Norristown Area School District | Case 25132-20-21 | 2022-03-25
Pennsylvania special education due-process decision
- Case number
- 25132-20-21
- Date
- 03/25/2022
- Parties / district (official listing)
- Norristown Area School District
- Hearing officer
- Brian Ford
- Issues (official listing)
- Compensatory Education Individualized Education Program Independent Educational Evaluation
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This is a redacted version of the original decision. Select details have been removed from
the decision to preserve anonymity of the student. The redactions do not affect the
substance of the document.
Pennsylvania Special Education Hearing Officer
Final Decision and Order
ODR File Case Numbers
25132-20-21 & 25487-21-22
CLOSED HEARING
Child’s Name:
Y.T.
Date of Birth:
[redacted]
Parent:
[redacted]
Counsel for Parent:
Frederick M. Stanczak, Esquire
59 Creek Drive
Doylestown PA 18901
Local Education Agency:
Norristown Area School District
401 N. Whitehall Road
Norristown, PA 19401
Counsel for the LEA:
Mary T. Laster, Esquire
Blue Bell Executive Campus
400 Norristown Road, Suite 100
Blue Bell, PA 19422
Hearing Officer:
Brian Jason Ford, JD, CHO
Date of Decision:
03/25/2022
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Introduction, Background, and Procedural History
This special education due process hearing concerns the special education
rights of a student (the Student). The Student’s parent (the Parent) resides
with the Student in the Norristown Area School District (the District). This
matter arises under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20
U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(Section 504), 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. The parties agree that the Student is
a “child with a disability” and that the District is the Student’s Local
Educational Agency (LEA), as those terms are defined by the IDEA. 20
U.S.C. § 1401(3), (19). More specifically, the Student qualifies for, and is
entitled to, special education as a child with Autism Spectrum Disorder and
an Intellectual Disability.
Detailed background information is provided in a due process decision
resolving a prior dispute between the parties. See ODR No. 20956-1819. I
will summarize that background for context.
After receiving early intervention services, the Student enrolled in the
District in the fall of 2014. A dispute between the Parent and the District
arose in 2016. That dispute ended when the parties signed a settlement
agreement and release. The Student attended a specialized private school
for children with Autism at the District’s expense starting in January 2017,
pursuant to the settlement agreement. Pursuant to the same agreement, the
District reevaluated the Student in 2018 and then proposed an Individualized
Education Program (IEP) for the Student’s return to the District’s schools.
The Parent raised substantive and procedural challenges to the proposed IEP
through a prior due process hearing. At the prior hearing, the Parent
demanded an order for the District to maintain the Student’s private school
placement. The prior hearing officer found that the 2018 reevaluation and
the proposed IEP were substantively and procedurally appropriate and,
therefore, the Parent was not entitled to the relief she demanded.
The Parent did not return the Student to the District after the prior due
process hearing. Instead, the Parent homeschooled the Student during the
2018-19 school year. In the spring of 2019, the Parent told the District that
the Student would return to the District’s schools. The District permitted the
Student to attend its Extended School Year (ESY) program in the summer of
2019. For reasons detailed below, the Student attended the ESY program for
only two days. The Student then attended the District’s schools during the
2019-20 school year until all Pennsylvania schools closed as part of the
Commonwealth’s COVID-19 mitigation effort.
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The Parent alleges that the Student was denied a free appropriate public
education (FAPE) in several ways:
First, the Parent alleges that the Student derived no benefit from the
summer 2019 ESY program because the District failed to provide appropriate
transportation for the Student, making the Student’s attendance impossible.
The Parent demands 54 hours of compensatory education (the total time of
the ESY program) as a remedy for this violation.
Second, the Parent alleges that the District violated her right to meaningfully
participate in the Student’s IEP development before the start of the 2019-20
school year. The Parent demands 10 hours of compensatory education as a
remedy for this violation.
