New Media Technology Charter School | Case 17929-15-16 | 2016-11-08
Pennsylvania special education due-process decision
- Case number
- 17929-15-16
- Date
- 11/08/2016
- Parties / district (official listing)
- New Media Technology Charter School
- Hearing officer
- Charles Jelley
- Issues (official listing)
- Charter School Free Appropriate Public Education Transfer into District Compensatory Education
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Decision text
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This is a redacted version of the original decision. Select details have been removed from the decision
to preserve anonymity of the student. The redactions do not affect the substance of the document.
Pennsylvania
Special Education Hearing Officer
DECISION
Child’s Name: M.B.
Date of Birth: [redacted]
Dates of Hearing: 9/14/2016
Closed HEARING
ODR File No. 17929-15-16
Parties to the Hearing: Representative:
Parents
Parent[s]
Parent Attorney
Daniel Cooper Esq.
Law Offices of Kenneth S. Cooper
45 E. City Avenue, #400
Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004
610-608-6185
Local Education Agency
New Media Technology Charter School
8034 Thouron Avenue
Philadelphia, PA 19150
LEA Attorney
Unrepresented
Date Record Closed:
October 14, 2016
Date of Decision: November 8, 2016
Hearing Officer:
Charles Jelley Esq. LL.M.
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Introduction
During the 2015-2016 school year, the Student1 was enrolled at the New Media
Charter School (Charter School) for sixth grade. In June 2016, the Charter School
closed. The Student is now enrolled in the Student’s school district of residence and is
repeating sixth grade. Student’s mother (Parent) filed this due process request,
pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §1401 et seq.
(IDEA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitations Act.
Parent asserts that the Charter School failed to comply with the IDEA, by
failing to implement the Student’s Individualized Education Program (IEP). Parent
also asserts that the School failed to provide Student with a free appropriate public
education (FAPE) as required by the IDEA. Parent seeks full days of compensatory
education for the entire 2015-2016 school year. The Charter School is now closed and
did not appear for the scheduled hearing. The Office for Dispute Resolution (ODR)
and Parent’s counsel provided the Charter School advanced notice of the hearing
date, to an individual identified in ODR records as a contact for the School. The
hearing was completed in one session with testimony from one witness. I have
determined the credibility of the single witness and I have considered and weighed all
of the written evidence in the record. I conclude that the Charter School failed to
appropriately educate the Student.
Issues
1. During the relevant period from the first day of school in the School’s 2015-
2016 school year until the last day of school in June 2016, did the School fail to
implement the Student’s Individualized Education Program (IEP)?
2. During the relevant period, from the first day of school in the School’s 2015-
2016 school year until the last day of school in June 2016, did the School fail to
provide Student with FAPE as defined by the IDEA and Section 504?
3. Should the hearing officer order the Charter School to provide the Student
with compensatory education for of all or any part of the relevant period?
1 The Parent filed six due process complaint notices in 30 days for three children. Three of the
complaints were dismissed. The generic use of Student, rather than a name and gender-specific
pronoun, is employed to protect the confidentiality of the student.
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Findings of Fact
1. The Student was identified as a child with a disability by the [redacted] School
District (District) who needed specially-designed instruction (P#1). When the
Student enrolled at Charter School, the Charter School did not hold an
Individualized Education Program (IEP) conference to discuss or review the
District IEP (P#1).
2. The records show that prior to entering Charter School, the Student was
identified as a student with an Emotional Disturbance and an Other Health
Impairment (P#1 p.8).
3. The Parent provided Charter School with records and documents outlining the
Student’s educational background, including a history of outside diagnoses and
participation in community based behavioral health services (P#1 p.8).
4. The Student has a significant history of struggling in school, including a
lengthy history of school-based discipline (P#1 p.8).
5. Charter School was aware that the Student’s Notice of Recommended
Educational Placement (NOREP) and Student Profile (P#2 pp.2-3) noted the
Student’s need for specially-designed instruction and Supplemental Emotional
Support.
6. The NOREP and Student Profile both indicated the Student should receive
specially-designed instruction and Supplemental Emotional Support (P#6).
