LJ obo ZW v Newark City BOE | Case 08980-22 | 2022-10-24
New Jersey special education due-process decision
- Case number
- 08980-22
- Date
- 10/24/2022
- Parties / district (official listing)
- LJ obo ZW v Newark City BOE
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Decision text
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New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
FINAL DECISION
FOR EMERGENT RELIEF
OAL DKT. NO. EDS 08980-22
AGENCY DKT. NO. 2023-35037
L.J. ON BEHALF OF Z.W.,
Petitioner,
v.
NEWARK CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Respondent .
___________________________________
L.J., petitioner, appearing pro se
Sabrina Styza, Esq., for respondent, Newark Public Schools
BEFORE NANCI G. STOKES, ALJ:
Record closed: October 21, 2022 Decided: October 24, 2022
STATEMENT OF T HE CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 6, 2022, petitioner L.J., filed a request for emergent relief with the
Office of Special Education ( OSE) seeking an order to return her minor child, Z.W., to
high school after being suspended for a fight, having been out of school for fourteen
days.
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In her petition, L.J. highlights that Newark failed to conduct a required
manifestation meeting and that Z.W. has not received services si nce the fight on
September 16, 2022. L.J. also desires an IEP meeting to discuss Z.W. ’s return to a
regular program high school.
Newark opposes this application asserting that L.J. fails to meet the criteri a for
emergent relief unde r N.J.A.C. 1:6A-12.1(e).
On October 7, 2022, OSE transmitted the emergent application to the Office of
Administrative Law (OAL) for a determination as a contested matter. Newark submitted
opposition to the request for emergent relief on October 17, 2022, and I conducted oral
argument on October 21, 2022, via Zoom due to continuing COVID -19 restrictions.1
FINDINGS OF FACT
Based on t he documentary evidence presented by the parties in support of and
in opposition to the motion, and based on the arguments presented during oral
argument and my assessment of L.J.’s credibility, I FIND the following as FACT for
purposes of this application only:
Z.W. resides in the Newark School District with his mother, L.J. Z.W. is eligible
to receive special education and related services with the classification of other health
impaired with a diagnosis of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) . Z.W.
attended several Newark high schools before attending Central High School ( “Central”)
this school year and is in twelfth grade. The last placement the parties agreed upon is
Central.
Specifically, Z.W. was enrolled at Weequahic Hig h Sch ool from September 7,
2021, to September 15, 2022. Z.W. transferred to Central on September 15, 2022.
Previously, Newark enrolled Z.W. at Malcolm X. Shabazz High School and North Star
Academy. Although L.J. does not dispute problems at Z.W.’s high schools before
1 The OAL scheduled o ral argument on the emergent application for October 18, 2022. T he parties
agreed to attempt a resolution and reschedul e the argument fo r October 21, 2022.
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Central, L.J. di sputes Newark’s characterization of those events and whether Z.W.
could return to those schools. Currently, Z.W. has insufficient credits to earn his
diploma at the end of this school year.
On September 16, 2022, Z.W. was invol ved in a fight with another student , and
the Incident Report identifies that a “minor injury” occurred. Newark suspended both
students from September 19, 2022, until September 22, 2022, or four days. Central’s
Principal, Terry Mitchell, issue d a Notice of Suspens ion dated Septembe r 16, 2022,
noting an attack on students as its basis. See, Mitchell Certification, Exhibit B. 2 After
the fight, Mitchell spoke to Z.W. , who did not dispute the incident captured by video.
Mitchell contacted L.J . immediately after the fight to obtain he r consent to release Z.W.
from school, which she gave. Mitchell also requested that L.J. come to school to
discuss the incident, but L.J. was out of town.
Yet, Newark did not permit Z.W. back to Central after hi s suspension. Instead,
on September 20, 2022, M itchell called L.J. to discuss Z.W.’s need for additional
intervention to address his conduct. Mitchell offered alternative high school
environments, including Newark Night School and Lead Academy, a charter school in
the District, and Leaders for Life, a private placement. L.J. did not agree with those
alternatives and believes night school for a student with Z.W.’s disability is
inappropriate, leaving him at home alone during the day. During that phone
conversation, Mitchell advi sed L.J. that Z.W. woul d not be able to return to Central
because she believed Z.W. needed additional supports, and his misconduct was
unacceptable.
On September 27, 2022, Mitchell again called L.J. to advise her that Z.W. would
be enrolled at Newark Nigh t School beginning on O ctober 3, 2022. Newark attempted
to provide Z.W. with a Chromebook to facilitate that placement, but L.J. refused.