Third, from the start of the 2019-20 school year through the COVID-19
closure, the Parent alleges that the District’s practice of dismissing students
with disabilities early resulted in 81 hours of missed instruction from
September 2, 2019, to March 12, 2020. The Parent demands 81 hours of
compensatory education to remedy this violation.
Fourth, the Parent alleges that the Student’s augmentative and alternative
communication (AAC) device broke in school in November 2020 and that the
Student was without the AAC devise until January 23, 2021. The Parent
alleges that the absence of an AAC devise violated the Student’s right to a
FAPE during that time and seeks 288 hours of compensatory education to
remedy this violation.
Fifth, the Parent alleges that the District violated the Student’s right to a
FAPE during the mandatory school closures in response to COVID-19 from
March 13, 2020, through the end of the 2019-20 school year for failing to
provide a PCA. The Parent demands compensatory education to remedy this
violation, but it is not clear how much.
Sixth, the Parent alleges that the District’s ESY program in the summer of
2020 violated the Student’s right to a FAPE. The Parent demands 8 hours of
compensatory education to remedy this violation.
Seventh, for the 2020-21 school year, the Parent alleges that the Student
required a personal care assistant (PCA) during the school day (meaning
remote instruction in the Student’s home), but that the District did not
1
1 The Parent also sees $22.00 for shipping costs incurred to fix the AAC device. I do not
have authority to award such damages, but the Parent’s demand is preserved as part of the
record of these proceedings.
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provide a PCA. The Parent demands 723 hours of compensatory education to
remedy this violation.
Eight, the Parent alleges that there were 11 early dismissals during the
2020-21 school year, resulting in 8 hours of lost educational benefit. The
Parent demands 8 hours of compensatory education to remedy this violation.
Ninth, the Parent alleges that the District failed to provide one-to-one (1:1)
staff support for the Student in the Student’s home during the Districts ESY
program in the summer of 2021. The Parent alleges that the Student was
entitled to four hours of 1:1 support per day over the District’s 19-day ESY
program, resulting in a demand for 76 hours of compensatory education to
remedy this violation.
Tenth, the Parent demands an independent educational evaluation (IEE) at
public expense.
As discussed below, I find in part for the Parent and in part for the District.
Issues
The issues presented for adjudication are:
1. Did the District violate the Student’s right to a FAPE by failing to
provide appropriate transportation to and from its ESY program in the
summer of 2019?
2. Did the District violate the Parent’s right to meaningfully participate in
the development of the Student’s IEP before the start of the 2019-20
school year?
3. Did the District dismiss the Student early, resulting in a loss of
educational benefit, from September 2, 2019, to March 12, 2020?
4. Did the District violate the Student’s right to FAPE by failing to provide
an AAC device to the Student in school between November 2020 and
January 23, 2021?2
2 Those dates come from the Parent’s closing brief and do not correspond with the evidence.
Below, I will examine whether the District’s failure to provide a AAC devise resulted in a
denial of FAPE at any time.
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5. Did the District violate the Student’s right to a FAPE by failing to
provide a PCA in the Parent’s home between March 13, 2020, and the
end of the 2019-20 school year?
6. Did the District violate the Student’s right to a FAPE through its ESY
program in the summer of 2020?
7. Did the District violate the Student’s right to a FAPE by failing to
provide a PCA in the Student’s home during the 2020-21 school year?
8. Did the District violate the Student’s right to a FAPE by dismissing the
Student early during the 2020-21 school year?
9. Did the District violate the Student’s right to a FAPE by failing to
provide 1:1 support in the Student’s home for the District’s ESY
program in the summer of 2021?
10. Is the Student entitled to an IEE at public expense?
Findings of Fact
I reviewed the record in its entirety. I make findings of fact, however, only
as necessary to resolve the issues before me. I find as follows:
Background: General Background and the 2017-18 School Year
1. There is no dispute that the Student is a child with a disability as
defined by the IDEA. The Student’s primary disability identification is
Autism and secondary disability identification is Intellectual Disability.