7. Between the first day of school and the development of the November 2015
IEP, the Student was involved in numerous discipline incidents. By October
2015, the Parent was receiving multiple calls per week asking that she pick up
the Student early from school (NT 52-56).
8. Despite having knowledge that the Student’s unique needs necessitated a high
level of special education programming from Student’s 1st day of school,
Charter School failed to provide the Student with special education and an IEP
until November 19, 2015 (P#5 p.7, P#5 p.3).
9. The November 2015 Charter School IEP failed to include mandated present
levels of educational performance (PLEP) (P#5 pp.9-10). After reviewing the
Special Factors and Considerations, the IEP team concluded the Student did
not need a Positive Behavior Support Plan (PBSP) (P#5 p.9). The IEP
included a math goal and a behavior goal, along with multiple specially-
designed instruction strategies (P#5 pp.14-15).
10. The November 2015 Charter School IEP called for the Student to receive 90
minutes a month of one-on-one counseling. The November 2015 IEP included
480 minutes a week of Emotional Support in the regular class and 220 minutes
a week of Emotional Support outside of the regular class (P#5 p.4).
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11. The Parent testified that the Student did not meet with the special education
teacher (NT pp.59-60). The Parent also testified that the Student did not
receive the promised specially-designed instruction in the regular education
classroom. Id.
12. Although identified as a person with a disability, the Charter School continued
to discipline the Student at the same rate as prior to the implementation of the
November 2015 IEP (NT pp.60-61). Before and after the November 2015
IEP, the Student was suspended from school on multiple occasions (NT pp.60-
61).
13. In January 2016, a manifestation determination meeting was held as the result
of the Student’s misbehavior and school-based discipline (P#6 pp.5-8).
14. The Charter School members of the manifestation determination team
concluded that the Student’s misbehaviors were not a manifestation of the
Student’s disability. When the Parent requested additional support, Parent was
informed that the Student was receiving school-based counseling and that
maybe Student could qualify for a Functional Behavior Assessment (FBA)
(P#7 p.1).
15. Less than a month after the manifestation determination meeting, the Student
was directed to go to the crisis center for making suicidal statements. The staff
at the School told the Parent that the Student could not return to school until
the Parent provided proof of a crisis center evaluation (NT p.69, P#7).
16. For the remainder of the school year, the Student continued to struggle
academically and behaviorally (P#13 pp.1-2).
17. The Charter School Staff directed the Parent to take the Student to the crisis
center, for similar statements, on two other occasions (P#13).
18. In the spring of 2016, Charter School completed a FBA and developed a PBSP
(P#9.P#10). The PBSP and additional specially-designed instruction was not
implemented. Id.
19. By the end of the school year, Charter School sent a letter to the Parent
indicating that the Student could not even finish out the school year (P#12).
20. The Student’s final report card included multiple failing grades and a notation
that the Student should be retained in the 6th grade (P#14 p.1, NT p. 75).
21. The Student is now repeating the 6th grade this school year (P#14 p.1, NT p.
75).
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Applicable Legal Principles
Conclusion of law and burden of proof
The burden of proof is composed of two considerations, the burden of going
forward, and the burden of persuasion. Of these, the more essential consideration is
the burden of persuasion, which determines which of two contending parties, must
bear the risk of failing to convince the finder of fact. In Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49,
(2005), the court held that the burden of persuasion is on the party that requests relief
in an IDEA case. The other consideration, the burden of going forward, simply
determines which party must present its evidence first, a matter that is within the
discretion of the tribunal or finder of fact (which in this matter is the hearing officer).
A “preponderance” of evidence is a quantity or weight of evidence that is greater than
the quantity or weight of evidence produced by the opposing party. See, Comm. v.
Williams, 532 Pa. 265, 284-286 (1992). This rule can decide the issue when neither side
produces a preponderance of evidence – when the evidence on each side has equal
weight, which the Supreme Court in Schaffer called “equipoise”. On the other hand,
whenever the evidence is preponderant (i.e., there is weightier evidence) in favor of
one party, that party will prevail, regardless of who has the burden of persuasion. Id.
