PR and AR obo PR v Wayne Township BOE | Case 11066-20 | 2020-12-16
New Jersey special education due-process decision
- Case number
- 11066-20
- Date
- 12/16/2020
- Parties / district (official listing)
- PR and AR obo PR v Wayne Township BOE
Open saved decision PDF · Official source
This page reproduces text extracted from the public decision. The saved PDF controls formatting and wording. No attorney-reviewed summary has been added.
Decision text
Page 1
New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
FINAL DECISION - EMERGENT RELIEF
OAL DKT. NO. EDS 11066-20
AGENCY DKT. NO. 2021-32336
P.R. AND A.R. ON BEHALF OF P.R.,
Petitioners,
v.
WAYNE TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Respondent.
___________________________________
P.R. and A.R., petitioners pro se
Carolyn R. Chaudry , Esq., for respondent Wayne Town ship Board of Education
(Scarinci and Hollenbeck, attorneys)
Record Closed1: December 16, 2020 Decided: December 16, 2020
BEFORE GAIL M. COOKSON, ALJ:
Petitioners P.R. and A.R. filed their due process petition on or about April 14,
2020, on behalf of their son P.R., who is fourteen years old and in eighth grade in the
Wayne Township Board of Education (District). [OAL Dkt. EDS 4308-20.] On or before
1This matter is final with record closed only as t o the Application for Emergent Relief. As set forth below,
the due process petition remains at the OAL.
Page 2
OAL DKT. NO. EDS 11066-20
2
that date, the District filed a separate petition seeking an order denying a parental request
for
Page 3
OAL DKT. NO. EDS 11066-20
3
independent evaluations. [OAL Dkt. EDS 4322-20.] It is not disputed that P.R. is entitled
to special educational services under the Individuals wi th Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA), 20 U.S.C.A. §1400 et seq., as a child classified with Autism . On or about
March 30, 2020 , the parents and the CST convened for an Individual Education Plan
(IEP) review meeting. The challenged IEP set forth that P.R. would be educated at an
out-of-district placement at the Mount Carmel Guild School in West Orange , New
Jersey. The petitioners did not agree with this placement because of major safety and
educational concerns on their part.
The Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP) transmitted the petitions to the
Office of Administrative Law (OAL) on or about April 22, 2020. The cases were assigned
to the Honorable Ellen S. Bass, A.L.J. On or about May 14, 2020, hearing dates were set
down f or July 20-22, 2020. In June 2020, the matters were re -assigned to the
undersigned. Numerous case management and settlement conferences have been
conducted in th e interim, including on some of the s cheduled and rescheduled hearing
dates. The current Cov id-19 state of emergency has impacted both the processing of
these cases and the underlying educational program for P.R.: (1) Mount Carmel no longer
had an opening for P.R. in September 2020 ; and (2) petitioners opted for all -virtual
learning for P.R. because of an at-risk, multi-generational household. Accordingly, many
of our off -the-record discussions have revolved around a n appropriate placement when
and if petitioners agree that P.R. can be taught in-person.
On or about December 3, 2020, petitioners filed an application for emergent relief
with OSEP seeking an immediate placement of P.R. in the autism program at Caldwell
University because their son is in crisis and has not had a full day of school allegedly
since September 2019 . Apparently, and as d iscussed herein, this was triggered by a
settlement proposal floated by the District in mid-November. OSEP transmitted just the
emergency application to the OAL on December 4, 2020. Because of the underlying due
process petition, the request for emergency relief was also assigned to the undersigned.
The District filed a Letter -Brief in Opposition and support ing certifications prior to the
argument on December 16, 2020. The emergency application was scheduled for oral
argument on December 16, 2020, on which date the record closed.
Page 4
OAL DKT. NO. EDS 11066-20
4
LEGAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
For the reasons set forth on the reco rd and after due consideration of the written
submissions and oral argument received, I CONCLUDE that petitioners ’ request for
emergent relief must be DENIED.
Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.7(r), emergent relief shall only be requested for the
following issues:
i. Issues involving a break in the delivery of services;
ii. Issues involving disciplinary action, including
manifestation determinations an d determinations of interim
alternate educational settings;
iii. Issues concerning placement pending the outcome of due
process proceedings; and
iv. Issues involving graduation or participation in graduation
ceremonies.