2. The Student attended a specialized private school for children with
Autism during the 2017-18 school year.
3. On August 23, 2018, Hearing Officer Skidmore issued a final decision
and order in a due process hearing that the Parent initiated against the
District. In re: Y.T., a Student in the Norristown Area School District,
ODR No. 20956-1819-KE (2018).3
4. Hearing Officer Skidmore determined that an IEP that the District
proposed for the Student’s return to the District’s schools for the
2018-19 school year was appropriate (the 2018 IEP). Hearing Officer
3 The District entered an unredacted copy of ODR No. 20956-1819 into evidence as S-2.
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Skidmore also ordered the parties to meet an IEP team meeting so
that the Parent could provide information to the District regarding the
Student’s present education levels, and then ordered the District to
revise the IEP based on the information that the Parent shared. Id.
Background: the 2018-19 School Year
5. Rather than return the Student to the District’s school under the
District’s IEP, the Parent chose instead to home school the Student
during the 2018-19 school year. Passim.
6. In May 2019, the Parent informed the District that the Student would
return to the District’s schools and re-enrolled the Student. The
District arranged for the Parent to meet with building-level staff and
tour the school building that the Student would attend. NT 128- 129,
379-380, 503.
7. Upon reenrollment, the Parent asked the District for an IEP team
meeting. The District informed the Parent that it would implement the
2018 IEP until such time as it could reevaluate the Student and update
the IEP to address the Student’s needs. See, e.g. S-165 at 5-6; P-35;
NT 121-122, 326-327, 334, 337-338. At the same time, the District
sought information from the Parent about the Student’s progress
during the year of homeschooling. The Parent was not responsive to
the District’s inquiries. NT 225-226, 380; P-35 A, P-35.
8. The 2018 IEP included the District’s determination that the Student
was eligible for summer ESY services. See, e.g. S-165 at 89. To
comply with that provision of the 2018 IEP, the District invited the
Student to its ESY program for the summer of 2019.4
9. Ultimately, the Parent agreed to send the Student to the District’s ESY
program. Passim.
The Summer 2019 ESY Program
10. The District’s ESY program began on July 1, 2019. The District
provided transportation to and from the ESY program, which was
located about a mile from the Parent and Student’s home. The District
4 District personnel testified that it offered ESY in the summer of 2019 to assist with the
Student’s transition back to school. While that may be what the District had in mind, as
discussed below, the District’s legal obligation to offer ESY in the summer of 2019 flows
from the 2018 IEP.
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assigned two adults to the bus: the bus driver and an aide. The aide
was assigned to the bus, not to the Student. There were several other
students on the bus as well. The ride from the Student’s home to the
ESY program was uneventful.
11. The same day, the Student engaged in a behavioral incident upon
boarding the bus to return home. This happened after the Student
boarded the bus and while other students were boarding. There is no
dispute that the Student’s behaviors were a function of the Student’s
disability.
12. Specifically, the Student attempted to elope from the bus and, despite
the intervention of the bus aide and five other adults, and with other
children boarding, the Student successfully eloped from the bus. The
bus was not moving, the Student did not get far from the bus, and was
always surrounded by adults. However, this behavior was alarming
and objectively dangerous.
13. As the incident developed, District personnel contacted the parent by
FaceTime (a mobile video conferencing service) so that the Parent
could help the Student deescalate. This was successful, and the
Student ultimately took the bus home. NT 134- 135, 231.
14. School Personnel contacted the Parent the same day, explaining that
the District would make two changes to the Student’s transportation:
First, the District would change the bus aide. Second, the District
would make sure that the Student boarded the bus last at dismissal,
decreasing the amount of time that the Student would wait on the bus.
NT158, 324, 333-336, 395.
