West Orange Town BOE v. G.B. obo P.B. | Case 01303-26 | 2026-02-19
New Jersey special education due-process decision
- Case number
- 01303-26
- Date
- 2/19/2026
- Parties / district (official listing)
- West Orange Town BOE v. G.B. obo P.B.
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Decision text
Page 1
New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
FINAL DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDS 01303-26
AGENCY DKT. NO. 2026-40324
WEST ORANGE TOWN
BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Petitioner,
v.
G.B. ON BEHALF OF P.B.,
Respondents.
__________________________________
Jared S. Schure, Esq., for petitioner (Methfessel & Werbel, attorneys)
G.B., pro se, for respondents
Record Closed: February 19, 2026 Decided: February 19, 2026
BEFORE MATTHEW G. MILLER, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Board of Education of the West Orange Town, Essex County (“West Orange
BOE” or “District”), filed a Petition for Due Process against G.B. on behalf of P.B. to deny
a request for an independent educational evaluation (“IEE”).
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 5, 2026, respondents G.B. (mother) and P.B. (son) requested an IEE,
although she did not specify what type of evaluation that should be. On January 23, 2026,
per N.J.A.C. 6A:14 -2.5(c)(1)(i), petitioner, West Orange BOE , filed a Petition for Due
Process (Petition) against the respondents, seeking to deny the request for an IEE. The
matter was transmitted by the New Jersey Department of Education (Department), Office
of Special Education, to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL), where it was filed on
January 23, 2026 . Telephone prehearing conference s were scheduled for January 27
and January 29, 2026, but the respondent failed to appear. A hearing was scheduled for
February 24 , 202 4, but on February 4, 2026, petitioner filed a Motion for Summary
Decision. A briefing schedule was set and the record on the Motion was closed on
February 19, 2026.
MOTION
Petitioner West Orange BOE filed a Motion for Summary Decision, based on the
very simple proposition that G.B. has never specified what type of “independent
educational evaluation” she is requesting. While conceding that there are situations
where a parent may be entitled to an IEE per N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.5 et seq., the parent must,
at the very least, specify the type of evaluation they are seeking. N.J.A.C. 6A:14 -2.5(c).
The parent must also express the reason for their disagreement with any evaluation
covering the area/topic that has been previously performed.
Here, the petitioner points out that G.B.’s initial January 5, 2026 , email did not
comply with those Administrative Code regulations. Then, when the District emailed her
later that day asking, “which independent educational evaluation” she was requesting,
she replied with a generalized complaint concerning P.B.’s overall evaluation, calling it
“incomplete, insufficient, and procedurally flawed ,” along with a generic review of basic
IEE law and language.
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Given that the respondent’s request is legally invalid, the District argues that
Summary Decision is appropriate.
In opposition to the Motion, G.B. submitted an email forwarding prior emails which
detailed her discontent with the District and her grievances with what she considers a
delay in the IEP process . While she now “agree(s) that (P.B.) requires an IEP ,” she
“firmly dispute(s) the district’s evaluation, which is incomplete, biased, and unsupported
by sufficient data.”
She continues to oppose portions of the IEP and the amount of home instruction
time P.B. is receiving. She concludes her opposition with:
For these reasons, I formally dispute the district’s conclusions
and demand an Independent Educational Evaluation at public
expense.
FACTUAL STIPULATIONS AND FINDINGS
Because the following is undisputed, I FIND the following as FACT.
1. P.B. is a five-and-a-half-year-old kindergartener
assigned to Hazel Avenue Elementary School who is
eligible for special education under the classification
Emotional Regulation Disorder.
2. G.B. is P.B.’s mother.
3. P.B. was initially evaluated for eligibility for special
education on or about September 15, 2025.
4. In conjunction with the determination that P.B. was
eligible for special education, the District conducted the
following evaluations (all 2025);
a. October 2 – Functional Behavior Assessment
(P-B.)
b. October 24 – Occupational Therapy Evaluation
(P-C.
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c. November 10 – Psychoeducational Assessment
(P-D.)
d. November 14 – Speech-Language Assessment
(P-E.)
5. Based upon the results of the above-listed evaluations,
the District, on or about December 15, 2025, proposed
initial eligibility for special education under the
classification of Emotional Regulation Impairment and
proposed an initial IEP for P.B. (P-F.)
6. G.B. declined to accept the classification or consent to
an IEP and on January 5, 2026, she also requested an
“Independent Educational Evaluation.” (P-G.)
7. Due to significant behavioral issues, G.B. is currently
receiving “administrative home instruction.”
