SM obo LT v. Mahwah Township BOE | Case 10020-22 | 2023-04-05
New Jersey special education due-process decision
- Case number
- 10020-22
- Date
- 04/05/2023
- Parties / district (official listing)
- SM obo LT v. Mahwah Township BOE
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Decision text
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New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
FINAL DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDS 10020-22
AGENCY DKT. NO. 2023-34827
S.M. ON BEHALF OF L.T.,
Petitioner,
v.
MAHWAH TOWNSHIP BOARD
OF EDUCATION,
Respondent.
__________________________
S.M., petitioner, pro se
Nathanya G. Simon, Esq., for respondent (Scarinci & Hollenbeck , attorneys)
Record Closed: March 23, 2023 Decided: April 5, 2023
BEFORE MARGARET M. MONACO, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter arises under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1400, et seq., (the IDEA), and the implementing federal and state regulations. S.M., on
behalf of her daughter, L.T., contests L.T.’s placement at the Inclusive Learning Academy
(ILA).
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On or about August 9, 2022, petitioner filed a request for due process (the Petition)
with the Office of Special Education (OSE). The OSE transmitted the matter to the Office
of Administrative Law (OAL), where it was filed for hearing on November 7, 2022. On or
about November 21, 2022, the Mahwah Township Board of Education (the District) filed
its Answer to Petition For Due Process With Affirmative Defenses . A prehearing
conference was held on January 24, 2023, and a prehearing order was issued on January
30, 2023, which memorialize s that the hearing was scheduled for March 28, 2023. The
prehearing order further provides that the District “intends to file a m otion that the within
matter is moot”; the District “shall file the motion on or before February 10, 2023”; and
“[p]etitioner shall file a response on or before February 24, 2023.” On February 9, 2023,
the District filed a motion for summary decision and submitted a brief with supporting
exhibits, along with a certification of the District’s Director of Special Services, Lisa Rizzo.
Petitioner did not respond to the motion by the February 24, 2023 deadline. On March 3,
2023, counsel for the Board request ed a ruling on the motion since petitioner had not
withdrawn the Petition or filed a response to the motion. Petitioner later sent an e -mail
on March 3, 2023 , advising that she was “going to officially respond” to the motion and
requesting advice regarding the “deadline for [her] response.” In response, I informed the
parties by e-mail on March 3, 2023, that, although the deadline for petitioner’s submission,
as discussed during the prehearing conference and memorialized in the prehearing order,
was February 24, 2023, I would extend the time in which petitioner could file a response
to March 8, 2023. Petitioner filed a response to the motion on March 8, 2023. In view of
the pending motion, and the undersigned’s request for supplemental submission s, the
hearing was adjourned at the District’s request and resc heduled for April 17, 2023 . On
March 16, 2023, the District filed a supplemental brief with a supporting exhibit, along with
second certification of Lisa Rizzo (Rizzo Cert.). On March 23, 2023, petitioner filed a
response accompanied by various do cumentation.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
Based upon a review of the documentary evidence presented, I FIND the following
pertinent FACTS:
L.T. is twelve years of age and in the seventh grade. (Rizzo Cert. ¶ at 2.) Pursuant
to the May 2022 IEP in place at the time petitioner filed her Petition, L.T. was deemed eligible
for special education and related services under the classification category of multiply
disabled. (Ibid.)1 See May 2022 IEP attached as Exhibit C to the District’s February 9, 2023
brief. Prior to the 2022–2023 school year, L.T. attended an out of d istrict placement,
ILA. (Rizzo Cert. at ¶ 4.) The May 2022 IEP provided for the continuation of an out of
district placement for the 2022 –2023 school year , and the District was prepared to
continue placement at ILA. See May 2022 IEP; Rizzo Cert. at ¶ 4.
On or about August 9, 2022, petitioner filed the instant Petition contesting L.T.’s
placement at ILA.2 In her Petition, petitioner describes how the problem can be resolved as
follows:
Temporary placement back in district until new placement,
mutually agreed upon, is selected. District behaviorist, Mrs.
Bussellini, Regina, who has 1:1 history, oversee & write a new
behavior plan.
On August 23, 2022, ILA notified petitioner and Distric t staff that ILA would not be
reopening in September 2022 due to decreased enrollment. See August 23, 2022 e-mail
attached as Exhibit D to the District’s February 9, 2023 brief; Rizzo Cert. at ¶ 4. 3
On August 26, 2022, the District convened a meeting with school staff and the
parents to discuss the change in placement that now needed to occur for the 2022–2023
1 L.T.’s classification category was recently changed to specific learning disability. (Rizzo Cert. at ¶ 2.)
2 Petitioner also filed a request for emergent relief ( OAL Dkt. No. EDS 06913-22), seeking an immediate
change in placement from ILA. See Exhibit A attached to the District’s February 9, 2023 brief. By Decision
dated August 18, 2022, Administrative Law Judge Ernest M. Bongiovanni denied petitioner’s application “ to
immediately change L.T.’s continued out of district placement at [ILA], pending a final due process hearing[.]”
