NL obo SC v Washington Twp BOE | Case 08217-22 | 2022-11-01
New Jersey special education due-process decision
- Case number
- 08217-22
- Date
- 11/1/2022
- Parties / district (official listing)
- NL obo SC v Washington Twp BOE
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Decision text
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New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
FINAL DECISION-DISMISSAL
OAL DKT. NO. EDS 08217-2022
A GENCY DKT. NO. 2023-34757
N.L. ON BEHALF OF S.C.,
Petitioner,
v.
WASHINGTON TOWNSHIP BOARD
OF EDUCATION,
Respondent.
N.L., petitioner, pro se
Sanmathi Dev, Esq., for respondent (Capehart & Scatchard, P.A., attorneys)
Record Closed: October 27, 2022 Decision: November 1, 2022
BEFORE ELAINE B. FRICK, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner, N.L., on behalf of her minor child, S.C., (parent and student), seek
continuation of the student’s program and placement with the same teacher in the
elementary school for the respondent , Washington Township Board of Education ( the
District). Respondent has filed a motion to d ismiss the due process petition, asserting
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there is no such relief permitted as a matter of law. Petitioner opposes the motion,
contending that S.C. is unique, and the disruption caused to S.C. by moving her to a
different classroom, with a different teacher, is detrimental to the student.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner initiated a mediation- only request with the New Jersey Department of
Education (DOE) on July 6, 2022. Mediation was conducted on July 28, 2022. The matter
was not resolved. Petitioner requested to convert the mediation -only request to a due
process hearing request. The DOE did so. Respondent submitted the Board’s Answer
and Affirmative Defenses to the DOE on August 4, 2022. The matter was transmitted to
the Office of Administrative Law (OAL), where it was docketed on September 21, 2022,
to be heard as a contested case. N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to 14B-15; N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to 14F-
13.
Prior to t he parties attending a settlement conference at the OAL, respondent
submitted a Motion to Dismiss on September 30, 2022, to the settlement conference
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The settlement conference was conducted on October
4, 2022. The matter w as not resolved, and was thus assigned to the undersigned ALJ
for a hearing.
A telephonic conference was conducted with the parties on October 7, 2022. A
briefing schedule was set for the Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner submitted written
opposition to the motion on October 11, 2022. Respondent’s reply letter brief was
submitted on October 19, 2022. Oral argument was heard telephonically on October 27,
2022. The record closed on that date.
FACTUAL DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
Based upon the written submissions and argument presented by the parties,
certain facts were undisputed, and I thus FIND as FACTS the following:
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The student, S.C., is currently nine years old. The child is classified as multiply
disabled. Petitioner describes S.C. as having “a very rare genetic mutation leaving her
to be a very complex, non- verbal child with severe disability.” (Parental request for
mediation submission.) The student is in the multiple disabilities classroom placement,
pursuant to the most recent In dividualized Educational Program (IEP) from the annual
meeting in January 2022. That IEP continued placement of the student in the multiple
disabilities classroom for the remainder of the 2021– 2022 school year; provided for
Extended School Year (ESY) in t he summer of 20 22; and continued placement of the
student in the multiple disabilities classroom for the 2022–2023 school year.
Per her parent, S.C. has been in the same program and placement for four years,
with the same classroom teacher, Ms. M.C. , and the same aides. The District agreed
that Ms. M.C. was the teacher for S.C.’s classroom for the 2021 –2022 school year.
Counsel for the District could not affirmatively agree during oral argument that Ms. M.C.
and the same individuals who serve as aides in the multiply disabled classroom were the
exact same staff going back four years.
For the 2022–2023 school year, S.C. has been placed in the same program, the
multiply disabled class, pursuant to the January 2022 IEP. However, the physical
classroom has changed and there is a different teacher.
Arguments of the parties
The District contends that the due process petition should be dismissed as there
is no legal basis for petitioner ’s request to keep the student with the same teacher , Ms.
M.C. The District asserts that the student is in the appropriate placement, which is not
disputed by petitioner; and that petitioner has acknowledged, in her opposition filing, that
there is no law stating the District must grant her request for a specific teacher.
Petitioner’s request is seeking relief that is not permitted under the law and thus should
be dismissed, as there is no legal basis to mandate that the parent’s request for a specific
teacher must be awarded.
Petitioner does not dispute the programming for the student. She seeks to keep
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S.C. with the same classroom teacher, Ms. M.C., she has had in the past, for the next
two academic years to minimize disruption to S.C. Petitioner asserts that S.C. is a very
unique and rare student, and does not cope well with change. She believes the classroom
environment, in which S.C. has been in with Ms. M.C. , allowed S. C. to thrive and
progress. Petitioner recognizes that S.C. will have to move to the middle school in two
years. Petitioner seeks to minimize the anticipated negative impact w hich will occur to
S.C. if she does not remain with the same teacher now, recognizing that they must cope
with such disruption in two years when S.C. will transition from the elementary school
building to the middle school building. Petitioner understands that personnel and staffing
decisions are within the discretion of the District , yet asserts that a parent’s request in a
situation that is unique, such as with her daughter, S.C., should “hold a lot more weight.”