15. School Personnel also suggested that the Student could use a harness
on the bus. The Parent rejected this proposal and a harness was not
5used. Id.
16. On July 2, 2019, the Student took the bus to the ESY program without
incident.
5 I must note that use of transportation harnesses for children with disabilities, without
proper training and supervision, is exceptionally dangerous and can be deadly. See, e.g.
Susavage v. Bucks Cty. Sch. Intermediate Unit No. 22, CIVIL ACTION NO. 00-6217, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10869 (E.D. Pa. June 18, 2002). There is nothing in the record about the
training and supervision of the people who would have put the Student into the harness had
the Parent accepted the District’s offer, but the District’s casual approach to this offer (both
at the time and on the stand) is alarming.
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17. On July 2, 2019, the Student engaged in another incident when
boarding the bus to return home. Although the bus aide was different
and the Student boarded last, the Student would not remain seated,
attempted to elope, and successfully left the bus again. The Student
was able to leave the bus despite what the District properly
characterizes as the “substantial efforts” of its staff. As the incident
developed, the District called the Parent and asked the Parent to come
to the ESY program to take the Student home. NT 128-172, 230-238,
325-341.
18. The Parent does not drive and, because of the Student’s ongoing
behaviors, the walk home was dangerous for both the Parent and the
Student. NT 141-145.
19. On or around July 2, 2019, the Parent informed the District that she
would not send the Student back to the ESY program until appropriate
transportation supports were in place. The Parent continued to seek an
IEP team meeting from the District. Passim (see, e.g. id.).
20. The District invited the Parent to an IEP team meeting on July 16,
2019. The invitation stated that the purpose of the meeting was to
“Discuss possible changes to your child’s current IEP and revise it as
needed.” S-5.
21. When the Parent arrived at the meeting, District personnel told the
Parent that that the meeting was not an IEP team meeting (despite
what written on the invitation), but rather the purpose of the meeting
was for the District to secure the Parent’s consent to evaluate the
Student and gather information from the Parent. The District again
told the Parent that it would not make changes to the IEP until an
evaluation was complete. NT 123-124, 126-128, P-35a.
22. There is no evidence in the record that the District discussed or offered
any additional or alternative transportation services to the Student in
the summer of 2019.6
23. There is no dispute that the Parent did not send the Student back to
the District’s ESY program.
6 The District points to NOREPs at S-6 and S-9 as agreements with the Parent about ESY
services following the July 16, 2019, meeting. Those documents indicate an agreement that
the Student qualified for ESY services and full time Autistic Support during the upcoming
school year – nothing more. They provide no information at all about the particulars of the
services that the District was offering and completely silent as to transportation services.
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24. During the 2019-20 school year, before the COVID-19 school closures,
the District provided different transportation services that were
successful for the Student.
IEP Development
25. On August 29, 2019, the Parent and District met at an IEP team
meeting. The Parent was assisted at the meeting by an advocate. The
meeting was lengthy, and the Parent came to the meeting with a
written list of concerns. The IEP team discussed those concerns, the
Student’s needs, and abilities, and various programming options. S-
10, S-11.
26. At the time of the IEP team meeting, the District’s reevaluation was
still pending. See S-10, S-11.
27. The District used the information obtained in the IEP team meeting,
information from the private school that the Student attended in the
2017-18 school year, information from a 2018 reevaluation report (the
2018 RR) to draft a new IEP for the Student. S-12.
28. The District issued the proposed IEP to the Parent with a NOREP. The
Parent rejected the NOREP on September 20, 2019, stating that
information was missing from the IEP and that she wanted changes in
the IEP (the NOREP itself did not say what changes the Parent
wanted). S-16.
29. The IEP team convened again on October 2, 2019. At that meeting,
the District proposed a revised IEP that included significant changes in
response to the Parent’s concerns and information that the Parent
shared. S-24.
