Central Jersey College Prep Charter School BOE v. A.G. and T.G. obo T.L. | Case 02379-2026 | 2026-02-27
New Jersey special education due-process decision
- Case number
- 02379-2026
- Date
- 2/27/2026
- Parties / district (official listing)
- Central Jersey College Prep Charter School BOE v. A.G. and T.G. obo T.L.
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Decision text
Page 1
New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
FINAL DECISION ON
EMERGENT RELIEF
OAL DKT. NO. EDS 02379-2026
AGENCY DKT. NO. 2026-40426
CENTRAL JERSEY COLLEGE
PREP CHARTER SCHOOL
BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Petitioner,
v.
A.G. AND T.G. ON BEHALF OF T.L.,
Respondents.
Thomas O. Johnston, Esq., and Jaryda A. Gonzalez , Esq., for petitioner (The
Johnston Law Firm, LLC, attorneys)
A.G. and T.G., on behalf of T.L., respondents, pro se
Record Closed: February 24, 2026 Decided: February 27, 2026
BEFORE KATHLEEN M. CALEMMO, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner Central Jersey College Prep Charter School Board of Education (Charter
School) seeks an emergent order placing student T.L. on interim home instruction for a
forty-five-day period, or until March 23, 2026, pending placement in an emotional
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
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regulation impairment program. The Charter School maintains that because of his
behavior, T.L. presents a danger to himself and to others. The Charter School
documented incidence of disruptive behaviors, violence, and sexualized physical contact.
While not denying the behaviors, A.G.L.1, on behalf of her minor son, T.L.,
disagreed with the Charter School’s decision to place T.L on home instruction. She
believes that with appropriate supports, clear and regular communication, fidelity to T.L.’s
Safety Plan, and an appropriate Behavior Intervention Plan (BIP), T.L. could safely remain
in school. On February 19, 2026, A.G.L. filed for due process challenging the proposed
Individualized Education Program (IEP), dated February 6, 2026, placing T.L. on home
instruction, pending placement in an emotional regulation impairment program. During
the pendency of her due process complaint, A.G.L. seeks stay-put under the last agreed
upon IEP, which was implemented in October 2025. In opposition to the Charter School’s
request for emergent relief, A.G.L. seeks the immediate return of her son to school under
stay-put protection.
To prevail, the Charter School alleged and therefore must prove that continuing
T.L. in his most recent educational placement is “substantially likely to result in injury to
the child or to others” in the school environment. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(3)(A). The standard
that must be met under the statute is an intentionally difficult one, which the Charter
School has not met. Without question, the evidence shows that T.L.’s behavior has a
negative impact on the educational environment of other students. That alone, however,
is not enough to prevent him from attending school, with appropriate supports and
services.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 10, 2026, the Charter School filed for emergency relief and due
process seeking a temporary order to place T.L. on home instruction. The emergent
matter was transmitted by the Office of Special Education (OSE) to the Office of
1 A.G.L. is designated as A.G. in the caption, which did not include her full hyphenated name. For purposes
of this decision, she will be referred to as A.G.L.
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Administrative Law, (OAL), where it was filed on February 11, 2026, as a contested case.
N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15; N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -23.
On February 11, 2026, A.G.L. filed a cross-motion for emergent relief seeking an
order for “stay put,” immediately returning T.L. to the Charter School.
On February 23, 2026, the Charter School submitted a letter brief and certification
of Jaryda A. Gonzalez, Esq, with exhibits A -K, in support of its request and in opposition
to A.G.L.’s cross-motion. On February 24, 2026, A.G.L. submitted the parents’
supplemental emergent rebuttal. The parties presented oral argument on the emergent
relief application s by ZOOM platform on February 24, 2026, and the record closed.
