CA obo MA v. Holmdel Township BOE Docket Number 04497-23 | Case 04497-23 | 2023-07-26
New Jersey special education due-process decision
- Case number
- 04497-23
- Date
- 07/26/2023
- Parties / district (official listing)
- CA obo MA v. Holmdel Township BOE Docket Number 04497-23
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Decision text
Page 1
New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
FINAL DECISION
EMERGENT RELIEF
OAL DKT. NO. EDS 04497-23
AGENCY DKT. NO. 2023-35753
C.A. ON BEHALF OF M.A.,
Petitioner,
v.
HOLMDEL TOWNSHIP BOARD
OF EDUCATION ,
Respondent .
Laura A. Siclari, Esq., for petitioner (Santomassimo Davis, LLP, attorneys)
Robin S. Ballard, Esq ., for respondent (Schenck Price , Smith & King, LLP,
attorneys)
Record Closed: July 25, 2023 Decided: July 26, 2023
BEFORE JOAN M. BURKE, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
C.A. on behalf M.A. (petitioner), brings an action for emergent relief against
Holmdel Township Regional Board of Education (respondent, District), seeking an order
as follows:
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1. Directing respondent to comply with the stay-put provisions of the
Individual s with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA ) pursuant to 20 U.S.C.
Section 1415(j) and N.J.A.C. 6A:14 et seq.;
2. Directing respondent to resume providing M.A. with home instruction for
purposes of stay-put until the due process issues are resolved and for the
respondent to continue to pay for the requested home instruction;
3. Respondent to provide M.A. for courses taken while on home instruction
during the 2022 –2023 school year and permit him to advance to the next
grade at the conclusion of the school year;
4. Determination that the respondent’s discontinuance of home instruction as
of April 20, 2023, is inappropriate under the operative IEP;
5. A determination that continued home instruction is appropriate for M.A .;
6. Respondent to create an IEP within thirty days of the entry of an order that
calls for M.A.’s continued placement in home instruction for so long as this
placement remains appropriate;
7. Respondent to continue the direct funding of the full cost of home
instruction , including any related services provided in conjunction with the
program, for as long as the placement remains appropriate;
8. Petitioner reserves the right to seek reimbursement for all attorneys’ fees,
expert fees and court costs associated with the filing of this action ; and
9. Any other relief the Court deems equitable and just.
[Petitioner’s Notice for Emergent Relief at 1 –2.]
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The petitioner filed a request for a due process hearing on April 20, 2023. The
District filed a sufficiency challenge on April 27, 2023. The OAL determined the petition
was sufficient. On May 22, 2023, the Office of Special Education ( OSE) transmitted the
matter to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) as a contested case. A settlement
conference was conducted on May 30 , 202 3, without resolution. A pre -hearing
conference was scheduled for July 11, 2023 . On June 12, 2023, I received petitioner’s
emergent relief request. A phone conference was conducted with the parties on June 12,
2023, to discuss the issues . The parties agreed to inform this tribunal whether an
agreement was reached or whether a hearing would be necessary. The petitioner
informed the tribunal on June 13, 2023, that an agreement could not be reached, and the
matter would proceed to a hearing.
The emergent matter was scheduled for oral argument on June 26, 2023 . The
proceeding was conducted via telephone an d the record closed then.
Petitioner’s request for emergent relief with certification in Lieu of Affidavit or
Notarized Statement of Petitioner Seeking Emergent Relief were submitted and
considered for this proceeding. A letter brief on behalf of the District, dated June 21,
2023, was also submitted and considered.
On June 27, 2023, I issued an Order for Emergent Relief. Su bsequently a status
conference was held on July 1 1, 2023, regarding the underlying due process matter. At
that status conference it was brought to the attention of the tribunal that the Order for
Emergent Relief resolved the issue of the due process petition. The petitioner at that time
requested that the Order be amended to recite the language that all issues were resolved.
I requested that the petitioner prepare a letter brief as to what had occurred and her
request. Another status conference was scheduled for July 25, 2023 . The parties
submitted letter briefs. At the status conference, both sides presented their position as
stated in their briefs.