30. The District proposed the October 2019 Revised IEP with a NOREP. The
Parent did not return the NOREP, but in an email to the District stated
her understanding that the District would implement the IEP.7 S-29.
31. The District completed its reevaluation and issued a reevaluation
report on October 25, 2019 (the 2019 RR). The 2019 RR included an
Occupational Therapy evaluation, a Physical Therapy evaluation, input
7 I do not discuss this IEP or any of its multiple revisions in detail because there is no
dispute about its substantive appropriateness. No relief is demanded for any defect in this
IEP or its revisions. The particular alleged violations for which relief is demanded are listed
above.
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from the Parent and teachers, a review of records, and multiple,
standardized, normative assessments of the Student’s intellectual
ability, academic achievement, and behavioral presentation. S-27.
32. The full IEP team, including the Parent and the District’s psychologist
who was the primary author of the 2019 RR, reviewed the 2019 RR
together during at least three meetings, each of which was several
hours in duration. S-36, S-45, S-57; NT 391, 657-658.
33. In addition to the meetings to review the 2019 RR, the District
continued to convene IEP team meetings both at the Parents request,
and to revise the IEP to include or refine important items like a PCA.
During this time, the Parent expressed no particular objection to any
of the District’s proposed programs, but rather stated her belief that
the documents had not been completely reviewed. See, e.g. S-30, S-
31, S-34, S-36, S-45, S-47, S-48; NT 345- 346, 391-392, 524, 655-
656.
34. Ultimately, the District determined that the IEP team had thoroughly
reviewed the documents, and so it issued a NOREP on January 7,
2020. On February 10, 2020, the Parent approved the provision of
services in the then-current version of the IEP without conceding that
those services were appropriate. S-61.
Early Dismissal – September 2, 2019, through March 12, 2020
35. I take judicial notice that Governor Wolf closed all Pennsylvania school
on March 13, 2020, to mitigate the spread of COVID-19. The Governor
extended the school closure order through the end of the 2019-20
school year. The Parent’s claims concerning early dismissal cover the
period of time from the start of school on September 2, 2019, through
March 12, 2020 (a Thursday).
36. District personnel testified that, during the 2019-20 school year, low
incidence special education students, like the Student in this case,
would begin their day at 8:00 a.m. and conclude their day at 2:45
p.m. Most other students would begin their day at 8:30 a.m. and end
their day at 3:15 p.m. Despite a “staggered bell schedule” all students
received 6.25 hours of instructional time per school day. 377-378.
37. The Parent testified that the Student’s transportation to school did not
arrive at the family’s home until 8:00 a.m. and, on days when the
Parent picked the Student up in the afternoon, the Student was
dismissed at 2:50 p.m. See, e.g. NT 206-207.
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38. To resolve this conflicting testimony, I note that the Parent’s testimony
concerned the particular pickup and drop off times for the Student,
while the District employee’s testimony concerned his understanding of
the District’s policies and practices. In other words, the District could
only testify as to what should have happened while the Parent testified
to what actually happened. I also look to the contemporaneously
drafted emails. In those emails, the Parent raised concerns at the time
about Student coming to school late and leaving school early. The
District acknowledged the concern and stated that it was working to fix
the problem. S-25 at 33.
39. I make no findings concerning the District’s general practices. Rather,
I find that the Parent presented a preponderance of evidence that the
Student was regularly picked up at home around 8:00 a.m. was
regularly dismissed early. Whatever the District’s intention or policy, I
find that the Student missed 81 instructional hours as a result of the
District’s transportation and scheduling. Compensatory education is an
appropriate remedy for this violation, and an appropriate order follows.
AAC Device
40. There is no dispute that the Student uses an AAC devices as one
method of communication.
41. In the 2019-20 school year, the Student brought an AAC device that
the Parent owned to school. The glass screen of the AAC device was
damaged in school sometime in December 2019. Thereafter, the
Parent would not permit the Student to use the AAC device, fearing it
was unsafe. 8 NT 244, 398, 534-535.