Credibility
It is the responsibility of the hearing officer to determine the credibility of
witnesses. 22 PA. Code §14.162 (requiring findings of fact); A.S. v. Office for Dispute
Resolution, 88 A.3d 256, 266 (Pa. Commw. 2014)(it is within the province of the
hearing officer to make credibility determinations and weigh the evidence in order to
make the required findings of fact). In this matter, I have weighed the evidence with
attention to the reliability of the testimony. After listening to the Parent, I accord
persuasive weight to Parent’s testimony for three reasons. Although some of that
testimony was based upon personal interactions with the Student, administrators, and
teacher reports, some of the testimony is also hearsay. Nevertheless, the exhibits
corroborated the hearsay testimony. Second, the Parent displayed a clear memory of
the school year, talking clearly about calls from the Charter School directing her to
take the Student home on a number of occasions, which is also corroborated by the
documentary record. Third, the Parent’s memory was precise for almost all events;
therefore, I conclude that for events during the 2015-2016 school year her testimony
is persuasive. The Parent’s demeanor and manner of answering questions gave me
every reason to find her credible and sincere.
On several occasions, due to lack of a precise memory, Parent did not answer
in a way that supported Parent’s position, about which Parent was forthcoming and
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acknowledged. Therefore, I accord substantial weight to Parent’s testimony, as
reflected in my findings of fact. On balance, I find that Parent’s testimony represents
her best recollection of Student’s lengthy and complicated record of educational and
behavioral health concerns. I note that I am watchful that this matter was unopposed
at hearing because the Charter School is closed. While this observation affects the
weight that I accord to Parent’s testimony, untested by cross-examination, it also
establishes a record that is preponderant to the extent that I give weight to Parent’s
testimony. Thus, all of the above findings are based upon a preponderance of the
evidence. While some of the evidence is circumstantial, none of the testimony was
contradicted by any documents. I conclude therefore, that I can derive inferences of
fact from Parent’s lengthy restatement of Student’s struggles in school, in the home,
and community, combined with evidence in the recent LEA evaluation report; I find
that the record supports a finding of a denial of FAPE.
Free Appropriate Public Education
The IDEA requires that a state receiving federal education funding provide a
“free appropriate public education” (FAPE) to disabled children. 20 U.S.C.
§1412(a)(1). FAPE is “special education and related services”, at public expense, that
meets state standards, provide an appropriate education, and are delivered in
accordance with an IEP. 20 USC §1401(9).
School districts must provide FAPE by designing and administering a program
of individualized instruction that is set forth in an IEP 20 USC §1414(d). The IEP
must be “reasonably calculated” to enable the child to receive “meaningful
educational benefits” in light of the student's “intellectual potential”. Shore Reg'l High
Sch. Bd. of Ed. v. P.S. 381 F.3d 194, 198 (3rd Cir. 2004) (quoting Polk v. Cent.
Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 182-85 (3rd Cir. 1988).
“Meaningful benefit” means that an eligible child’s program affords him or her
the opportunity for “significant learning”. Ridgewood Board of Education v. N.E., 172
F.3d 238, 247 (3d Cir. 1999). In order to provide FAPE, the child’s IEP must describe
specially-designed educational instruction tailored to meet his/her unique needs and
must be accompanied by such services as are necessary to permit the child to benefit
from the instruction. Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181-82 (1982). An
eligible student is denied FAPE if his or her program is not likely to produce progress,
or if the program affords the child only a “trivial” or “de minimis” educational benefit.
M.C. v. Central Regional School District, 81 F.3d 389, 396 (3rd Cir. 1996).
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A school district is not required to provide the best possible program to a
student, or to maximize the student’s potential. Ridley Sch. Dist. v. MR, 680 F.3d 260,
269 (3rd Cir. 2012). An IEP is not required to incorporate every program, aide, or
service that parents desire for their child. Ibid. Rather, an IEP must provide a “basic
floor of opportunity” for the child. Mary Courtney T. v. School District of Philadelphia, 575
F.3d at 251; Carlisle Area School District v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 532 (3d Cir. 1995).