CERTIFICATION OF DAWN RABOY
Ms. Laboy is employed by the District as a school social worker1 and case manager
and has been personally involved with the case. She certified that the District “conducted a
battery of initial evaluations” and proposed classifying P.B. as eligible for special education
under the classification of Emotional Regulation Impairment. However, G.B. has not
consented to P.B. being eligible for these services, so “he remains a general education
student on administrative home instruction.”
She then reviewed the individual evaluations that have been performed and noted
that it was during the December 15, 2025 meeting of the Child Study Team (which included
P.B.) that P.B.’s eligibility was discussed and the IEP formulated. Ms. Laboy further certified
that she received G.B.’s January 5, 2026 email requesting an IEE. She responded to G.B.,
requesting what type of IEE she wanted performed and received the vague reply that she
was looking for “[a]dditional and comprehensive assessments” and “an Independent
Educational Evaluation at public expense[.]”
1 Ms. Laboy is a Licensed Clinical Social Worker. (P-1.)
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Ms. Laboy then reviewed the requirements for the performance of an IEE as
delineated in N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.5 et seq., but, as importantly, she also pointed to the New
Jersey Department of Education’s guidance in this area (which will be reviewed below),
which she certified justified the District’s decision to file the due process petition.
Finally, she certified the following:
21. Even if Respondent’s request for independent
evaluations complied with the Code and NJDOE
guidance, which it does not, the District would not
provide any independent evaluations because they are
completely unnecessary and inappropriate.
22. In my professional opinion, and in the unanimous
professional opinions of the entire CST, the District
already possesses all of the evaluative information it
needs in order to make informed decisions about P.B.’s
eligibility, placement, and programming, and to propose
an IEP that is reasonably calculated to ensure that P.B.
makes meaningful academic progress − i.e., that
provides him with a free and appropriate education.
23. In my professional opinion , and in the unanimous
professional opinions of the entire CST, P.B. was
assessed in all areas of suspected need by properly
certificated professionals, and the results of the
evaluations were accurat e and reflective of P.B.’s
strengths, weaknesses, and abilities.
24. In my professional opinion, and in the unanimous
professional opinions of the entire CST, no independent
evaluations are necessary or appropriate at this time.
The District has all of the evaluative information it needs.
[P-I.]
EMAIL EXCHANGE
While there has been reference to the email exchange s between G.B. and the
District, the only relevant exchange occurred as follows:
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1. January 5, 2026 @ 11:03 a.m. – G.B. to District – “Once again, I am formally
requesting an Independent Educational Evaluation (IEE).”
2. January 5, 2026 @ 3:58 p.m. – Ms. Raboy to G.B. – “We never received a
request from you for an independent educational evaluation. Please forward
it to us. Also, which independent educational evaluation are you requesting?
Kindly advise.”
3. January 6, 2026 @ 4:30 p.m. – G.B. to District – “This correspondence serves
as my formal, written, and unequivocal notice of disagreement with the school
district’s evaluation(s) of my child, (P.B.), who is currently enrolled in
kindergarten. I disagree with the district’s evaluation in all areas assessed,
including but not limited to the methods used, the scope of assessment, the
interpretation of data, and the conclusions and recommendations relied upon
in the development and implementation of the IEP. The evaluation conducted
by the district was incomplete, insufficient, and procedurally flawed. It failed
to adequately assess (P.B.) across all areas of suspected disability and did
not provide a comprehensive picture of his educational, developmental,
behavioral, and functional needs. As a result, the evaluation cannot be relied
upon to support appropriate educational planning, services, or placement
decisions.”
4. January 6, 2026 @ 6:19 p.m. – Attorney to G.B. − “I represent the West
Orange Board of Education. I am responding on my client’s behalf because
you have threatened to file a complaint or due process proceeding. The Code
gives the District 20 days to file for due process or grant your request. I will
advise as to the District’s decision no later than January 25th. If the District
grants your request, we will gladly provide the information you requested in
(3), below.”
[P-G and P-H.]
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NJDOE GUIDANCE
On July 7, 2015, the New Jersey Department of Education ’s Office of Special
Education authored guidance to school districts concerning IEEs. This letter reads, in
pertinent part, as follows:
SUBJECT: Guidance with Respect to Federal Regulations
Implementing the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of
2004 – Independent Educational Evaluations
I am writing to provide clarification regarding a parent’s right to
an independent educational evaluation (IEE). Changes to
Chapter 14 of the Administrative Code, Special Education were
effective on February 2, 2015. Among the changes was the
requirements that parents specify the assessment or
assessments they are seeking in a request for an IEE (N.J.A.C.