42. When the Parent discontinued the AAC device, the District made a flip
book containing the same images as the AAC device as a temporary
replacement. NT 398-399, 477, 534- 535.
43. Shortly thereafter, the District went on winter break. During the break,
the District ordered a new, identical AAC device for the Student’s use
in school. NT 244-246, 399-400, 477, 534-535; S-60.
8 The parties describe the damage differently and dispute whether it was safe to use the
AAC devise with a cracked screen. I make no finding concerning of the safe use of cracked
screen.
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In-Home PCA – March 13, 2020, Through the End of the 2019-20
School Year
44. There is no dispute that the Student’s IEP required the District to
provide a PCA during the school day.
45. There is no dispute that the District shifted to remote instruction after
schools closed on March 13, 2020.
46. There is no dispute that the District did not provide a PCA in the
Student’s home from March 13, 2020, through the end of the 2019-20
school year.
The Summer 2020 ESY Program
47. The District found the Student eligible for ESY services in the summer
of 2020. All ESY services were remote, as the District remained closed
for in-person instruction. Citing to the negative experience in the
summer of 2019, the Parent declined the District’s ESY offer. S-46, S-
69; NT 172-173, 368, 402.
The 2020-21 School Year – In-Home PCA
48. The District remained closed, providing remote instruction at the start
of the 2020-21 school year. The District later offered families the
option of hybrid instruction in which some instruction would occur in
school and some remotely. Citing health concerns and the Student’s
inability to tolerate masking, the Parent declined hybrid instruction and
the Student received remote instruction for the entire school year.
Passim (see, e.g. NT 173, 368, 402; S-56).
49. The only dispute concerning the Student’s program in the 2020-21
school year is the provision of 1:1 PCA support in the Student’s home.
See, e.g. Parent’s Closing Brief. Looking at the pleadings as a whole,
the Parent argues that the District’s failure to provide this
accommodation is a per se violation of the Student’s IEP and the
Student’s right to a FAPE. Alternatively, the Parents argue that the
absence of a PCA made it impossible for the Student to participate in
remote instruction. I, therefore, make no findings concerning the
efficacy of remote instruction itself for the Student, or the quantum of
progress that the Student made during the 2020-21 school year.
50. The District contracted with a private company to provide PCA support
in the Student’s home at the start of the 2020-21 school year. That
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company sent a PCA to the Student’s home for roughly seven weeks.
See, e.g. S-81.
51. As a precondition to receiving in-home PCA services, the District
required the Parent to sign a “Affirmation for Personal Care Services in
the Home.” Through that affirmation, the Parent agreed to wear a face
mask while the PCA was in the home, comply with social distancing,
supervise the Student, provide a 30-minute “student free” lunch
break, refrain from tobacco, drug and alcohol use when the PCA is in
the house, complete a daily COVID self-disclosure form daily, and
complete a daily temperature check. S-79.
52. The Parent signed the Affirmation on September 1, 2020. S-79.
53. The private PCA then resigned. The parties hotly dispute the reason
why the private PCA resigned. I do not resolve that dispute because
the reason for the PCA’s resignation is irrelevant to these
proceedings.9
54. Around the time of the private PCA’s resignation, the District revised
the Affirmation required before it would place a District-employed PCA
in any family’s home.10 There were two changes: first, the family
would have to submit a negative COVID test for every family member
living in the home. Second, the family would have to agree to a walk-
through safety inspection in which the District would check for safe
egress and open weapons. See P-38; NT 189, 406-407.
55. The Parent refused to sign the new Affirmation, raising concerns about
its intrusiveness, and the difficulty of testing the Student for COVID-
19. The District and the Parent discussed these concerns. The District
offered to inspect only the portion of the home where the PCA would
work and offered to provide less intrusive “quick tests” for the
Student. The Parent still refused. See, e.g. NT 355-357.