The law requires only that the program and its execution were reasonably
calculated to provide meaningful benefit. Carlisle Area School v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520 (3rd
Cir. 1995) (appropriateness is not judged prospectively so that lack of progress does
not in and of itself render an IEP inappropriate.) The appropriateness of an IEP must
be determined as of the time at which it was made, and the reasonableness of the
program should be judged only based on the evidence, known to the school district at
the time at which the offer was made. D.S. v. Bayonne Board of Education, 602 F.3d 553,
564-65 (3rd Cir. 2010); D.C. v. Mount Olive Twp. Bd. Of Educ., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
45788 (D.N.J. 2014).
Implementing Transfer Student’s IEP
The IDEA regulations define how schools can provide FAPE to students who
transfer from one school to another during the school year. Under these regulations,
the new school must provide FAPE, that includes “comparable services” to those
described in the student's prior IEP, until the district conducts an evaluation pursuant
to 34 C.F.R. §§300.304-300.306 and then develops, adopts, and/or implements a new
IEP if appropriate 34 C.F.R. §300.323.; 20 USC 1414(d)(2)(C)(i)(2). The Office of
Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, U.S. Department of Education
(OSERS) interprets the word “comparable” to have the “plain meaning” of the word,
which is “similar” or “equivalent”. Therefore, “comparable” services mean services
that are “similar” or “equivalent” to those that were described in the child’s transfer
IEP from the previous public agency, as determined by the child’s newly-designated
IEP Team in the new public agency. 71Fed. Reg., No. 156 at 46681 (Aug. 14, 2006).
The Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP) has also opined that the
requirement to provide “comparable services” can include a duty to provide
“temporary goals aligned with the annual goals in the student’s prior IEP.” Letter to
Finch, 56 IDELR 174 (OSEP Aug. 5, 2010). When the student enrolls in the new
school, the new school district conducts an initial evaluation, not a reevaluation,
which requires parental consent. 71Fed. Reg., No. 156 at 46682 (Aug. 14, 2006).
While not directly on point, the status of a transfer student’s out-of-state IEP
was addressed by the Third Circuit in Michael C. v. Radnor Twp. School District, 202 F.3d
642 (3rd Cir. 2002). In the Radnor Twp. the court held that in the case of an interstate
transfer student, the new school district is not required to consider the out-of-state
IEP as continuing in effect in the new state. Id. 202 F.3d at 651. In reaching that
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decision, the court approved the reliance on both the administrative rulings. Id. 202
F.3d at 649-650. The school district may choose to provide special education services
while it pursues an initial evaluation.2 Id
The court gave great weight to the OSEP policy memorandums noting that
after enrolling a student with an IEP from another state, the transferee school
district’s first step is to determine whether it will adopt the out-of-state evaluation and
eligibility determination or conduct its own evaluation. After the evaluation, the
district and the Parents must meet to develop an IEP. Once the IEP is developed, the
district must provide the parent Prior Written Notice Id. These basic principles apply
equally when the student moves from one local education agency (LEA) to another in
the same state.
Comprehensive assessment in all areas of unique need
When Students are thought to have a disability the regulations included a
requirement that the evaluators “[u]se technically sound instruments that may assess
the relative contribution of cognitive ... factors” (emphasis added). The U.S. Department of
Education further advises that a disability must be determined “on a case-by-case
basis, depending on the unique needs of a particular”.3
The eligibility inquiry must take into account a broad array of measures. The
eligibility inquiry must “[d]raw upon information from a variety of sources, including
aptitude and achievement tests, parent input, and teacher recommendations, as well as
information about the child's physical condition, social or cultural background, and
adaptive behavior”.4 The evaluation must include “standardized, individualized testing
(not just criterion-based testing or functional assessments)”. The comments to the
regulations note, “Nothing in the [IDEA] or ... regulations would preclude the
eligibility group from considering results from standardized tests when making
2 See also, Memorandum 96- 5, 24 IDELR 320 (OSEP 1995), Questions and Answers on
Individualized Education Programs (IEPs), Evaluations, and Reevaluations, 111 LRP
63322 (OSERS 09/01/11), Questions and Answers on Individualized Education Programs (IEPs),
Evaluations, and Reevaluations, 47 IDELR 166 (OSERS 2007), Questions and Answers on
Individualized Education Programs (IEPs), Evaluations, and Reevaluations 54 IDELR 297 (OSERS
2010).