6A:14-2.5(c)). This language was included in an attempt to
facilitate the distr ict’s response to a parental request, by
providing clarification to the district regarding the requested
assessments. However, it must be stressed that while it is not
unreasonable to ask a parent to specify the assessment(s) they
are seeking, the school district may not delay provision of an
IEE or filing a request for a due process hearing, to show that
its evaluation is appropriate, solely because the parents did not
specify the assessment(s) they are seeking as part of the
independent evaluation. If the request for an IEE does not
specify the assessment(s) being sought, the district
should immediately inquire as to what assessment(s) the
parent is seeking and either arrange for provision of the
assessment(s) or file for a due process hearing to seek to
deny the request. If the district does not file a request for a
due process hearing, it must ensure that the IEE is provided at
public expense and without undue delay. (emphasis in original)
[P-I.]
LEGAL DISCUSSION
Summary decision may be granted “if the papers and discovery which have been
filed, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.”
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N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b). The OAL summary decision rule is essentially the same as the
summary judgment rule under the New Jersey Court Rules, which states:
The judgment or order sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
or order as a matter of law. An issue of fact is genuine only if,
considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence
submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all
legitimate inferences there from favoring the non -moving
party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact.
[R. 4:46-2(c).]
The New Jersey Supreme Court has modified and clarified the analysis required
when considering a motion for summary decision/judgment. In Brill v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of America , 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995), the Court adopted the summary judgment
standard utilized by federal courts:
Under this new standard, a determination whether there exists
a “genuine issue” of material fact that precludes summary
judgment requires the motion judge to consider whether the
competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to
permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed
issue in favor of the non-moving party. The “judge’s function
is not himself [or herself] to weigh the evidence and determine
the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial.” [Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S.
242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 212
(1986).] . . . If there exists a single, unavoidable resolution of
the alleged disputed issue of fact, that issue should be
considered insufficient to constitute a “genuine” issue of
material fact fo r purposes of Rule 4:46-2. Liberty Lobby ,
supra, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S. Ct. at 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d at
213. The import of our holding is that when the evidence “is
so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law,”
Liberty Lobby, supra, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S. Ct. at 2512, 91
L. Ed. 2d at 214, the trial court should not hesitate to grant
summary judgment.
[Ibid.]
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The burden is on the moving party to exclude all reasonable doubt as to the
existence of any genuine issue of material fact and all inferences of doubt are drawn
against the moving party and in favor of the non-moving party. Saldana v. DiMedio, 275
N.J. Super. 488, 494 (App. Div. 1994). The critical question , therefore, is “whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require [a hearing] or whether it is so one-
sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Brill, 142 N.J. at 533 (citation
omitted). If the non -moving party's evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly
probative, summary judgment should not be denied. See Bowles v. City of Camden, 993
F. Supp. 255, 261 (D.N.J. 1998).
In part, the purpose of special education is to ensure that all students with disabilities
have available to them a free, appropriate public education (FAPE) as that standard is set
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq.).
N.J.A.C. 6A:14-1.1(b)(1). Per 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9), a FAPE means special education and
related services that − (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision
and direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency;
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in
the State involved; and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education
program (IEP) required under section 614(d) [20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)].
Generally, “evaluation” means procedures used in accordance with C.F.R. §§
300.304 through 300.311 to determine whether a child has a disability and the nature and
extent of the special education and related services that the child needs. 34 C.F.R. § 300.15
(2025). Each public agency must conduct a full and individual initial evaluation, in
accordance with 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.304 through 300.306, before the initial provision of
special education and related services to a child with a disability. 34 C.F.R. § 300.301(a)
(2025).
N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.5(c) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.502 (2024) govern independent
evaluations. N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.5(c) states in pertinent part:
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Upon completion of an initial evaluation . . . , a parent may
request an independent evaluation if there is disagreement
with the initial evaluation . . . provided by a district board of
education . . . . A parent shall be entitled to only one
independent evaluation at the district board of education's
expense each time the district board of education conducts an
initial evaluation . . . with which the parent disagrees. The
request shall specify the assessment(s) the parent is seeking
as part of the independent evaluation.
In addition, 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(1) (2024) outlines that “[a] parent has the right
to an independent educational evaluation at public expense if the parent disagrees with
an evaluation obtained by the public agency subject to the conditions in paragraphs (b)(2)
through (4) of this section.” In conducting those evaluations, the LEA shall:
(A) use a variety of assessment tools and strategies to
gather relevant functional and developmental
information, including information provided by the
parent, that may assist in determining whether−
(i) the child is a child with a disability; and
(ii) the content of the child's individualized
education program, including information
related to enabling the child to be involved in
and progress in the general curriculum or, for
preschool children, to participate in appropriate
activities;
(B) not use any single procedure as the sole criterion for
determining whether a child is a child with a disability
or determining an appropriate educational program for
the child; and
(C) use technically sound instruments that may assess the
relative contribution of cognitive and behavioral factors,
in addition to physical or developmental factors.