56. As a result of the Parents refusal to sign the new Affirmation or comply
with its terms, the District did not provide a PCA for the Student. NT
192-193, 409.
9 The amount of time waisted during the hearing on this issue is prepositus and will inform
my practice going forward.
10 The record reveals that the change in the Affirmation was the result of negotiations
between the District and the teacher’s union but, as with the reason for the Private PCA’s
resignation, the reason why the District changed the Affirmation is not relevant.
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57. In its closing statement, the District correctly summarizes the
Student’s participation in remote instruction during the 2020-21 school
year after the private PCA departed: “Following the PCA’s departure,
[the Student’s] attendance became sporadic, at best, and eventually
became non-existent. (S-147). As a result of [] absences, [the
Student’s] progress was hindered due to the limitations on access to
[the Student] and the ability to provide any sort of instruction or
intervention to [the Student]. (NT: 365-366; 546).”11
The 2020-21 School Year – Early Dismissal
58. It is not immediately clear how the concept of early dismissal applies
during a year of remote instruction. I interpret this issue to relate to a
loss of instructional hours during the 2020-21 school year as a result
of late starts or early stops to synchronous remote instruction and
make findings accordingly.
59. There is no preponderant evidence in the record that the Student
missed instructional time during the 2020-21 school year because of
anything that could be considered early dismissal. There is
overwhelming evidence that the Student stopped participating in
remote instruction after the private PCA resigned. Those issues are
distinct and should not be conflated.
The Summer 2021 ESY Program
60. The record is nearly silent about the summer 2021 ESY program (in
comparison to other issues). Even so, the Parent raises the same
argument about the provision of an in-home PCA during the summer
of 2021.
61. Facts concerning the provision of an in-home PCA during the summer
of 2021 are identical to the facts concerning an in-home PCA during
the 2021-22 school year.
62. On June 30, 2021, the Parent filed a due process complaint initiating
this matter. The Parent was not represented by an attorney at that
time.
63. The Parent retained an attorney and filed an amended due process
complaint on July 27, 2021.
11 Again, I make no determination about the actual quantum of progress that the Student
made during this time.
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Independent Educational Evaluation (IEE)12
64. Under Pennsylvania regulations, children with Intellectual Disabilities
must be reevaluated every two years. As a result, the Student was due
for a reevaluation during the 2021-22 school year.
65. On August 30, 2021, the District issued a form seeking the Parent’s
consent to reevaluate the Student. When the Parent did not respond,
the District sent the form twice more (one of those transmissions was
by email). S-136, S-140, S-141, S-183. Although the Parent never
signed a permission form, the District commutated that it would
evaluate the Student and the Parent participated in the evaluation by
returning some (but not all) rating scales and communicating with the
District and its evaluator. See, e.g. S-170.
66. Several of the assessments that the District intended to complete as
part of the reevaluation required in-person testing and could not be
completed remotely. NT 667-668, 684-685.
67. With the exception of a meeting on September 9, 2021, the Parent
refused to make the Student available for in-person testing at the
District. The parties briefly discussed an alternative location for in-
person testing but found no mutually agreeable location. See, e.g. NT
299-300, 429-430, 505, 561-566, 570-572, 576-577, ; S-137, S-139,
S-176
68. The District completed the reevaluation using the information it could
gather and issued a reevaluation report on October 25, 2021 (the
October 2021 RR). S-170.
69. After issuing the October 2021 RR, the District attempted to convene
meetings to review the reevaluation, update the Student’s IEP, and
discuss the Student’s placement. Broadly, the Parent refused to
participate, citing the pendency of these proceedings. Passim (see,
e.g. NT
70. On October 27, 2021, the District concluded that it should reevaluate
the Student again to obtain information that was missing from the
12 The Parent’s demand for an IEE at public expense relates to an evaluation that occurred
during the 2021-22 school year. The Parent raises no other issue concerning the 2021-22
school year in her complaint, and makes no argument concerning the appropriateness of
programming the District offered in the 2021-22 school year.