3 Letter from Alexa Posny to Catherine D. Clarke, Director of Education and Regulatory Advocacy,
American Speech and Hearing Association, U.S. Dep't of Educ. (Mar. 8, 2007)
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2007-1/clarke030807disability1q2007.pdf
4 34 C.F.R. §300.306(c)(1)(i); see also id. § 300.304(b)(1) (noting that the evaluation of whether the
child is a child with a disability must “[u]se a variety of assessment tools and strategies to gather
relevant functional, developmental, and academic information about the child”)
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eligibility determinations.5 Stated simply, just as no single assessment or measure
could support a finding of a disability, no single assessment or measure may
undermine a finding of “in need of special education” where other measures or
factors could support such a finding.6
The statute specifies that a child must “need [ ]” special education “by reason
[of]” the disorder as identified under, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(ii), and that special
education must be designed "to meet the unique needs of [the] child with a disability,"
id. § 1401(29) (emphasis added).
Charter School Responsibilities
Charter schools must comply with Pennsylvania and federal regular education,
special education, federal civil rights and disability laws. Chapter 711 et. seq. of the
Pennsylvania School Code, “Charter School and Cyber Charter School Services and
Programs for Children with Disabilitie”, contains regulations specific to individuals
with disabilities being educated in charter schools and cyber charter schools. Chapter
711 incorporates by reference all of the IDEA regulations at 22 Pa. Code 711.3.
Chapter 711 also incorporates relevant antidiscrimination provisions from Section 504
and its implementing regulations. Charter schools and cyber charter schools also must
comply with 22 Pa. Code Chapter 4 relating to academic standards and assessment, 22
Pa. Code Chapter 11 relating to pupil attendance, and 22 Pa. Chapter 12 relating to
discipline of students 22 Pa. Code §711. et. seq.
http://education.pasenategop.com/files/2014/03/Summary-Charter-Bill.pdf.
Charter School’s IDEA Requirements
Under the IDEA, all LEAs must locate, evaluate, and educate children with a
disability. 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(1)(A). If the evaluation identifies a disability and that the
child is in need of specially-designed instruction, the LEA must provide the student
with a free appropriate public education. The IDEA directs the LEA to prepare,
develop, and implement an Individualized Education Program (IEP). Id. The child's
IEP must be developed by a team that includes the child's parents, at least one regular
education teacher, at least one special education teacher, a representative of the LEA,
and the child himself or herself, if appropriate. 20 U.S.C. §1414(d)(1)(B).
The IEP should state the child's present levels of achievement and
performance, provide annual goals, and explain how progress will be measured. 20
5 .Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities and Preschool Grants for
Children with Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46540, 46651 (Aug. 14, 2006)
6 See generally 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(c)(2) (emphasizing “assessments and other evaluation materials
[to] include those tailored to assess specific areas of educational need and not merely those that are
designed to provide a single intelligence quotient”).
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U.S.C. §1414(d)(1)(A)(i). The IEP should also state “the special education and related
services and supplementary aids and services . . . to be provided to the child” and “the
anticipated frequency, location, and duration of those services and
modifications”. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV), (VII). The student’s progress must be
reglarly monitored and reported to the parents. Id. Once an IEP is created, it may only
be amended by the entire IEP team or by agreement between the parents and the
LEA. 20 U.S.C §1414(d)(3)(F).