FACTUAL DISCUSSION
For purposes of deciding this application for emergent relief, the following is a
summary of the relevant facts derived from the due process petitions with attachments,
supporting documentation, and oral arguments. Therefore, I FIND the following as
FACTS:
T.L. is eleven years old and enrolled at the Charter School for the 2025-2026
school year as a sixth-grade student. T.L. is a classified student under the classification
of Autism. In October 2025, after T.L. had attended the Charter School for approximately
thirty days, his IEP was revised by consent, after a meeting.
On November 24, 2025, the Child Study Team (CST) conducted a reevaluation
planning meeting. The CST decided reevaluations were warranted to get additional data
to support T.L.’s continued behaviors. As part of the reevaluation, T.L. underwent a
psychological assessment, educational assessment, occupational therapy assessment,
speech language assessment, and a Functional Behavior Analysis (FBA).
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On December 15, 2025, the Charter School proposed a Student Safety
Intervention Plan to help mitigate T.L.’s behaviors. Based on the teacher’s reports of
T.L.’s behaviors, A.L.G. was concerned that the teachers were not adhering to the plan
and violated its terms governing incident response and parental notification.
On January 16, 2026, A.L.G. sent an email to the CST to inform them that she was
keeping T.L. home temporarily while issues were reviewed and corrective steps
established. A.L.G. indicated that this was a temporary safety-based pause. Meghan
Deutsch, Director of Special Education , responded, “that during this short term period
while concerns are being reviewed” T.L.’s absences would be coded as an “excused
absence for good cause.” Director Deutsch ended the email by stating that “[w]e remain
committed to working collaboratively with you to review concerns, implement appropriate
supports, and determine a plan for [T’s] safe and successful return to school.” (Emails,
dated January 16, 2026, attached to A.G.L.’s cross-petition.)
On January 28, 2026, the Charter School proposed placing T.L. on home
instruction. A.L.G. responded as follows:
I consent to moving forward with Home Instruction on a
temporary, interim basis to maintain continuity of instruction
while the evaluation and IEP matters are addressed. This is
understood to be temporary and not a resolution of placement
or support needs.
[Attachment A to Charter School’s petition]
In a responsive email, Director Deutsch thanked A.L.G. for agreeing to home
instruction on a temporary basis, while the evaluations and IEP matters were being
addressed. Ibid.
In anticipation of the upcoming IEP meeting, A.G.L. sent the following email to the
CST, dated January 29, 2026:
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We need to clarify that [T.L.] will need to return to school no
later than Monday, 2/10. We are requesting that the team
focus on ensuring the appropriate supports are in place for
that return.
Given the re-evaluation results, proposed eligibility, proposed
placement, Home Instruction, and development of a BIP are
all interrelated, we are requesting that these matters be
addressed in one consolidated IEP meeting to discuss all of
these items together.
[Email attached to A.G.L.’s cross-petition.]
The reevaluation IEP meeting occurred on February 6, 2026. The parents rejected
the proposed IEP and filed for due process. In an email, dated February 8, 2025, T.L.’s
parents rejected home instruction and invoked stay put.
On February 10, 2026, A.G.L. sent T.L. to the Charter School. Director Deutsch
sent A.G.L. an email advising her to pick up T.L. from school because T.L. had been
placed on home instruction. T.L. was not permitted to attend school. (Email, dated
February 10, 2026, at 10:05 A.M., attached to A.G.L.’s cross-petition.)
T.L.’s disabilities manifest with problematic behaviors. The Gonzalez certification
outlined the following behaviors, which form the basis for the Charter School’s emergent
request:
A. Kicking a classmate that resulted in an Harassment, Intimidation, or Bullying
(HIB) complaint.
B. Yelling out in class, playing video games on his Chromebook, distracting his
classmates and defiant attitude towards teacher in a series of events on
October 27, 2025, during social studies.
C. Incident in hallway on November 6, 2025, when T.L. was pushing other
students and made inappropriate physical contact with a student’s private area.
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D. HIB incident on November 12, 2025, when what resembled a tag touch, T.L.
touched the chest of a female student and ran out of the classroom. T.L.
apologized for his actions.