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In reviewing the petition that was sent over from OSE there appeared to have been
a transmission error. The nature of the case was listed as: ” Petitioner obo student seeks
to continue home instruction for the remainder of the 2023 -2024 school year”. See
transmittal from the OSE . In speaking with petitioner, that was in error. This was
corroborated by the petitioner’s “Request for Due Process Hearing”, where it states”
”Provide a description of how this problem could be resolved .” Ibid. The petitioner ’s
response was “This problem can be resolved by allowing M to complete this year on
Home Instruction.” Ibid.
Petitioner therefore request a n Amended Order, showing that the issues have
been resolved. The respondent posits that the appropriate way to address th is issue is
for the petitioner to withdraw the underlying due process matter or alternatively,
respondent files a motion for mootness.
FACTUAL DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
Based upon the submissions of the parties, and the arguments presented on June
26, 2023, I FIND the following as FACT:
1. M.A. is currently sixteen years old and is a sophomore at Holmdel High
School (Holmdel).
2. M.A. is eligible for special education and related services under the
classification of “Emotional Regulation Impairment.” M.A. is diagnosed with
hypermobile Ethers-Danlos syndrome (hEDS), major depressive disorder,
chronic bartonella infection, postural orthostatic tachycardia syndrome,
mast cell activation syndrome and dysautonomia .
3. On December 21, 2022, the IEP team held a meeting and M.A.’s IEP was
adjusted for placement on “Home Instruction .”
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4. On February 6, 2023 , there was an amendment to the IEP without a
meeting. The placem ent category was listed as Home Instruction.
(Respondent’s Brief, Exhibit 2.)
5. On March 6, 2023, there was an “Assess Progress Review and Revise of
the IEP. ” (Respondent Brief, Exhibit 3.) The placement category was
identified as “Home Instruction.” Ibid. Respondent stated that this was an
error.
6. Starting on or about December 21, 2022 , M.A. started to receive home
instruction .
7. On February 7, 2023 , Valeria Dworkowitz , a Doctor of Nursing Practice
(DNP), sent a letter stating M.A. was experiencing varying levels of anxiety
ranging from mild to high during his discont inuation schedule of the
medication Cymbalta. She recommended he returned to school on
February 27, 2023.
8. On February 10, 2023, M.A. ’s treating physician, Dr. Tamara Odell, DO ,
sent a letter to the District requesting that based on the treatment M.A. was
receiving that he be placed on home-bound instruction immediately through
April 11, 2023.
9. On March 20, 2023, Dr. Elad Tennen , wrote a letter advocating for home
instruction for approximately thirty days as M.A. was being worked up for
severe lower extremity pain in the setting of chronic Bartonellosis.
10. The District, sometime in April 2023, informed M.A. that his home instruction
expired as of April 20, 2023, and he was expected to return to school on
April 21, 2023.
11. On April 24, 2023 , Dr. Odell wrote a letter to the District informing of his
collaboration with Dr. Elad Tennen, sports medicine/orthopedics who found
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ongoing ankle pain that was related to nondisplaced fibular fracture found
on an MRI associated with bone marrow edema. Dr. Odell requested that
M.A. be referred for home -bound instruction immediately to run through
June 24, 2023.
12. On May 4, 2023, Dawn Gerdes, APN, wrote a note that M.A. has been under
the care of pediatric urology for urinary frequency and urgency and believed
that it would be in M.A.’s best interest if he could finish out the school year
on home instruction . This letter was not signed.
13. On May 8, 2023, Dr. Odell wrote to the District informing them that M.A. has
been und er his medical care for management of hEDS, mast cell activation
syndrome and an active Bartonellosis infection. Appropriate management
of Bartonellosis can take six months or more for resolution. Dr. Odell stated
that M.A. is unable to attend school due to his medical issues and asked
that he be referred for home -bound instruction starting immediately to run
through June 24, 2023.
14. The scho ol physician did not verify that M.A . required home instru ction for
medical reasons.
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
Petitioner argues that the petitioner was diagnosed with major depression and
anxiety disorder sometime in 2021. Over the past two years since then, he has had
difficulty attending school because of a urine bladder issue wherein he becomes fixated
on going to the bathroom and unable to focus on his education. Petitioner argues that
M.A. was without any educational services from April 20, 2023, until the end of the school
year on or about June 19, 2023. Petitioner argues that to frame this matter as a medical
home instruction issue as the respondent does is incorrect because the issue here is that
the District fails its Child Find obligation un der the Individuals with Disability Education
Act.