Here, the application for emergen t relief concerns placement pending the outcome of
due process proceedings in accordance with N.J.A.C. 6A:14 -2.7(r)(1)(iii). Before
analyzing the legal criteria for emergent relief, it is important to recognize the “stay-put”
provision under the Individua ls with Disabilities Education Act ( “IDEA”), 20 U.S.C.A. §
1400, et seq.; 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(j). That provi sion and its count erpart in the New
Jersey Administrative Code require that a child remain in his or her current educational
placement “during the pendency of any administrative or judicial proceeding regarding a
due process complaint. ” 34 C.F.R. § 300.51 8(a); N.J.A.C. 6A: 14-2.7(u). The stay-put
provision functions as an automatic preliminary injunction and it assures stability and
consistency in th e student's education by preserving the status quo of the student's
current educational placement until the proceedings under the IDEA are finalized.
Page 5
OAL DKT. NO. EDS 11066-20
5
Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist. , 78 F.3d 859, 864 --65 (3d Cir. 1996) ; Susquenita Sch.
Dis't v. Raelee S., 96 F.3d 78, 82 (3d Cir. 1996).
Therefore, petitioners, who are seeking to alter the status quo or change t he
stay-put placement, have the burden of satisfying the requisite emergent relief
standards. As set forth in N.J.A.C. 1:6A -12.1(e), N.J.A.C. 6A:14 -2.7(s), and N.J.A.C.
6A:3-1.6(b), codifying Crowe v. DeGoia , 90 N.J. 126 (1986), an application for
emergent relief will be granted only if it meets all four of the following requirements.
The touchstone of emergent relief is whe ther irreparable harm wil l befall the
petitioning party prior to the ability of the forum to hear the underlying merits of the due
process petition. Thus, it is well established that a judge may order e mergent relief if
the judge determines that the balan ce of equities favors gra nting relief. My.
determination is controlled by N.J.A.C. 1:6A-12.1, which provides that a judge may
order emergency relief pending issuance of the final decision in a special e ducation
matter if it appears from the proofs that:
1. The petitioner will suffer irreparable harm if the requested relief
is not granted;
2. The legal right underlying the petitioner's claim is settled;
3. The petitioner has a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of the
underlying claim; and
4. When the equities and interests of the parties are balanced, the
petitioner will suffer greater harm than the respondent will suffer if
the requested relief is not granted.
See also N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.6; N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.7(s); and Crowe v. DeGioia , 102 N.J. 50
(1986), which echoes the re gulatory standard for this extraordinary relief. It is well
established that a moving party must satisfy all four prongs of the regulatory standard to
establish an entitlement to emergent relief. See also: Crowe at 132-35. I CONCLUDE
that petitioners cannot meet the standard for an award of emergent relief and that their
application must be denied.
Page 6
OAL DKT. NO. EDS 11066-20
6
As stated, and supported by the District, in the special education context,
irreparable harm is general ly substantiated when there is a substantial risk of ph ysical
injury to the child, or others, or when there is a significant interruption in or termination
of educational services. M.H. v. Milltown Board of Education , 2004 N.J. AGEN LEXIS
677 (OAL Dkt. No. EDS 8411-03). For example, in S.V., M.R. and G.R. o/b/o K.V., E.R.
and F.H. v. Board of Educ. of the City of Camden , 2012 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 537, the
Court found n o irreparable harm where students are left in their current placements
which parents are clai ming are not in general providing an appropriate educat ion but
provide no credible evidence to support their claims. See also J.P. o/b/o J.P. v.
Pemberton Bd. of E duc., 2001 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 278, *29 -30 (finding that
compensatory serv ices available under th e IDEA is a form of relief which resembles
actions to recover damages caused by another.).
In M.H., the parents of a five -year old preschool student sought to c hange their
child’s agreed upon placement to include attendance at a p rivate out of district school
through emergent relief. The ALJ held that the parents were not entitled to emergent
relief as the student would not experience irreparable harm if the req uested relief was
not granted. In the decision on the underlying due process matter in that case, the ALJ
expounded upon his decision, noting that during the emergent relief hearing, he could
not make a preliminary determination on the appropriateness of the IEP’s placement to
find irreparable harm. M.H., 2004 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 677 at *2.