E. In social studies class on November 17, 2025, T.L. left the classroom without
permission, called a classmate names and used profanity, disrupted the class
with loud outbursts.
F. On December 11, 2025, complaints were made by students that T.L. poked a
classmate in her eye and pulled the hair of another classmate while teasing
her.
G. On January 9, 2026, T.L. and other students were running in the hallway
causing disruption. T.L. asked to see a student’s religious prayer necklace and
the student refused, due to its religious significance. T.L. insulted the boy’s
culture and religion, causing him to cry.
H. On January 13, 2026, T.L.’s social studies teacher sent a series of emails to
T.L.’s case manager and other Charter School personnel informing them that
T.L. grabbed an empty desk and made inappropriate pelvic thrusting motions.
I. On January 15, 2025, during first period, T.L. started the day very well, but
when another student started to fidget, T.L. yelled at him to “shut up.” When
no one responded to T.L.’s outburst, he grew quiet and went back on task.
However, when T.L. noticed the other student continuing to move, T.L. began
to insult the student and told him to “shut the fuck up.” T.L. stopped after a bit
but then continued to insult the student.
J. The Charter School’s Incident Report for T.L. contained twenty separate
entries of infractions. The incidents ranged from inappropriate language,
ongoing classroom disruptions, insubordination and defiant behavior, obscene
behavior and gestures, physical aggression, electronic device offenses, and
minor theft of taking snacks. Among the actions taken were three separate
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one-day out of school suspensions, counseling, verbal warnings, lunch
detentions, parent contact, and referral to special services.
A separate incident allegedly occurred on January 14, 2026. On January 20, 2026,
a Franklin Township Police detective responded to the school for a report of offensive
touching. (Exhibit A to Charter School’s emergent petition.) There is no indication in the
record that the school had any prior knowledge of this incident. A.L.G. learned of the
incident on February 4, 2026, when she was contacted by a detective from Franklin
Township Police Department. When A.G.L. questioned why she had not been informed
of the incident, the detective informed her that T.L. was not facing criminal charges. The
detective also contacted the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (DCP&P),
where he was informed that the incident did not warrant a response or follow-up. (Police
Incident – attached to A.G.L.’s petition for emergent relief.) A.G.L. disputed that her son
was present on the date of the alleged incident. The daily attendance record for January
14, 2026, showed that T.L. was absent that day. (A.G.L.’s Petition exhibits, B.)
A.L.G. did not deny her son’s culpability for the behaviors listed in the certification.
However, she was distressed by the Charter School’s lack of communication with her and
indicated that she was not copied on the emails sent to T.L.’s case manager about his
behaviors. Without consistent communication, A.L.G. was unable to provide support. On
November 17, 2025, after reviewing classroom behavior reports, she questioned T.L.’s
case manager why the documentation did not include antecedents, consequences, or
functional data. As a result, A.L.G. requested FBA by a Board Certified Behavior Analysts
(BCBA), consideration of additional supports, and data collection to determine what was
happening. She stressed that each teacher was required to follow the safety plan, yet
T.L.’s behavior was able to escalate without intervention. A.L.G. further contended that
discipline was imposed in place of the preventive measures listed in the safety plan. The
narratives from the teachers also showed that staff were aware of the early warning signs
but took no proactive intervention, which resulted in escalation. A.L.G. believed that the
placement of home instruction was a premeditated determination by the Charter School
rather than offering a BIP based upon a credible FBA.
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LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Charter School has determined that it is no longer safe for T.L. to attend
school. It is well settled that a board of education is entitled to a change of placement of
a student with a disability to an interim alternative placement upon showing that it is
dangerous for the student to be in the current placement, and the parent and district
cannot agree to an appropriate placement. N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.7(n); N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.8(f).
When there is no agreement, a board of education is entitled to seek an order to change
the placement to an appropriate interim alternative educational setting for not more than
forty-five school days. The Charter School has the burden to prove that maintaining the
current placement is substantially likely to result in injury to the child or others. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(k)(3)(A).