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Petitioner argues that M.A. was missing class due to chronic absenteeism and
sometime in December 2022 , M.A.’s mother wrote the school coupled with a letter from
M.A.’s treating physician , dated December 15, 2022. Dr. Odell’s letter stated that M.A.
meets the diagnosis criteria for hEDS, which is a genetic connective tissue disorder. On
December 21, 2022, the IEP team met, reviewed and revised M.A.’s IEP. The placement
was changed to home instruction. In February there was an amended IEP which states
the placement category “Home Instruction” but under the summary of special education
programs and related services, it stated In -Class Resource for English, math, foreign
language , social studies and science. Similarly, an amended IEP was done on March 6,
2023, which states placement category as “Home Instruction ” but under the Summary-
Special Education Programs and Related Services, it states , “In-class Resource for
English, Math and Science. ” See Respondent’s Brief, at Exhibit 3.
Petitioner argues that M.A.’s proper placement is home instruction. Petitioner
admits that the March IEP is the last agreed upon IEP. However petitioner admitted that
the District informed her ‘home instruction ’ written as the placement was in error. While
petitioner acknowledged that she was told that this was a typographical error, it is the
petitioner’s belief that the last agreed upon IEP, where a meeting was convened with the
IEP team, was in December 2022 and at that time the agreed upon placement was home
instruction.
Petitioner contends that when looking at the matter, it should not be viewed in a
vacuum. Although petitioner’s IEP was changed to allow him to attend a school dance
and a school play, he was not able to go back to school. In March after the IEP was
created, he made an attempt to go back to school but was unable to. He was extended
home ins truction until April 20, 2023. Petitioner also argues that they have submitted
between February 2023 and April 7, 2 023, from M.A.’s medical team, six letters, all of
which show the overall medical issues that confronts him, and each letter puts the District
on notice that there were co-occurring mental health and physical symptoms preventing
him from accessing in-person education.
Petitioner argues that stay-put should apply when you look at the totality of the
circumstance and , therefore, there would not be a need for evaluation of the Crowe v.
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DeGoia standard. M.A., for most of his school year , has been on home instruction.
However, there was a break in service and not having school for two months has resulted
in irreparable harm if he is not allowed to rectify it this summer as he was notified by the
District that he has failed nearly every class. Petitioner argues that he will have to repeat
the whole school year when he only missed two months of the fourth marking period.
Petitioner also offers three options on how this matter should be resolved. First,
since M.A. passed the first three marking periods, the District could modify the attendance
policy and pass M .A. for the year; the second option would be to provide M.A. the
opportunity through home instruction to make up his missing assignments over the
summer and the third option is giving modified final exams only in the units M.A. missed
from the fourth marking p eriod. (Petitioner’s June 26, 2023 Brief at 5.)
Respondent argues that there is a fundamental misunderstanding of the process.
Petitioner was out of school for medical reasons and was on medical based home
instruction. Respondent argues that there was a request made on February 3, 2023, to
amend M.A.’s IEP without a meeting. The petitioner signed off on it. It required that M.A.
would stop home instruction and participate in a school event on February 3, 2023 , and
return to school on Monday, February 6, 2023. Based on Dr. Odell’s letter , dated
February 10, 2023 , and a letter, dated February 7, 2023 , from M.A.’s psychiatric, an
advanced practice nurse, - discussing levels of anxiety that he would experience with the
discontinuation of a medicine, he was granted home instruction. His last IEP was done
on March 6, 2023. In that IEP respondent argues, that based on a letter , dated March
20, 2023, from his psychiatric APN he was given home instructions until April 20, 2023.
Respondent states that M.A. was expected to return to school on April 21, 2023 .
Respondent argues that the letters from Dr. Odell, dated April 24, 2023, and May 8, 2023,
did not satisfy the requirements under N.J. A.C 6A:16-10.1. The District doctor did not
verify what medical condition M.A. had which prevented him from attending school.
