003.57(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2014), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A- 6.03311(9)(w); or b) brings a civil action in the appropriate district court of the United States pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2), 34 C.F.R. § 300.516, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-6.03311(9)(w).