IDEA also requires the states to provide a dispute resolution system should a
parent or LEA disagree whether the child is a person with a disability in need of
specially-designed instruction. 20 U.S.C. §§1415(b)(6), (c)(2), (d), (e), (f). Either party
may seek mediation or present a complaint to a hearing officer, who will then
adjudicate the parties’ disagreement in a due process hearing. Id. The procedural
safeguards recognize the LEA and the parent as the parties at the due process hearing.
Id. Any party aggrieved by the hearing officer’s findings can file an action in a court of
competent jurisdiction. §1415(g);§1415(i)(2).
Compensatory Education
In G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 2015) the court
endorsed a “complete” make whole remedy favoring relief for the entire period of the
violation G.L. 802 F.3d at 626. Compensatory education “accrue[s] from the point,
that the school district knows or should know of the injury to the child, and the child
is entitled to compensatory education for a period equal to the period of deprivation,
but excluding the time reasonably required for the school district to rectify the
problem”.7 One approach to calculate the compensatory education relief is to adopt
the MC “cookie cutter” approach. The second option is to employ the Reid
“qualitative” approach. The third compensatory education calculation option is to
review the record as a whole, make equitable adjustments, and then formulate a make
whole remedy, grounded in the pure equitable powers of the fact finder, to grant
appropriate relief.
Compensatory education is appropriate relief that is intended to compensate a
disabled student, who has been denied the individualized education guaranteed by the
IDEA.8 Compensatory education should place the child in the position they would
7 G.L. at 618-619 quoting M.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Cent. Reg'l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 396-97 (3d Cir. 1996)
(citations omitted).
8 Wilson v. District of Columbia, 770 F.Supp.2d 270, 276 (D.D.C.2011) (citing Reid v. District of Columbia,
401 F.3d 516, 518 (D.C.Cir. 2005).
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have been in but for the violation.9 The make whole calculation requires some
evidence about the type and amount of services needed to place the student in the
same position he or she would have occupied but for the LEA’s violations of the
IDEA.10 Also after GL following MC, the parents must establish when the District
either “knew or should have known” the child was not receiving FAPE.11 Assuming a
finding of a denial of FAPE, the LEA, on the other hand, must produce evidence on
what they suggest is the length of a reasonable rectification period. Id. Whether the
parents follow Reid or MC, the make whole remedy must be supported by the record
evidence. Id.
Each alternative, is acceptable, if, the relief granted makes the student whole.
Implicit in each alternative is the assumption that the record is properly developed to
support the award of the equitable relief ordered.
In this matter, the evidence is insufficient to apply the Reid “make-whole”
remedy; the Parent did not offer an expert opinion testimony on what remedial and
special education services are needed to bring the Student’s academic, social and
behavioral skills to the level at which they would have been found in the absence of
the deprivation of FAPE.
As the School is closed and did not respond, the Parent must work with the
SEA as described in the Student’s companion action to access the relief ordered
herein. The SEA, in the companion action agreed to provide the Student with
appropriate relief, if ordered. 34 C.F.R. §300.227.
9 Boose v. District of Columbia, 786 F.3d 1054, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 8599 (D.C. Cir. 2015) IEPs are
forward looking and intended to “conform[] to . . . [a] standard that looks to the child's present
abilities”, whereas compensatory education is meant to “make up for prior deficiencies”. Reid, 401
F.3d at 522-23. Unlike compensatory education, therefore, an IEP “carries no guarantee of undoing
damage done by prior violation”, IEPs do not do compensatory education's job.
10 Walker v. District of Columbia, 786 F.Supp.2d 232, 238-239 (D.D.C.2011), citing Reid, supra. (the
parent, as the moving party, has the burden of “propos[ing] a well-articulated plan that reflects the
student’s current education abilities and needs and is supported by the record.”); Phillips ex rel. T.P. v.
District of Columbia, 736F.Supp.2d 240, 248 (D.D.C.2010) (citing Friendship Edison Pub. Charter Sch.
Collegiate Campus v. Nesbitt, 583 F.Supp.2d 169, 172 (D.D.C.2008) (Facciola, Mag. J.); Cousins v. District
of Columbia, 880 F.Supp.2d 142, 143 (D.D.C.2012). (the burden of proof is on the parents to produce
sufficient evidence demonstrating the type and quantum of compensatory education that makes the
child whole).