See Final Decision Denying Emergent Relief attached to the District’s March 16, 2023 brief.
3 Petitioner filed a second request for emergent relief on or about August 24, 2022 (OAL Dkt. No. EDS
07399-22), which , according to the OAL’s records, was ultimately withdrawn. See Exhibit B attached to the
District’s February 9, 2023 brief.
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OAL DKT. NO. EDS 10020 -22
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school year. At that meeting, the parents indicated that they wanted L.T. to return to
attend school in Mahwah , and a plan was developed for L.T. to return to a program and
placement in Mahwah. See Rizzo Cert. at ¶ 4; meeting notes dated August 26, 2022
attached as Exhibit E to the District’s February 9, 2023 brief.4
L.T. transitioned into the program starting on the first day of school in September
2022 and continues in the program in District to date. (Rizzo Cert. at ¶ 4.) A new IEP for
the program and placement in Mahwah was developed and formalized in October 2022.
See Id. at ¶¶ 4, 6; October 2022 IEP attached as Exhibit G to the District’s February 9,
2023 brief.5
LEGAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1 -12.5(b), summary decision “may be rendered if the papers
and discovery which have been filed, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to
prevail as a matter of law.” This rule is substantially similar to the summary-judgment rule
embodied in the New Jersey Court Rules. See Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of
Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 74 (1954). In Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Co., 142 N.J. 520, 540
(1995), the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the appropriate test to be emplo yed in
deciding the motion:
4 The District’s brief notes that petitioner had filed a petition for due process during the 2021–2022 school
year challenging aspects to the ILA program and placement, and the District had filed a petition for due
process opposing the request for an independent FBA. These matters were assigned to Administrative
Law Judge Thomas R. Betancourt and consolida ted (OAL Dkt. Nos. EDS 00823 -22 and EDS 02482 -22).
Based on the change in L.T.’s placement, the District filed a motion for summary decision, arguing that the
due process issues were moot. On November 30, 2022, Judge Betancourt issued a Final Decision gr anting
the District’s motion for summary decision and dismissing petitioner’s petition for due process with
prejudice. In this regard, Judge Betancourt explained: “None of the relief requested in Petitioner’s due
process is available as ILA is closed. T hat matter is moot. This is inclusive of Petitioner’s request for an
independent FBA, as that request is directly related to the program at ILA.” See Final Decision attached
as Exhibit H to the District’s February 9, 2023 brief.
5 The District’s brief notes that petitioner filed a due process petition after L.T. transitioned into Mahwah
involving the October 2022 IEP and the program in Mahwah that started in September 2022 , which is
pending before Administrative Law Judge Elissa Mizzone Testa ( OAL Dkt. Nos . EDS 11066- 22 and EDS
00426-23).
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[A] determination whether there exists a “genuine issue” of
material fact that precludes summary judgment requires the
motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential
materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable
to the non -moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational
factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the
non -moving party. The “judge’s function is not . . . to weigh
the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but t o
determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” . . . . If
there exists a single, unavoidable resolution of the alleged
disputed issue of fact, that issue should be considered
insufficient to constitute a “genuine” issue of material fact for
purposes of Rule 4:46-2.
[Citations omitted.]
In evaluating the merits of the motion, all inferences of doubt are drawn against
the movant and in favor of the party against whom the motion is directed . Judson , 17
N.J. at 75. However, “[w]hen a motion for summary decision is made and supported, an
adverse party in order to prevail must by responding affidavit set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue which can only be determined in an evidentiary
proceeding.” N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b). The New Jersey Supreme Court has cautioned that,
“if the opposing party offers no affidavits or matter in opposition, or only facts which are
immaterial or of an insubstantial nature, a mere scintilla, . . . ‘[f]anciful, frivolous, gauzy or
merely suspicious’ . . ., he will not be heard to complain if the court grants summary
judgment, taking as true the statement of uncontradicted facts in the papers relied upon
by the moving party, such papers themselves not otherwise showing the existence of an
issue of material fact.” Judson , 17 N.J. at 75 (citation omitted). Stated differently, “[b]are
conclusions . . . without factual support in tendered affidavits, will not defeat a meritorious
application for summary judgment.” U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 67
N.J. Super. 384, 399 -400 (App.Div.1961) . Likewise, unsupported, and self -serving
statements, standing alone, are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.