L.J. filed her petition and request for emergent relief because she believes
Central did n ot follow the correct pro cedures, and her son wa s not allowed to return to
2 While Newark supplies a copy of the letter, the attachments referenced, incl uding an appeal form , are
absent from the record.
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school, leaving him without services under his IEP. Specifically, Central removed Z.W.
without a manifestation meeting.
After L.J. filed her petition and emergent relief applica tion, Central advised L.J. of
a meeting on Octob er 14, 2022. L.J. then accepted the Chromebook, declaring that her
acceptance was only for attendance at the meeting.
Central conducted a manifestation meeting on October 14, 2022. Newark’s
director of special education, supervisors of special education from Central High School
and Newark Evening High School, the case manager, and L.J. attended the meeting.
After discussions of Z.W.’s disruptive conduct leading to the suspension, his educational
status, his need for academic and behavioral supports, his IEP, and his educational
record, the team concluded that Z.W.’s acts were not a manifestation of his disability.
At this meeting, L.J. did not agree to placement outside a regular high school program
or even home instruction. Ne wark maintains that ho lding a manifestation meeting
moots L.J.’s request for one.
Despite efforts to do so, an IEP meeting to discuss neces sary educational
services and an alternate placement did not occur after L.J. filed with OSE. L.J.
expresses conce rn that Central’s Chil d Study Team does not know her son after only
two days in school and urges that his prior case manager be involved. Newark
facilitated a conversation between Z.W.’s case manager at Central and his last ca se
manager.
Still, L.J.’s refusal to meet or cons ider alternative placements has frustrated
Newark’s attempts to move forward from the suspension and provide Z.W. with
educationa l services under his IEP.
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
This case arise s under the Indi viduals with D isabilities Education A ct, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400 to 1482 . One purpose of the Act is to ensure that all children with disabilities
have available to them a “free appropriate public educa tion that emphasizes special
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education and r elated services designed to me et their unique needs a nd prepare them
for further education, employment, and independent living.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) .
This “Free Appropriate Public Education” i s known as FAPE.
In New Jersey, the State Board of Education has promul gated rules following the
standards outline d in the Act. N.J.A.C. 6A:14-1.1(b)(1); N.J.A.C. 6A:14-1.1 to -10.2.
Under those rules, a parent or adult student may request a due process hearing
before an administrative law judge (ALJ) to r esolve disputes "re garding ident ification,
evaluation, re evaluation, classification, educational placement, the provision of a free,
appropriate public edu cation, or disciplinary action." N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.6(a); N.J.A.C.
6A:14-2.7(a).
Further, under N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.7(r), a party may request emergent relief f or the
following issues:
i. Issues involving a break in the delivery of serv ices;
ii. Issues involving disciplinar y action, including
manifestation determinations and determinations of
interim alternate educational settings;
iii. Issues conce rning placement pending t he outcom e of
due process proceedings; and
iv. Issues involving graduation or participation in
graduation ceremonies.
Undeniably, the case involve s Newark’s disciplinary action and a break in the
delivery of services.
Under N.J.A.C. 1:6A-12.1(e), an ALJ may or der emergency relief pending
decision in the case, if the judge determines from the proofs that:
1. The petitioner will suffer irreparable harm if the
requested relief is not granted;
2. The legal r ight underlying the petitioner’s claim is
settled;
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3. The pe titioner has a likelihood of prevailing on the
merits of the un derlying claim; and
4. When the equities and interests of the parties are
balanced, the petitioner will suffer greater harm than the
responden t will suffer if the requeste d relief is not
granted.
[Ibid.]
To be successful, an applicant m ust satisfy all four requirements. Crowe v.
DiGioia, 90 N.J. 26 (1982).
However, a school district can make no changes to the student's program or
placement pending a due process heari ng. N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.6(d)(10); N.J.A.C. 6A:14-
2.7(u); see also , 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). Indeed, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) sets forth one of the
most significant safeguards in the Act, often called the "stay -put" provision. Id. This
section provides that a child is to remain in their "th en-current educational placement"
during the "pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to [IDEA]." Id.; N.J.A.C.
6A:14-2.6(d)(10); N.J.A.C. 6A:14 -2.7(u). The purpose of “stay put” i s to maintain the
status quo for the child w hile the dispute over the placement o r program remains
unresolved. Ringwood Bd. of Educ. v. K.H.J. , 469 F.Supp.2d 267, 270 –71. (D.N.J.
2006.)
Notably, the "stay-put" provision "acts as an automatic preliminar y injunction" and
"protects the status quo of a child's educational pl acement while a parent challenge s a
proposed change to, or elimination of, services." Drinker by Drinker v. Colonial Sch.
Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 864 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing 20 U.S.C. § 1 415(j), the federal
analog to New Jersey's sta y-put provision N.J.A.C 6A:14-2.7(u)). C.H. v. Cape
Henlopen Sch. Dist. , 606 F.3d 59, 71-72 (3d Cir. 2010). In essence, the petitioner need
not demonstrate that she meets the requirements of Crowe v. DiGioia , 90 N.J. 26
(1982), if the stay-put is appropriately invoked. Drinker, 78 F.3d at 864.
Yet, exceptions exist to stay -put. First, although “the child shall remain in the
then-current educational placement of the child,” the parties can agree to a different
placement. 20 U.S.C.S. § 1415(j). Second, stay-put considerations y ield to the intra -
state school district transfer provisions of N.J.A.C. 6A -14-4.1(g), requiring only
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“comparable” services to the prior program. See, J.F. v Byram Twp. Bd. of Educ., 629
F. App’x 235 (3rd Cir. 2015). Third, relevant here, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k ) allows a school
to s uspend, expel, or otherwise alter the educational placement of children with
disabilities. Indeed, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k) and N.J.A.C. 6A:14 -2.8 set fort h the
procedures for disciplining students with disabili ties.
Notably, a stude nt with disabilities su spended for ten days or fewer consecutive
or cumulative school days is subject to the same district board of education procedures
as nondisabled stud ents. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(B). At the time of removal, t he
principal shall forward written notification a nd a description of the reasons for such
action to the case manager and the student's parents. N.J.A.C. 6A:14 -2.8.
Under N.J.A.C. 6A:14 -2.8(c)(1), if a school district suspends a student for more
than ten c onsecutive school days, the suspension is removal , and the removal is a
change in placement. If Central suspended Z.W. for only four days, as argued, the
September 16, 2022, letter to L.J. would s how Newark complied with this requirement.
However, becaus e Newark did not allow Z.W. ba ck to Central, the su spension
continued well beyond ten days. Indeed, I CONCLUDE that Newark unilaterally
changed Z.W.’s placement without L.J.’s consent by removin g Z.W. from Central.
When there is a change in placement ca used by a suspension greater th an ten
consecutive d ays, the district must conduct a manifestation determination by the tenth
day of removal, to determine if the "conduct in question was caused b y, or had a direct
and substantial relationship to, the child's disability; or . . . if the conduct in question w as
the direct result of the district's failure to implement the IEP.” 20 U.S.C. §
1415(k)(1)(E)(i).
If the conduct is determined to be manife station of the student's disability, the
district cannot suspe nd and must return the student to his or her placement, unless the
parent and district agree to change the student's placement. 20 U.S.C.A. §
1415(k)(1)(F)(iii).
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Here, there is no dispute that the manifestation meeting did not occur within ten
days. The October 14, 2022, meeting led to Central’s conclu sion that Z.W.’s actions on
September 16, 2022, were not a manifestation of his disability. That determination
occurred after L.J. filed her pe tition and nearly a month after removing Z.W. from
Central. Newark presents no written decis ion concerning the manifestation meeting.
See, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(k)(1)(H).
Even if the conduct is not a manifestation of the student's disability, discipline
procedures applicable to children without disabilities still app ly. 20 § U.S.C.
1415(k)(1)(C). Further, although suspended, the student must continue to receive the
educational services enabling the student to progress toward meeting the goals set out
in the student's IEP. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(D)(i). Given that the removal from school was
more than t en d ays, N.J.A.C. 6A:16 -7.3, addressing long -term suspensions, would
apply, including an explanation of the student’s due process rights under N.J.A.C.
6A:16-7.1(c)3. Central’s September 16, 2022, suspension letter does n ot apprise L.J. of
her rights concernin g long-term suspensions, and Central provided no additional notice.
While L.J. may not have challenged a four -day suspension concerning the fight she
acknowledges, she disputes that her son was appropriately kept out of school for an
extended period becaus e of that fight.
Notwithstanding, 20 § U.S.C. 1415(k)(1)(G) permits school districts to remove a
disabled student from their educational placement to an interim alternate education
setting for up to forty-five days in specific circumstances, "without reg ard to whether the
behavior is determined to be a manifestation of the child's disability,” including cases
“where a child . . . has inflicted serious b odily injury” while at school. Id.; See also, 20 §
U.S.C. 1415(k)(3)(b)(ii)(II) (allowing such change if the hearing officer concludes “that
maintaining the current placement” of the child is “substantially likely to result in injury to
the child or others”).