(Petitioner’s opposition filing.)
Petitioner has asserted, during oral argument , that she requested that the C hild
Study Team (CST) reconvene, which meeting did occur towards the end of the last school
year. She asserts it was discussed during that meeting that she wanted S.C. to remain
with the same teacher for the 2022–2023 school year. Petitioner contends that the school
did some “trials” with S.C. by placing her in a different classroom with a different teacher
for fifteen minutes while she had a snack. She acknowledged the student did well since
she is fine while snacking. Petitioner’s concern is that S.C., who is non-verbal, can have
extreme “melt downs” and it is hard to snap her out of it. Her former teacher, Ms. M.C. ,
was very good at picking up on cues from S.C.
Petitioner filed her request for mediation- only, which was converted into the
pending due process petition when she learned that the school would be continuing S.C.’s
placement in the same program but that her physical classroom would change and the
teacher would not be Ms. M.C. Petitioner wanted to stop that change from occurring, and
keep S.C. in the same physical classroom with teacher, Ms. M.C., for the next two years.
She seeks to minimize any disruptions to S.C., until the time that change will be necessary
when transitioning from the elementary school to the middle school.
Respondent contends that it cannot agree with the information asserted by
petitioner regarding S.C.’s condition. Further, even though a CST meeting may have
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occurred towards the end of the school year, it does not always result in a new or modified
IEP. Respondent recognizes the very personal struggles parents endure regarding their
children; here, however, there is simply no legal basis for the relief sought by petitioner,
and the petition should be dismissed.
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
The Federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400
et seq., was enacted to ensure that children with disabilities have access to a Free
Appropriate Public Education (FAPE). 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1). IDEA provides the
framework for special education in New Jersey, as reflected in New Jersey statutes
N.J.S.A. 18A:46 -1 to 46- 55 and regulations at N.J.A.C. 6A:14- 1.1 to 14 -10.2. IDEA
requires states to implement polic ies and procedures to ensure disabled students are
provided FAPE.
FAPE includes special education instruction and related services designed to meet
the needs of a child. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9); N.J.A.C. 6A:14-1.1, et seq. The primary
method of ensuring delivery of FAPE is through an IEP. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A). An
IEP outlines the child’s present levels of academic achievement and functioning, outlines
measurable goals and the services to be provided, and establishes objective criteria for
evaluating the child’s progress. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i); C.H. v. Cape Henlopen
School District, 606 F.3d 59, 65 (3d Cir. 2010).
IDEA leaves the interpretation of FAPE to the courts. See Ridgewood Bd. of Educ.
v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 247 (3d Cir. 1999). In Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Central
School District v. Rowley , 458 U.S. 176 (1982), the United States Supreme Court held
that a S tate provides a disabled child with FAPE if it provides “ personalized instruction
with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that
instruction.” Id. at 203. The Court reasoned that IDEA was intended to bring previously
excluded disabled children into the public education systems of the States and to require
the States to adopt procedures that w ould “result in individualized consideration of and
instruction for each child.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189. IDEA was amended by Congress in
1997, subsequent to Rowley. The amendments focused on ensuring that students with
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disabilities receive a “quality public education” and not just “some benefit.” Forest Grove
School District v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 239 (2009).
Here, the District will have satisfied the requirements of the law by providing S.C.
with personalized instruction and sufficient support services which “are necessary to
permit the child ‘to benefit’ from the instruction.” G.B. v. Bridgewater-Raritan Regional Bd
of Educ., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15671 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2009), citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at
189. IDEA does not require the District to maximize S.C.’s potential or provide her the
best education possible, or a specific program of instruction, or placement with a specific
teacher. Instead, IDEA requires a school district to provide a basic floor of opportunity ,
with an education that provides significant learning and meaningful benefit to the student.
Carlisle Area Sch ools v. Scott P., 62 F. 3d 520, 533– 34 (3d Cir. 1995) ; Ridley School
District v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Circ. 2012). A school d istrict must offer an IEP
that is “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of
the child's circumstances.” Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District RE-1, 580 U.S.
386, 349 (2017).
The New Jersey Administrative Code permits the filing of motions to be made in
administrative hearings. N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.1, et seq. A Motion to Dismiss is not specifically
enumerated under the Administrative Code, but an ALJ may proceed in the absence of a
specific regulation, in accordance with the New Jersey Court Rules, to achieve “just
results, simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of
unjustifiable expense and delay.” N.J.A.C. 1:1- 1.3(a). The New Jersey Court Rules
provide that a party may move for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. R. 4:6-2(e).
A reviewing court must search a complaint “in depth and with liberality” to ascertain
whether a cause of action “may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim.”
Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989), citati on
omitted. At this preliminary stage of litigation, a reviewing tribunal “is not concerned with
the ability of plaintiffs to prove the allegation contained in the complaint” and “plaintiffs are
entitled to every reasonable inference of fact.” Id., citations omitted. A “generous and
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hospitable approach” must be taken when examining the allegations of fact within a
complaint. Id.
The common method for resolving a case on the papers in an administrative
proceeding, without a hearing, is by a motion for summary decision under N.J.A.C. 1:1 –
12.5. The New Jersey Court Rule regarding a motion to dismiss specifies that if the
dismissal is sought based upon failure to state a claim , and if matters outside the initial
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, then the motion shall be treated
as a summary judgment motion, which is the equivalent motion to an administrative law
summary decision motion. R. 4:6-2; N.J.A.C. 1:1–12.5.
A party in an administrative law matter “may move for summary decision upon all
or any of the substantive issues in a contested case.” N.J.A.C. 1:1–12.5(a). The motion
“shall be served with briefs and with or without supporting affidavits” and t he decision
“may be rendered if the papers and discovery which have been filed, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged
and that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” N.J.A.C. 1:1–12.5(b).
The non-moving party will prevail if they “set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue which can only be determined in an evidentiary proceeding.” Id. , See R.
4:46-2 and Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).
When rendering a determination on a motion for summary judgment, “the ‘judge’s
function is not . . . to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to
determine whether there is a genuine issue for tri al.’” Brill at 540, citing Anderson v .
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Summary judgment, like summary
decision, “is designed to provide a prompt, businesslike and inexpensive method of
disposing of any case” upon a discriminating search of the merits of the pleadings and
documentation presented for such a motion. Brill at 540, citations omitted. If such a
search of the information demonstrates there is no genuine issue of material fact requiring
disposition at a hearing, the motion shall be granted. Id. “An evidentiary hearing is
mandated only when the proposed administrative action is based on disputed
adjudicatory facts.” In re Farmers’ Mutual Fire Assurance Association of New Jersey, 256
N.J. Super. 607, 618 (App. Div. 1992).
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Here, there is no dispute as to the programming and placement of the student,
pursuant to her most recent IEP. S.C. is in the appropriate program pursuant to the IEP.
The dispute is the parent’s desire for the student to remain with the same classroom
teacher, Ms. M.C., under whom petitioner asserts the student has progressed and thrived.
Petitioner contends that S.C. does not cope well with change, and seeks to minimize
disruption to the student caused by changing her teacher, knowing that S.C. will need to
cope with change in two years when transitioning from the elementary school to the
middle school. Petitioner is concerned that due to S.C.’s condition, regression typically
occurs from age nine through twelve. She cannot say for certain if some recent observed
instances of the student’s behaviors are due to her medical condition or difficulty in
adapting to the change of the classroom and teacher.
Respondent contends that the matter shall be dismissed, as there is no legal basis
for the parent to dictate the specific teacher or personnel for their student . In the matter
of L.Z. and S.Z. on behalf of K.Z. v. Springfield Twp. Board of Education, OAL Dkt No.
EDS 09419-06, 2007 N.J. Agen Lexis 684 (October 5, 2007), the parents sought a specific
individual to continue to provide services for their child. The ALJ did not grant the relief,
as there was no showing that the school’s replacement provider resulted in the denial of
FAPE. The ALJ emphasized that “the District has the discretion and prerogative to select
personnel.” Id. at *20-21.
There is no legal basis to support petitioner’s contention that the student shall
remain with the same teacher, Ms. M.C., for this academic school year, 2022–2023. The
IEP is being followed, with placement in the multiply disabled classroom. It is thus
deemed reasonably calculated to enable S.C. to make appropriate progress in light of her
circumstances. Endrew F. 580 U.S. at 349. It is recognized that the parent’s impassioned
plea for her child to have the least disruption possible, and keep her progressing, is a
genuine concern. This does not demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact is in
dispute. Nothing has been demonstrated or asserted that the need for this specific
teacher is to ensure FAPE is provided. There is no right under the law to be placed with
a specific staff member teacher. I thus CONCLUDE that with no basis in law for the relief
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sought by petitioner, the Motion to Dismiss should be GRANTED and the matter shall be
DISMISSED.
ORDER
It is ORDERED that respondent’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and the petition
shall be DISMISSED.
This decision is final pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(1)(A) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.514
(2022) and is appealable by filing a complaint and bringing a civil action either in the Law
Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey or in a district court of the United States. 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2); 34 C.F.R. § 300.516 (2022). If the parent or adult student feels that
this decision is not being fully implemented with respect to program or services, this
concern should be communicated, in writing, to the Director, Office of Special Education.
November 1, 2022
DATE ELAINE B. FRICK, ALJ
Date Received at Agency:
Date Mailed to Parties:
EBF/jns