Heyert v. Taddese, 431 N.J. Super. 388, 413-414 (App. Div. 2013). And the “non-moving
party cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment merely by pointing to any fact in
dispute.” Brill, 142 N.J. at 529 . Disputed issues of fact that are immaterial or of an
insubstantial nature will not suffice. Ibid. Rather, “[c]ompetent oppo sition requires
‘competent evidential material’ beyond mere ‘speculation’ and ‘fanciful arguments,’”
Cortez v. Gindhart, 435 N.J. Super. 589, 605 (App. Div. 2014), certif. denied, 220 N.J.
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269 (2015) (citation omitted), and the party opposing the motion “‘ must do more than
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.’” Alfano v.
Schaud , 429 N.J. Super. 469, 474 (App. Div. 2013), certif. denied, 214 N.J. 119 (2013)
(citation omitted).
Against this backdrop, the District contends that the claims set forth in the Petition
are moot since it is undisputed that ILA has closed and the District has already granted
petitioner her demanded relief. Based upon the foregoing facts and the applicable law, I
CONCLUDE that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the matter is
ripe for summary decision.
It is firmly established that “questions that have become moot or academic prior to
judicial scrutiny generally have been held to be an improper subject for judicial review.”
Anderson v. Sills , 143 N.J. Super. 432, 437 (Ch. Div. 1976); see Oxfeld v. New J ersey
State Board of Education , 68 N.J. 301 (1975). In this regard, “f or reasons of judicial
economy and restraint, courts will not decide cases in which the issue is hypothetical, a
judgment cannot grant effective relief, or the parties do not have concr ete adversity of
interest.” Anderson , 143 N.J. Super. at 437.
“‘[A] case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack
a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.’” Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd.,
336 F.3d 211, 216 (3rd Cir. 2003) ( quoting Powell v. McCormack , 395 U.S. 486, 496
(1969)). A “court ’s ability to grant effective relief lies at th e heart of the mootness
doctrine.” Ibid. In other words, ‘“[i]f developments occur during the course of adjudication
that eliminate a plaintiff ’s personal stake in the outcome of a suit or prevent a court from
being able to grant the requested relief, th e case must be dismissed as moot.’ ” Ibid.
(quoting Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698 -699 (3d Cir. 1996)). A
case is considered to be moot “ ‘when the decision sought in a matter, when rendered,
can have no practical effect on the existing controversy.’” Greenfield v. New Jersey Dep’t
of Corrections, 382 N.J. Super. 254, 257-58 (App. Div. 2006) (citation omitted). An action
is also moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues
raised have been resolved. Betancourt v. Trinitas Hosp., 415 N.J. Super. 301, 311 (App.
Div. 2010). See S.J o/b/o J.J v.Willingboro Bd. of Educ. , EDS 14567-13 (February 19,
2014) http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/ (dismissing parent’s petition as moot where
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the specific relief sought by the parent, i.e. a qualified one -on-one aide, was provided as
a related service in a later IEP).; P.S. o/b/o I.S. v. Edgewater Park Twp. Bd. of Educ. ,
EDS 10418 -04 (October 31, 2005) http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/ (dismissing
parent’s petition as moot where the IEP team accepted the parent’s requested placement
of I.S. at the Bancroft School).
In short, petitioner’s Petition seeking a change in placement from ILA to Mahwah is
moot. It is undisputed that ILA is now closed, and that L.T. transitioned into the in-District
program in September 2022. The IEP that was challenged is no longer L.T.’s IEP, ILA is
no longer her placement, and there is a new program, placement, and IEP. Since the
requested change in placement has already occurred, petitioner has been granted her
demanded relief and there is no further relief to which petitioner is entitled.
To the extent that petitioner’s submissions assert other claims , the issues for
disposition in this matter are limited to those set forth in petitioner’s Petition, and petitioner
cannot purse newly asserted claims in this proceeding. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(B); see
N.J.A.C. 6A:14 -2.7(c) (the request for due process must “ state the specific issues in
dispute, relevant facts and the relief sought”). Additionally, there is no merit to petitioner’s
“cross-motion” requesting that the within matter, which is clear ly moot, s hould now be
consolidated with a new due process petition that petitioner filed on or about March 23,
2023.
Based upon the foregoing, I CONCLUDE that dismissal of petitioner’s Petition with
prejudice is warranted and petitioner’s “cross-motion” should be denied.
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ORDER
I ORDER that respondent’s motion for summary decision be and hereby is
GRANTED and that petitioner’s cross-motion be and hereby is DENIED. I further ORDER
that petitioner’s Due Process Petition be and hereby is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE .
This decision is final pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(1)(A) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.514
(2022) and is appealable by filing a complaint and bringing a civil action either in the Law
Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey or in a district court of the United States. 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2); 34 C.F.R. § 300.516 (2022). If the parent or adult student feels that
this decision is not being fully implemented with respect to program or services, this
concern should be communicated in writing to the Directo r, Office of Special Education .
April 5, 2023
DATE MARGARET M. MONACO, ALJ
Date Received at Agency
Date Mailed to Parties:
jb