Emergent relief shall only be requested for the following issues pursuant to
N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.7(r):
i. Issues involving a break in the delivery of services;
ii. Issues involving disciplinary action, including manifestation
determinations and determinations of interim alternate
educational settings;
iii. Issues concerning placement pending the outcome of due
process proceedings; and
iv. Issues involving graduation or participation in graduation
ceremonies.
Here, both parties are seeking emergent relief. Arguably, the first three prongs are
applicable as the basis for emergent relief. First, there was a break in the delivery of
services on February 10, 2026, when the Charter School refused to admit T.L. to school.
Second, although the parties do not dispute that the behaviors exhibited by T.L. are
manifestations of his disability, they disagree that T.L. requires an interim alternate
educational setting to manage his behaviors. The third issue is the crux of the matter and
concerns whether stay put is applicable pending the outcome of the pending due process
petition regarding the proposed February 6, 2026, IEP. I CONCLUDE this matter involves
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the issue of placement pending the outcome of a due process proceeding, which requires
emergent relief, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.7(r)iii.
The stay-put provision under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)
provides an automatic preliminary injunction, preventing a school district from changing
placement from the last agreed-upon IEP during the pendency of a petition challenging a
proposed IEP. Drinker by Drinker v. Colonial School Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 864 (3d Cir.
1996). The “stay-put” provision acts as an automatic preliminary injunction, the
overarching purpose of which is to prevent a school district from unilaterally changing a
disabled student’s placement or program. See Drinker, 78 F.3d at 864.
There are two exceptions to the stay-put provision. The first is if the parties agree
to a different placement; otherwise, “the child shall remain in the then-current educational
placement of the child.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). The second exception, applicable here,
arises under the disciplinary provisions of IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k).
Emergency relief may be granted pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:6A-12.1(e) and N.J.A.C.
6A:14-2.7(s)(1), if the judge determines from the proofs that the following conditions have
been established:
i. The petitioner will suffer irreparable harm if the requested
relief is not granted;
ii. The legal right underlying the petitioner ’s claim is settled;
iii. The petitioner has a likelihood of prevailing on the merits
of the underlying claim; and
iv. When the equities and interests of the parties are
balanced, the petitioner will suffer greater harm than the
respondent will suffer if the requested relief is not granted.
N.J.S.A. 6A:14-2.7(s); Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982), codified at N.J.A.C. 6A:3 -
1.6(b).
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In deciding these competing motions for emergent relief, it is the Charter School
who bears the burden of satisfying all four prongs of this test. Crowe, 90 N.J. at 132-34.
First, the Charter School must demonstrate irreparable harm will occur if T.L. is permitted
back in school. Harm is irreparable when there can be no adequate after-the-fact remedy
in law or in equity; or where monetary damages cannot adequately restore a lost
experience. Crowe, 90 N.J. at 132-133; Nabel v Board of Education of Hazlet, EDU 8026-
09, Final Decision on Application for Emergent Relief (June 24, 2009).
Here it is the student, T.L., who is subject to irreparable harm, for remaining on
home instruction, because he is not receiving services other than basic academic
instruction. T.L. is not receiving counseling and support services and is not receiving an
education among his peers. There is no other remedy in law or equity, or monetary
damages, to restore this lost experience, for the student.
Moreover, before placing a child outside the district, “the school ‘must consider the whole
range of supplemental aids and services, including resource rooms and itinerant instruction,’
speech and language therapy, special education training for the regular teacher, behavior
modification programs, or any other available aids or services appropriate to the child’s particular
disabilities.” Oberti v. Board of Education, 995 F .2d 1204,1216 (3rd Circuit, 1993). (citation omitted).
While the Charter School provided a list of behavioral issues, it failed to put procedures
in place to address these manifestations of T.L.’s disability. Moreover, the Charter School
conducted an FBA but never implemented a BIP, before placing T.L. on home instruction.