11 . G.L. at 618-619 quoting M.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Cent. Reg'l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 396-97 (3d Cir. 1996)
(citations omitted).
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Discussion
In August 2015, the Charter School was aware the Student was a person with a
disability in need of specially-designed instruction. The Charter School failed to
schedule an IEP meeting to review the Student’s transfer IEP. This fundamental error
denied the Student FAPE.
The record is preponderant; the Student has a long history of a variety of
behaviors that interfere with learning. The delay in developing a comprehensive
behavioral strategy, ultimately led to the Student being suspended and completely
excluded from school.
The November 2015 IEP failed to include PLEP. The failure to include PLEP
and baseline data prevents any hope of progress monitoring. This fundamental error
denied the Student FAPE. The SDIs and the PBSP failed to include sufficient
strategies to teach the Student how to focus, increase time on task, and transition
from class to class or subject to subject. The failure to develop and implement an IEP
contributed to the Student’s misbehavior. Charter School was aware the Student was
making suicidal statements yet they failed to conduct an assessment or work with the
crisis center to develop interventions.
In sum, after listening to the limited testimony and reviewing the exhibits the
evidence is preponderant that the Charter School denied the Student FAPE. As to the
determination of the form of the appropriate relief, the evidence is also preponderant
that relief can be calculated with sufficient particularity to avoid a windfall.
Compensatory Education
To remedy the denial of FAPE, the Parent is suggesting an hour-for-hour
remedy for the entire school year. The IEP notes the Student should receive school-
based counseling and Emotional Support. The November 2015 IEP provides that the
Student should receive 90 minutes a month of one-on-one counseling. The
November 2015 IEP included 480 minutes a week of Emotional Support in the
regular class and 220 minutes a week of Emotional Support outside of the regular
class (P#5 p.4).
The failure to hold an IEP meeting in August of 2015 was a denial of FAPE. After
reviewing the IEP, the PBSP, and the FBA, I find the November 2015 IEP was
legally insufficient at the time it was written. The record is preponderant that the IEP
goals are inadequate and vague. [Charter School] was aware when the Student enrolled
the Student needed specially-designed instruction yet it failed to provide FAPE. The
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Student did not receive the agreed upon support. Therefore, the compensatory
education claim accrued in August of 2015. I find that the Student is entitled to one
school year of compensatory education.
Compensatory education may take the form of any appropriate developmental,
remedial, or instructional services, product, or device, selected at the discretion of
Parent, which furthers or supports the Student’s education. Services in the amount set
forth above may be provided after school hours, on weekends, or during summer
months when convenient for Student or Parent. The services ordered above shall be
provided by appropriately qualified, and appropriately, Pennsylvania certified or
licensed, professionals, selected by Parent. The cost of any such services shall not
exceed the rate for privately retained professionals qualified.
Conclusion
In sum, I find that the LEA deprived the Student FAPE from August 2015
through the end of the 2016 school year. Therefore, I find the Student is entitled to
an award of compensatory education from August 2015 to the last day of school. The
Student’s behavioral needs were the contributing factor to repeated removals from
school, interfered with learning, and created peer and adult difficulties. Therefore, I
find that the Student should be awarded one full year of compensatory education. The
IEP provides that the school day is 6.8 hours each day (P#5 p.6). Therefore, the
Student is awarded 1224 hours of compensatory education.12
12 The Student attends school for 34 hours per week (6.8 hours a day x 180 days a year = 1224 hours.
The compensatory education claim accrued on the first day of school.
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ORDER
The Student should receive the following compensatory education services:
1. The Student should be provided 1224 hours of compensatory education. The
Parent can select the service provider. The responsible educational agency should
pay the provider, the rate charged for the services in the location in which the
services are provider.
It is FURTHER ORDERED that any claims that are encompassed in this
captioned matter and not specifically addressed by this decision and order are denied
and dismissed.
Date: November 8, 2016 Charles W. Jelley, Esq. LL.M.
Hearing Officer