Respondent states that the District had reached out to Dr. Tennen , who at the time, told
them he was no longer taking care of M.A.
Respondent argues that the stay -put provision of IDEA prevents the very relief
being sought by the petitioner . The March 6, 2023 , IEP was the last one agreed upon
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which calls for placement in class at Holmdel High School . Respondent noted that there
was a mistake on this IEP , placement of “Home Instruction ,” was placed in error, as
almost everything written in the IEP had to do with in class learning. Respondent argues
that M.A. does not require home instruction and specifically on an emergent basis
because the school year has ended. In addition , petitioner is seeking to change his
placement to home instruction which can only be done through a plenary hearing on the
underlying due process matter. Respondent argues that the petitioner fails to meet the
requirements of prongs two and three in that M.A. failed to show legal entitlement to home
instruction when school has concluded for the year , and he is not eligible for extended
school year services. Respondent also argues that if petitioner was to be granted relief
in this matter harm would come to the District. The respondent further posits that if
emergent relief was granted it would “increase the number of emergent relief applications
filed seeking orders for interim pl acements of students in the location or progra m
preferred by parents, both in and out of this and other districts.” See Respondent’s Brief
at 9.
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
N.J.A.C. 1:6A-12.1(a) provides that the affected parent(s), guardian, district, or
public agency may apply in writing for emergent relief. An emergent relief application is
required to set forth the specific relief sought and the specific circumstances that the
applicant contends justify the relief sought. Each application is required to be supported
by an affidavit prepared by an affiant with personal knowledge of the facts contained
therein and, if an expert’s opinion is included, the affidavit shall specify the expert’s
qualifications.
Emergent relief shall only be requested for the following issues pursuant to
N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.7(r):
i. Issues involving a break in the delivery of services;
ii. Issues involving disciplinary action, including
manifestation determinations and determinations of
interim alternate educational settings;
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iii. Issues concerning placement pending the outcome of due
process proceedings; and
iv. Issues involving graduation or participation in graduation
ceremonies.
In her Certification in Lieu of Affidavit or Notarized Statement of Petitioner Seeking
Emergent Relief, petitioner indicated that she believes she is entitled to emergent relief
on issues involving a break in the delivery of services (i); and issues concer ning
placement pending the outcome of due process proceedings (iii).
Therefore, I CONCLUDE that petitioner has established that the issue in this
matter concerns a current and potential break in the delivery of services and issues
concerning placement pending proceedings.
The petitioner here contends that she is invoking the “stay-put” provision to require
the Board to provide home instruction to M.A. through the end of the school year. Since
the school year has ended, to provide him over the summer to allow him to complete the
fourth marking period of his sophomore year. With a “stay-put” claim, the petitioner is
seeking an automatic statutory injunction against any effort to change M.A.’s program at
the time the provision is invoked. Drinker by Drinker v. Colonial School Dist. , 78 F.3d
859, 864 (3d Cir. 1996). Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.7(u):
Pending the outcome of a due process hearing, including an
expedited due process hearing, or any administrative or
judicial proceeding, no change shall be made to the student’s
classification, program, or placement unless both parties
agree, or emergency r elief as part of a request for a due
process hearing is granted between the district board of
education and the parents for the remainder of any court
proceedings. [Emphasis added.]
The “stay -put” provision acts as an automatic preliminary injunction, t he
overarching purpose of which is to prevent a school district from unilaterally changing a
disabled student’s placement or program. See Drinker, 78 F.3d at 864. In terms of the
applicable standard of review, the emergent relief factors set forth in N.J .A.C. 6A:14 -
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2.7(r)-(s), N.J.A.C. 1:6A -12.1, and Crowe v. DeGioia , 90 N.J. 126, 132 –34 (1982), are
generally inapplicable to enforce the “stay -put” provision. As stated in Pardini v.
Allegheny Intermediate Unit , 429 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2005), “Congress has already
balanced the competing harms as well as the competing equities.”
In Drinker, the court explained:
The [IDEA] substitutes an absolute rule in favor of the status
quo for the court’s discretionary consideration of the factors of
irreparable ha rm and either a likelihood of success on the
merits or a . . . balance of hardships.
[78 F.3d at 864 (citations and internal quotations marks
omitted).]