The Charter School contends that it is no longer safe for T.L. to attend but the
proofs did not adequately address how T.L. poses a danger to himself or others. There
is no doubt that T.L.’s behaviors caused a disruption. It is hard to reliably determine
whether the fault was with the safety plan, as proposed or as implemented, or whether
the absence of an FBA made it impossible for CST to determine the most effective
strategies for T.L. While T.L.’s conduct was inappropriate and disruptive, I CONCLUDE
that the proofs do not demonstrate that continuing to allow T.L. to attend the Charter
School is substantially likely to result in injury to him or others in the school setting. Thus,
the Charter School has not demonstrated irreparable harm.
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Second, the Charter School must demonstrate it has a settled legal right to the
relief requested. The Charter School argued that the legal right to implement a program
for a disabled student determined by an IEP team is a fundamental right under the IDEA,
20 U.S.C. 1414(d)(2). While that is true, it is also fundamental that the parents are part
of the IEP team. Here, the Charter School is seeking an exception and has not
demonstrated a settled legal right to the relief requested.
Pursuant to the New Jersey Administrative Code, no changes are to be made to a
child’s classification, program, or placement unless emergency relief is granted.
Specifically , N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.7(u) provides that:
Pending the outcome of a due process hearing, including an
expedited due process hearing, or any administrative or
judicial proceeding, no change shall be made to the student’s
classification, program or placement unless both parties
agree, or emergency relief as part of a request for a due
process hearing is granted by the Office of Administrative Law
according to (m) above or as provided in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)4
as amended and supplemented.
N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.7(u).
This prohibition of a change in placement, commonly referred to as “stay put”, acts
as an automatic preliminary injunction . The overarching purpose is to prevent a school
district from unilaterally changing a disabled student’s placement. Drinker by Drinker v
Colonial School District, 78 F.3d 859, 864 (3d Cir. 1996). Regarding the standard of
review for a “stay put” request, the emergent-relief factors set forth in N.J.A.C. 6A:14-
2.7(r)–(s), N.J.A.C. 1:6A-12.1, and Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126, 132–34 (1982), are
generally inapplicable . “Congress has already balanced the competing harms as well as
the competing equities.” Pardini v. Allegheny Intermediate Unit, 420 F.3d 181, 188 (3d
Cir. 2005). In Drinker, the court explained that IDEA “substitutes an absolute rule in favor
of the status quo for the court’s discretionary consideration of the factors of irreparable
harm and either a likelihood of success on the merits or a . . . balance of hardships.”
Drinker, 78 F.3d at 864 (citations omitted.) If the “stay put” provision applies, injunctive
relief is available without the traditional showing of irreparable harm. Ringwood Board of
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Education v. K.H.J. ex rel K.F.J., 469 F. Supp. 2d 267 (D.N.J. 2006). Under such
circumstances, it becomes the duty of the court to ascertain and enforce the “then-current
educational placement” of the student. Drinker, 78 F.3d at 865.
The purpose of “stay put” is to maintain stability and continuity for the student. The
first preference for interim placement is one agreed to by the parties. However, when the
parties are unable to agree, the placement in effect when the due process request was
made, i.e., the last uncontroverted placement or program, is the status quo. In this matter,
the October 2025, IEP was agreed upon by the parents. The February 6, 2026, IEP came
about because of T.L.’s escalating discipline and behavioral issues. The parents objected
to this IEP and filed for due process. Therefore, I CONCLUDE that “stay put” is
appropriate injunctive relief, which requires the student’s placement at the Charter
School.
The third prong of the factors the Charter School must satisfy is whether it has a
likelihood of prevailing on the merits of the underlying claim. Stay put is an automatic
injunction , so further analysis under Crowe is not necessary.
In determining that I am unable to grant the relief sought by the Board, I am guided
by the express statutory language contained at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(3)(A). Our courts
assume that the drafters of a statute intended to ascribe to words their ordinary meaning.