[20 U.S.C. §1414(b)(2)(A)−(C).]
Upon receipt of a parent’s request for an independent evaluation, the district shall
either provide the independent evaluation or request a due process hearing not later than
twenty calendar days after receipt of the parent’s independent evaluation request.
N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.5(c)(1)(i) and (ii); see 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(2) (2024). The requested
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“independent evaluation(s) shall be provided at no cost to the parent, unless the district
board of education initiates a due process hearing to show that its evaluation is
appropriate and, following the hearing, a final determination to that effect is made .”
N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.5(c)(1); see 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(3) (2024).
In reviewing the sequence of events leading up to the filing of this petition and,
ultimately, this Motion for Summary Decision, we see a not uncommon scenario. We
have a very young student just beginning his educational journey, whom both sides agree
is struggling and needs some sort of educational assistance/guidance. We have a pro
se parent who is enthusiastically and/or aggressively (depending on your perspective)
advocating for her son and who disagrees with the way he is being both portrayed and
handled by the District. We also have a District that professes that it is acting in the best
interests of the child and a parent who has grave doubts that this is true.
More importantly here, however, we have a parent who is clearly familiar with the
basic language and goals of the IDEA but who, unfortunately, demonstrates a lack of
understanding of how its often complicated provisions work. That lack of understanding
is exemplified by the “opposition” to the District’s Motion. In her email, G.B. rattles of f a
litany of complaints, beginning with a perceived delay in the development of P.B.’s IEP,
before delving into disputes with his teacher and paraprofessional, his exclusion from
in-person classes and the evaluation process as a whole.
And, frankly, at least some of those allegations did cause me to raise an eyebrow.
The problem for G.B., however, is that for all her warnings that she would file a due
process petition, this petition was filed by the District for a very specific and very limited
reason. In response to the respondent’s general complaint of P.B.’s overall evaluation,
the District, as permitted by law, requested that G.B. specifically delineate which of the
six evaluations she was referencing. In reply, the District received a generic “the entire
process was unfair and biased and unsupported by sufficient data and is violative of the
IDEA” non -response. Even in her opposition, she still failed to delineate what
evaluation(s) she is seeking and how or why she disagrees with those already performed.
This general “the District is not complying with the IDEA” argument , while perhaps
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sufficient to support a potential due process petition of her own, is simply insufficient, as
a matter of law, to satisfy the requirements of N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.5(c).
Given the unopposed certification of Ms. Laboy, the undisputed facts cited above,
the inadequate nature of G.B.’s opposition 2 and the dictates of N.J.A.C. 6A:14 -2.5(c), I
CONCLUDE that the District obtained the required functional, developmental, and academic
information to determine continued eligibility for special education and related services and
to determine the contents of P.B.’s IEP, including an appropriate educational program. I
further CONCLUDE that the evaluations were sufficiently comprehensive to identify P.B.’s
special education and related services needs. Accordingly, I CONCLUDE that the District’s
evaluations from October th rough November 2025 were appropriate and that the
respondents do not have a right to any additional evaluations at public expense.
ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the District’s evaluations were appropriate and the
respondent’s request for an IEE, be and is hereby DENIED.
2 While I acknowledge that G.B.’s opposition does not comply with the requirements of N.J.A.C. 1:1-
12.4(a), for the purposes of this Motion, it was fully considered.
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This decision is final pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(1)(A) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.514
(2025) and is appealable by filing a complaint and bringing a civil action either in the Law
Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey or in a district court of the United States. 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2); 34 C.F.R. § 300.516 (2025). If the pare nt feels that this decision is
not being fully implemented with respect to program or services, this concern should be
communicated in writing to the Director, Office of Special Education.
February 19, 2026 ________________________________
DATE MATTHEW G. MILLER, ALJ
Date Received at Agency February 19, 2026
Date Mailed to Parties: February 19, 2026
sej
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APPENDIX
EXHIBITS
For petitioner:
P-A Curriculum vitae of Dawn M. Raboy, M.S.W., L.C.S.W.
P-B Functional Behavior Assessment & Behavior Intervention Plan (October 2,
2026)
P-C Occupational Therapy Evaluation (October 24, 2025)
P-D Psychoeducational Assessment (October 23, 2025)
P-E Speech-Language Assessment (October 24, 2025)
P-F Proposed Individualized Education Plan (December 15, 2025)
P-G Email exchange between G.B. and District (January 5–6, 2026)
P-H Email from District to G.B. (January 6, 2026)
P-I DOE IEE Guidance (July 7, 2015)
P-J Certification of Dawn Raboy (February 1, 2026)
For respondents:
None