In other words, in cases where the “stay -put” provision applies, injunctive relief is
available without the traditional showing of irreparable harm. Ringwood Bd. Of Educ. v.
K.H.J. o/b/o K.F.J., 469 F. Supp. 2d 267 (D.N.J. 2006). Under those circumstances, it
becomes the duty of the court to ascertain and enforce the “then -current educational
placement” of the handicapped student. Drinker, 78 F.3d at 865. “[T]he dispositive factor
in deciding a child’s ‘current educational placement’ should be the individualized
education program . . . actually functioning when the ‘stay put’ is invoked.” Id. at 867,
quoting Woods v. N.J. Dept. of Ed., No. 93-5123, 20 Indiv. Disabilities Educ. L. Rep. (LRP
Publications) 439, 440, 3rd Cir. September 17, 1993.
Here, the last agreed upon and operative IEP is dated March 6, 2023. There is an
issue with the placement that was written on this IEP as it states, “Home Instruction .”
However, under Summary-Special Education Programs and Related Services paragraph,
it states:
In class Resource for English , from 2/06/2023 – 06/06/2023
3x4 day cycle 56 min.
In-class Resource: Math — from 2/06/2023 – 06/06/2023 3x4
day cycle 56 min.
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In-class Resource: Science from 2/06/2023 – 06/06/2023 3x4
day cycle 56 min.
Petitioner believes stay-put should apply because the petitioner was on home
instruction for the majority of the school year and was the last placement M.A. was on the
day before the petitioner filed for due process on April 20, 2023. The petitioner contends
that any deviation represents a violation of s tay-put. However, the operative IEP when
stay-put was invoked was the March 6, 2023 , IEP. There was no other IEP. On page
fifteen of the March 6, 2023 , IEP, it stated:
M returned today from home instruction. M returned on a ½
day schedule whereby he will be schedule for Algebra 2,
English, Chemistry, and US History in the morning. M will be
permitted to leave 3 days a week @10:18 and 1 day a
week@10:45 am. . . .
[See Respondent’s Brief, Exhibit 3.]
Thus, I CONCLUDE that the petitioner has no stay -put rights in a program not
contained in his last agreed -to IEP.
The petitioner argues even if stay-put is found inapplicable, the petitioner is entitled
to emergent relief under the traditional equitable standards set forth in Crowe v. DeGioia,
90 N.J. 126 (1982), and are codified at N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6. The petitioner bears the burden
of proving:
1. that the party seeking emergent relief will suffer irreparable
harm if the requested relief is not granted;
2. the existence of a settled legal right underlying the
petitioner’s claim;
3. that the party seeking emergent relief has a likelihood of
prevailing on the merits of the underlying claim; and
4. when the equities and the interests of the parties are
balanced, the party seeking eme rgent relief will suffer
greater harm than the respondent.
[Crowe, 90 N.J. at 132–34.]
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The petitioner must establish all the above requirements in order to warrant relief
in their favor and must prove each of these Crowe elements “clearly and convincingly.”
Waste Mgmt. of N.J. v. Union Cnty. Utils. Auth. , 399 N.J. Super. 508, 520 (App. Div.
2008); D.I. and S.I. on behalf of T.I. v. Monroe Township Board of Education , 2017 N.J.
Agen LEXIS 814, 7 (OAL Dkt No. EDS 10816-17, October 25, 2017).
Respondent argues that this case falls under N.J.A.C. 6A:16-10.1 which provides:
a) The district board of education shall provide instructional
services to an enrolled student, whether a general
education student in kindergarten through grade 12 or
special education student age three to 21, when the
student is confined to the home or another out-of-school
setting due to a temporary or chronic health condition or a
need for treatment that precludes participation in their
usual education setting, whether general education or
special education.
1. To request home instruction due to a temporary or
chronic health condition, the parent shall submit to the
school district a request that includes a written
determination from the student's physician
documenting the projected need for confinement at the
student's residence or other treatment setting for more
than 10 consecutive school days or 20 cumulative
school days during the school year.
i. The school district shall forward the written
determination to the school physician, who shall
verify the need for home instruction. The school
physician may contact the student ’s physician to
secure additional information concerning the
student’s diagnosis or need for treatment, and shall
either verify the need for home instruction or shall
provide to the district board of education reasons
for denial.