In such a situation, under N.J.A.C. 6A:14 -2.7(n), a distri ct must request an
"expedited hearin g" if it seeks "to remove" a student with disabilities from school
because the distric t believes that "it is dangerous for the student to be in the cur rent
placement," but "cannot agree to an appropriate placement" with the parent. Id. 20 §
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U.S.C. 1415(k)(3). L.J. did not accept an alternate placement, but Newark did not file
an expedited due process petition. Failing to file an expedited application before
removal can be considered a denial of FAPE. See, Christine C. v . Hope Twp. Bd. of
Educ., 2021 U.S. Dist. LE XIS 20132. The Christine C. Court relied upon the holding in
Honing v Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 327, 108 S. Ct. 592, 98 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1988 ), addressing
whether school districts can change the placement of a student with a disability contrary
to “stay put” protections when it feels that stu dent is “dangerous”:
Congress attacked [ ] exclusionary practices [particularly
regarding students with emotional disabilities, 82 percent of
whom had unmet needs prior to the IDEA] . . . . and barred
schools, through the stay-put provision, from changing [ ]
placement over the parent's objection until all review
proceedings were completed . . . . and allowed for interim
placements [only] where parents and school officials are
able to agree on one . . . . Conspicuously absent . . . is any
emergency exception for dangerous students.
[Ibid.]
Notably, Honig highlighted the Department of Education ’s observ ation that ,
"[w]hile the [child's] placement may not be changed . . ., this does n ot preclude the
agency from using its normal procedures for dealing with children who are endangering
themselves or others ." 484 U.S. at 325 . Indeed, the 2004 amend ments to the IDEA
after Honig , inc luding 20 § U.S.C. 1415(k) , identify those mechanisms av ailable to
school districts. See also, N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.8, -2.7.
As such, I CONCLUDE that Newark failed to follow procedures required under
20 U.S.C. § 1415(k), N.J.A. C. 6A:14-2.8, and -2.7, to remove Z.W. from Central for the
incident on September 16, 20 22. Therefore, I CONCLUDE Newark must return Z.W. to
Central, his last agreed -upon placement. In other words, Newark did not take the
required steps for Z.W.’s “stay put” at Central to yield. Indeed, I base this determination
on violations of the IDEA a nd stay-put protections rather than a sh owing of eme rgent
relief factors. Drinker, 78 F.3d at 864. See, K.R. & J.W. obo L.W. v. Franklin Twp. BOE
and Y.A.L.E. Sch ool Southeast , OAL Dkt. No. , EDS 1346 -22, Final Decision on
Emergent Relief (February 25, 2022).
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I further CONCLUDE that the parties m ust promptly conduct an IEP meeting to
discuss appropriate placement and whether Z.W. needs additional supports and
services. Still, t he IDEA does not require that a school district place a student at a
specific school chosen by his or her parents. W. Windsor-Plainsboro Reg'l Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ. v. J.S., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25855 (Oct. 31, 2005).
This decision gr ants the relief requested by L.J., and nothing remains in this
action, even though the parties a re still in disagreement. As noted, a mani festation
meeting occurred, and I am dir ecting the parties to conduct the requested IEP meeting.
Regardless, Newark can follow the correct due process procedures concerning its
manifestation determination, includ ing notification, the now long -term suspension, and
an expedited application for due process. Should L.J. dispute tho se actions ,
determinations, or a proposed IEP, she can challenge the outcome. Yet, from the
record, those are future events . I am mindfu l that Newark attempted to address an
appropriate placement given Z.W.’s disruptive behavior and problems at other area high
schools. In other words, Newa rk c ommendably shifted its focus from discipline to
addressing supports that it believed Z.W. needs f or success and graduation, given the
problems occurring in multiple schools. Notably, Newark tried to address L.J.’s
concerns by ensuring Z.W.’s current case manager had an opportunity to speak with his
prior case manager to foster a better understanding of Z.W. given his short time at
Central. L.J. has been unwilling to participate, given her belief that Central did not act
appropriately or have her son’s i nterests in mind. Ultimately, however, the parties must
cooperate and rebuild trust for Z.W.’s sake.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, I ORDER that Newark return Z.W. to Central.
I further ORDER that Central convene an IEP team meeting with L.J. within one
week of this decision and that Newark immediately share information with L.J.
concerning the alternative placements it recommends.
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This decision on application for emergency relief resolves all the issues raised in
the due process complaint; the refore, no further proceedings in this matter are
necessary. This decision on application for emergenc y relief is final pursuant to 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(1)(A) and is appealable by filing a complaint and bringing a civil action
either in the Law Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey or in a district court of the
United States. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). If the parent or adult student feels that th is
decision is not being fully implemented with respect to program or services, this concern
should be communicated in writing to the Director, Office of Special Education.
October 24, 2022
__________________________
DATE NANCI G. STOKES, ALJ
Date Received at Agency _______October 24, 2022___________
Date Mailed to Parties: _______October 24, 2022___________
sej