Jablonowska v. Suther, 195 N.J. 91, 105 (2008). Moreover, and importantly, a court
should strive for an interpretation that gives effect to all of a statutory provision, and does
not render any language inoperative, superfluous , void, or insignificant. State v.
Reynolds , 124 N.J. 559, 564 (1991). The standard that must be met under the statute is
thus an intentionally difficult one, as it requires a showing that a child is “substantially”
likely to harm himself or others if not removed from his school setting. Without question,
the evidence shows that T.L.’s behavior, especially his disruption of his own and
neighboring classrooms with profanity, insults, and aggressions has a negative impact on
the educational environment of other students. That alone, however, is not enough to
prevent him from attending school.
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The use of the word “substantially” and the high standard set by that language
harmonizes with the overriding statutory preference for educating T.L. in the “least
restrictive environment.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) mandates that:
[t]o the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities,
including children in public or private institutions or other care
facilities, are educated with children who are not disabled, and
special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of
children with disabilities from the regular educational
environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the
disability of a child is such that education in regular classes
with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be
achieved satisfactorily.
Returning T.L. to the Charter School will not be enough; an FBA has been
completed and should serve as a guide to develop an appropriate BIP, by the CST, with
consent of the parents. The Charter School must make appropriate provisions to return
T.L. to school, without delay.
Finally, T.L.’s parents are cautioned not to interpret this decision as finding that the
concerns raised by school personnel are unreasonable . However, without the proper
supports in place for T.L., it appears likely that the parties will be before this forum again
to address the issue of T.L.’s ability to safely continue to attend school.
ORDER
It is ORDERED that the Charter School’ s emergent relief request to place T.L. on
interim home instruction for a forty-five-day period, pending placement in an appropriate
program or placement is DENIED.
It is FURTHER ORDERED that A.G.L.’s cross-motion for emergent relief as to stay
put placement at the Charter School during the pendency of the due process appeal of
the February 6, 2026, IEP is GRANTED.
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This decision on application for emergency relief resolves all the issues in the due
process complaint. No further proceedings are necessary, and this case is now closed.
If the parent or adult student believes that this decision is not being fully implemented,
then the parent or adult student is directed to communicate that belief in writing to the
Director of the Office of Special Education. This decision is final under 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(1)(A) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.514 and is appealable by bringing a civil action in the
Law Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey or in the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey under U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.516.
February 27, 2026
DATE KATHLEEN M. CALEMMO, ALJ
Date Received at Agency
Date Mailed to Parties:
KMC/tat
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APPENDIX
EXHIBITS
Petitioner, Central Jersey College Prep Charter School:
Petition with Exhibits:
Exhibit A: Franklin Township Police Department – Incident Report
Exhibit B: Email dated January 28, 2026 – Home instruction
Exhibit C: February 6, 2026, IEP
Gonzalez Certification with Exhibits:
Exhibit A. (HIB) complaint
Exhibit B. Behaviors during social studies - October 27, 2025
Exhibit C. Incident in hallway on November 6, 2025
Exhibit D. HIB incident on November 12, 2025
Exhibit E. Behaviors during social studies - November 17, 2025
Exhibit F. Student’s complaints of aggression - December 11, 2025
Exhibit G. Incident of January 9, 2026 - student’s religious prayer necklace
Exhibit H. Sexualized behaviors during social studies - January 13, 2026
Exhibit I. January 15, 2025 – use profanity and insulting behavior
Exhibit J. The Charter School’s Incident Report for T.L.
Respondents, A.G.L. on behalf of T.L.:
Petition with Exhibits:
Exhibit A: Franklin Township Police Department – February 4, 2026
Exhibit B: Attendance
Exhibit C: Emails
Exhibit D: Student Safety Intervention Plan
Exhibit E: Complaint, dated January 23, 2026
Exhibit F: Emails – January 28, 2026
Exhibit G: Request for Enforcement of Mediation Agreement
Exhibit H: Emails