2. The school district shall notify the parent concerning
the school physician’s verification or reasons for denial
within five school days after receipt of the written
determination by the student ’s physician.
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3. The school district shall provide instructional services
within five school days after receipt of the school
physician ’s verification or, if verification is made prior to
the student’s confinement, during the first week of the
student’s confinement to the home or out -of-school
setting.
[N.J.A.C. 6A:16-10.1.]
Petitioner bears the burden of satisfying all four prongs of this test. Crowe, 90 N.J.
at 132–34. Petitioner can establish that irreparable harm will be sustained if the relief
requested is not granted. Based on chronic absenteeism, petitioner’s IEP was changed
in December 2022 to home instruction. Since that time, there were two IEP amendments.
These amendments were done on February 6, 2023, and March 6, 2023. However, while
the IEPs were changed, the petitioner remained on home instruction because of medical
issues. M.A.’s medical team consisted of his treating physician, Dr. Odell, his psychiatrist
APN and Dr. Elad Tennen , a sports medicine/orthopedics . The school doctor accepted
the medical team’s letters and reason up until March 20, 2023. In subsequent letter s
written by Dr. Odell on April 24, 2023 , and May 8, 2023, the school doctor denied the
request for home bound instruction. It is not clear from the record if the school doctor
specified a reason as required by N.J.A.C. 6A:16-10.1; respondent only stated in its brief
that the school physician denied the request for home instruction, as he was unable to
verify the need for same. While he is not required to call the treating physician , I am not
sure how he made this determination given M.A.’s specific medical condition s that exist
according to Dr. Odell.
With regard to the first required prong, “irreparable harm” is defined as the type of
harm “that cannot be redressed adequately by monetary damages. ” Crowe, 90 N.J. at
132–33. In addition, the irreparable harm standard contemplates that the harm be both
substantial and immediate. Subcarrier Communications v. Day, 229 N.J. Super. 634, 638
(App. Div. 1977). However, pecuniary damages may sometimes be inadequate because
of the nature of the injury , or the right affected. Crowe, 90 N.J. at 133. For example,
in Crowe the Court determined neither an unwarranted eviction nor reduction to poverty
could be compensated adequately by monetary damages awarded after a distant
hearing. Ibid. The threshold standard for irreparable harm in the area of education is
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showing that once something is lost, it cannot be regained. M.L. o/b/o S.L. v. BOE of the
Township of Ewing , EDU 4949 -09, Emergent Relief (June 15, 2009). Since money
damages are not available in education cases, and compensatory education is the only
relief available, the analysis to be used is that if compensatory educat ion, provided at a
later date, cannot remedy the situation, then the harm is irreparable. Howell Township
Board of Education v. A.I. and J.I. o/b/o S.I., EDU 5433 -12, Emergent Relief (May 2,
2012). By only that as he was not able to verify the need for same.
Here if emergent relief is denied , petitioner would either send M.A. to school
despite two written letter s from M.A.’s physician that says that he should be in home -
bound instruction or keep him at home whe re as in this matter he did not receive
educational services. A child who is suffering from a physical or mental illness and is
deemed medically to be kept out of school may potentially and irreparably suffer harm if
compelled to attend school. To attend school (let alone potentially visit harm upon others
in the school setting) is self-evident and requires no further analysis. See Y.T. o/b/o L.R.
v. Bd. of Educ ation Township of Willingboro , EDU 17758-15. The question then
becomes, if the child is not receiving educational services can the lost education al
services be regained. Ibid. I CONCLUDE therefore that the petitioner has satisfied the
irreparable harm standard under Crowe.
The petitioner must also demonstrate that the legal right underlying her claim is
settled and she must make a preliminary showing of a reasonable probability of success
on the merits. Crowe, 90 N.J. at 133. The District’s responsibilities under the IDEA to
provide M.A. with a FAPE are well-defined in state and federal law. 20 USA § 1415(5)(B);
N.J.A.C. 6A:14-4.2 M.A. has an ongoing medical issue. This was noted in approximately
seven letters, specifically three from his treating physician . In the letter, dated April 24,
2023, in the final paragraph, Dr. Odell states:
As M’s mobility is compromised secondary to pain, I would
ask that he be referred for home bound instruction starting
immediately to run through June 24 th. I have a follow -up
appointment sc heduled with M and will be in close contact
with Dr. Tennen. Should anything change prior to June 24,
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2023, I will be in touch. Should you have any questions,
please feel free to contact my office .