Petitioners’ present emergent application seeks to change their son’s current
virtual Covid-19 home instruction wherein he has only b een receiving a couple of hours
of in struction per day, some of which they claim he cannot access because o f his
emotional and learning issues. They claim that the District is refusing to find a full-time
placement for P.R. and that is the heart of this e mergency application : a request to
mandate the location of an acceptable out -of-district pla cement, which m akes th eir
application similar to that discussed in M.H..
Petitioners describe P.R. as having Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and
is subject to sensory overload and extreme noise sensitivities. Petitione rs have
Page 7
OAL DKT. NO. EDS 11066-20
7
sometimes argued that their son canno t be placed in a classroom with o ther peers
unless they can have veto power o ver the specific peers. They ha ve also argued at
times that he is not ready to be in a classroom with any pe ers. They also argue that
P.R. has regressed during this period of Covid virtual home instruction and the previous
months of in-home instruction. He has becom e more inhibited and socially deficient
because of isolation from peers. They acknowledge in this application that “[h]is anxiety
and long absence from a classroom will require the care of highly trained pro fessionals
to monitor him for safety and psychological reasons. It will be difficult for our son at first
and these supports are needed to make sure he transitions smoothly back into social
settings with limited negative reactions.” [Pg. 3.]
Specifically, petitioners seek o n a n expedite d basis that P.R. be provided with
immediate therapeutic ca re in conjunction with a hands -on IEP of a placement with
additional upper tier supports of psychological professionals and BCBA supervision.
They claim he must be provided with a full -time progra m which can provide close
monitoring, so cialization opportunities, and routine physical activities. Petitioners’
research informed them that Caldwell Univer sity Center for Autism and Applied
Behavioral Analysis (Caldwell), which has been accepted as a Naples placement,
N.J.S.A. 18A:46-14, was an appropriate placement for P.R. Independently and without
prior or contemporary notice to the District , petitioners asked Caldwell to undertake an
intake of P.R. on or about November 25, 2020 , and set forth that th e center has
accepted him for immediat e enrollment . [Caldwell Letter, dated November 30, 2020 .]
Accordingly, petitioners herein request an Order mandating P.R. be placed at Caldwell
with transportation provided by the District.
Respondent argue s that petitioner cannot be granted this e xtraordinary relief in
the form of a mandatory, unilateral out -of-district placement because the relief sought is
not likely to succeed at a hearing on the merits, and at this emergency stage, cannot be
supported. The District also claims that it has been willing and able to provide P.R. with
an appropriate educational program sup ported by in -district resources , in a hybrid
learning environment of 2:1 in -person support and virtual learning and behavioral
supports in the home.
Page 8
OAL DKT. NO. EDS 11066-20
8
I agree with the District and CONCLUDE that petitioners have not met the Crowe
emergent facto rs because p etitioners have also not demonstrated a likelihood of
success on the meri ts. It is well-settled that a school district satisfies the requirements
of law by providing personalized instruction and sufficient supports services “as are
necessary to permit [th e student] to ‘benefit’ from the instruction . G.B. and D.B. o/b/o
J.B. v. Brid gewater-Raritan Reg’l. Bd. of Educ. , 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 15671(D.N .J.
2009)(citing Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley , 458 U.S. 176,
203, (1982). The IDEA does not require that a school district maximize a student’s
potential or prov ide him the best education possible. Instead, the IDEA requires a
school district to provide a basic floor of opportunity. Carlisle Area Sch. Dist. v. Scott P.,
62 Fed 520, 533-34 (3d Cir. 1995) See also Bayonne Bd. of Educ. v. L.Y. o/b/o J.Y. and
Elysian Charter Sch., 2010 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 438, *31-32.
I also CONCLUDE that petitioners have not supported their argument that P.R.
will suffer irreparable harm. Parents who disagre e with an IEP’s proposed program or
placement may make a unilateral plac ement while due process is pending , at their
financial risk . N.J.A.C. 6A:14 -2.10. The IDEA authorize s tuition reimbursement for
parents who unilaterally decide to place their child in an out-of-district school if the IEP
proposed by the school district fails to offer the child a FAPE and the placement the
parents chose was appropriate under the IDEA , although not necessarily an
unapproved school . Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S.
359, 370, 105 S. Ct. 1996, 85 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1985); Florence Cty. Sch. Dist. Four v.
Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15, 114 S. Ct. 361, 126 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1993). Therefore, any harm
is actually reparable through a later award of tuition reimbursement.
The petitioner ’s argument that Caldwell could be approved on an emergency
basis as a Naples placement is unavailing. As stated by the c ourts, ”the terminology
used in the last sentence of the [N.J.S.A. 18A:46-14 “Naples Amendment”] further
clarifies that the Amendment governs only placements recommended by a child study
team and effectuated by the [local education agency (LEA)].” Therefore, it has been
held that this language makes clear that Naples does not apply to unilateral parental
Page 9
OAL DKT. NO. EDS 11066-20
9
placements. L.M. v. Evesham Twp. Bd. of Educ., 256 F. Supp. 2d 290, 300 (D.N.J.
2003). It is also premature on this record. A private therapeutic placement, such as at
Caldwell, is one of the most restrictive type s of placement and is only granted in very
limited circumstances. N.J.S.A. 18A:46 -14. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); Oberti v.
Bd. of Educ. of Clementon Sch. Dist. , 995 F.2d 1204, 1214 (3d Cir . 1993). This forum
can only reach a conclusion for such a placement on a comp lete record and only after
the District has had the opportunity to carry its burden of proving that the IEP provided
FAPE to P.R.
Furthermore, I CONCLUDE that petitioners ’ objections and concerns about an
unexecuted proposed settlement position of the District is neither a compellin g nor a
lawful basis upon which to grant emergent relief. The settlement proposal presented to
petitioners by the District under cover of November 13, 2020 , has not been agreed
upon by both parties . It is entirely inappropriate for its outline to be considered as
evidence of a nything other than an attempt at a resolution. Under the well -established
principle that discussions toward an amicable reso lution are most fruitful when they are
conducted in confidence and without fear of publication, s ettlement proposals may not
be submitted into the record. See, e.g., N.J.R.E. 408.
“[T]here is a vital public policy in encouraging voluntary dispute resolution that
would be thwarted if a settlement proposal could only be made at the peril of knowing
that it could be used in court against the maker of the proposal if no settlement was
achieved.” Wyatt [v. Wyatt], 217 N.J. Super. [580,] 586 [(App. Div. 1987)]; see also
McCormick on Evidence § 266 at 411 (Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999) (noting the “social
desirability of promoting settlements of controversies over disputed claims”). Accord
Ciolli v. Iravani, 625 F. Supp. 2d 276, 285 (E.D. Pa. 2009 ). New Jersey Evidence
Rule 408 reflects this tradition . Brown v. Pica, 360 N.J. Super. 565, 570 (Law Div.
2001).
In sum, petitioners’ demand that I review and reject a proposed and unex ecuted
settlement offer in favor of their unilateral , preemptive pla cement of P.R. at Caldwell
Page 10
OAL DKT. NO. EDS 11066-20
10
must be denied. The issues involved in an appropriate placement in the least restrictive
setting are complex and must abide a plenary hearing or a new IEP.2
ORDER
ACCORDINGLY, it is ORDERED that petitioners’ application for emergent relief is
and the same is hereby DENIED.
This decision on application for emergency relief shall remain in effect until the
issuance of the decision on the merits in this matter. The hearing having been
requested by the parents, this matter is he reby returned to the Department of Education
for a local resolution session, pursuant to 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415 (f)(1)(B)(i). If the parent
or adult student feels that this decision is not being fully implemented with respect to
program or services, this conc ern should be communicated in writing to the Directo r,
Office of Special Education Policy and Dispute Resolution.
December 16, 2020
DATE GAIL M. COOKSON, ALJ
Date Received at Agency 12/16/20_________________________
Date Mailed to Parties: 12/16/20_________________________
id
2 In fact, i t appears that t he March 2020 IEP which formed the basis of the pending due process petition
might be moot and in need of immediate amendment due to circumstances outside the control of either
party because of both Covid and the lack of the designated out -of-district placement speci fied therein.
This will have to be the subject of a separate determinat ion on those other OAL matters. I have required
expedited briefing on th e issue of mootness insofar as negotiations have f ailed to result in a mutually
agreeable replacement IEP.
Page 11
OAL DKT. NO. EDS 11066-20
11
LIST OF EXHIBITS IN EVIDENCE
For Petitioner:
P-1 Naples exemplar
For Respondent:
None.