And in his letter, dated May 8, 2023, again Dr. Odell stated, “M is unable to attend
school due to his medical issues and I would ask that he be referred for home bound
instruction starting immediately to run through June 24 th.” Petitioner argues that these
letters do not meet the criteria under N.J.A.C. 6A:16-10.1., more specifically, the letters
provides no explanation as to how M.A.’s medical condition could have prevented his
attendance at Holmdel High school. I am not convinced as the letters are similar to the
letter written by Dr. Odell on December 15 , 2022, and does satisfy N.J.A.C. 6A:16-10.1.
Accordingly, I CONCLUDE that the petitioner has satisfied the second and third prongs.
Finally, as to the fourth prong of the standard for emergent relief, having
considered the equities and the interests of the parties, I CONCLUDE that the balance
weighs in favor of the petitioner. Requiring a child suffering from physical or mental illness
to attend school when they are not medically cleared to do so could lead to harms visited
upon that student or individuals around them in the school setting.
Based on the foregoing, I CONCLUDE that the petitioner has demonstrated
sufficiently that emergent relief is appropriate in this matter. Petitioner’s request is
GRANTED.
Based on the above, and the subsequent briefs received in this matter after June
27, 2023, I agree that the Order issu ed on June 27, 2023, resolved all the issues in this
case, a conclusion that the respondent has also determined as pointed out in their letter
brief, dated July 20, 2023. The respondent has recommended that the tribunal decline
the petitioner’s request for an amended Order or in the alternative, grant the respondent
a dismissal for mootness. I shall do neither. The June 27, 2023 , Order on Emergent
Relief is therefore corrected to reflect that all the issues raised in the due process petition
are resolved.
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ORDER
Having CONCLUDED that petitioner is entitled to the requested emergent relief
and that the petitioner’s request for emergency relie f is GRANTED, it is ORDERED that
respondent provide M.A. with home instruction during the pendency of the underlying due
process matter for a period not to exceed sixty days as Dr. Odell had requested April 24,
2023, to June 24, 2023 . This should allow M.A. to complete the last two months of the
fourth marking period.
The parties are reminded of the provisions of N.J.A.C. 6A:16-10(c)4 which states:
For a student with disabilities, the home instruction shall be
consistent with the student's individualized education plan (IEP)
to the extent appropriate and shall meet the New Jersey Student
Learning Standards. When the provision of home instruction will
exceed 30 consecutive school days in a school year, the IEP
team shall convene a meeting to review and, if appropriate,
revise the student's IEP.
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OAL DKT. NO. EDS 04497-23
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This decision on application for emergency relief resolves all of the issues raised
in the due process complaint; therefore, no further proceedings in this matter are
necessary. This decision on application for emergency relief is final pursuant to 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(1)(A) and is appealable by filing a complaint and bringing a civil action either in
the Law Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey or in a district court of the United
States. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). If the parent or adult student feels that this decision is not
being fully implemented with respect to program or services, this concern should be
communicated in writing to the Directo r, Office of Special Education .
July 26, 2023
DATE JOAN M. BURKE, ALJ
Date Received at Agency:
Date Mailed to Parties:
JMB/jm
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APPENDIX
WITNESSES
For petitioner
Counsel for Petitioner
For Respondent
Counsel for D istrict
EXHIBITS
For Petitioner
P-1 Petitioner’s submission accompan ying the Emergent Applicatio n
P-2 Petitioner’s Brief with Exhibits, dated June 26, 2023
Letter Brief dated July 18, 2023
Letter Brief dated July 21, 2023
For Respondent
R-1 Respondent ’s Brief in Opposition to the Application for Emergent Relief with
Exhibits 1 through 3, all of which were considered with this emergent
application , June 21, 2023
Letter Brief dated July 20, 2023
Letter Brief dated July 25, 2023