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Page 16
October 2021 RR. The District issued another permission to evaluate
form. S-174. When the Parent did not return that permission form, the
District re-sent the form on November 9 and 19, 2021. S-178, S-185.
The Parent acknowledged receipt of those forms but refused to sign
them without changes. S-184. The Parent never returned the forms.
71. On January 18, 2022, the District revised the RR (the January 2022
RR). The District characterizes this as a new RR. The primary changes
are the addition of information about the District’s proposed
programming and the Districts efforts to obtain more information
about the Student’s needs. S-179.
Witness Credibility
During a due process hearing, the hearing officer is charged with the
responsibility of judging the credibility of witnesses, and must make
“express, qualitative determinations regarding the relative credibility and
persuasiveness of the witnesses.” Blount v. Lancaster-Lebanon Intermediate
Unit, 2003 LEXIS 21639 at *28 (2003). One purpose of an explicit credibility
determination is to give courts the information that they need in the event of
judicial review. See, D.K. v. Abington School District, 696 F.3d 233, 243 (3d
Cir. 2014) (“[Courts] must accept the state agency's credibility
determinations unless the non-testimonial extrinsic evidence in the record
would justify a contrary conclusion.”). See also, generally David G. v.
Council Rock School District, 2009 WL 3064732 (E.D. Pa. 2009); T.E. v.
Cumberland Valley School District, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1471 *11-12 (M.D.
Pa. 2014); A.S. v. Office for Dispute Resolution (Quakertown Community
School District), 88 A.3d 256, 266 (Pa. Commw. 2014); Rylan M. v Dover
Area Sch. Dist., No. 1:16-CV-1260, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70265 (M.D. Pa.
May 9, 2017).
I find that all witnesses testified credibly in that all witnesses candidly
shared their recollection of facts and their opinions, making no effort to
withhold information or deceive me. To the extent that witnesses recall
events differently or draw different conclusions from the same information,
genuine differences in recollection or opinion explain the contradictions.
This does not mean that I assign equal weight to all testimony. Hearsay, no
matter how fervently believed by the witness, cannot form the basis of this
decision. Further, in this case, portions of the Parent’s testimony were
speculative in nature. The contradictions between the Parent’s testimony and
the testimony of District employees is notable, but the areas of
disagreement are not outcome determinative. To the extent that my findings
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General Legal Principles
The Burden of Proof
Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE)
of fact are derived from testimony alone (as opposed to documentary
evidence or a combination of both), the weight that I assign to each
witnesses’ testimony is reflected in my findings above.
The burden of proof, generally, consists of two elements: the burden of
production and the burden of persuasion. In special education due process
hearings, the burden of persuasion lies with the party seeking relief.
Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005); L.E. v. Ramsey Board of
Education, 435 F.3d 384, 392 (3d Cir. 2006). The party seeking relief must
prove entitlement to its demand by preponderant evidence and cannot
prevail if the evidence rests in equipoise. See N.M., ex rel. M.M. v. The
School Dist. of Philadelphia, 394 Fed.Appx. 920, 922 (3rd Cir. 2010), citing
Shore Reg'l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir.
2004). In this case, the Parent is the party seeking relief and must bear the
burden of persuasion.
The IDEA requires the states to provide a “free appropriate public education”
to all students who qualify for special education services. 20 U.S.C. §1412.
Local education agencies meet the obligation of providing a FAPE to eligible
students through development and implementation of IEPs, which must be
“‘reasonably calculated’ to enable the child to receive ‘meaningful
educational benefits’ in light of the student’s ‘intellectual potential.’” Mary
Courtney T. v. School District of Philadelphia, 575 F.3d 235, 240 (3d Cir.
2009) (citations omitted). Substantively, the IEP must be responsive to each
child’s individual educational needs. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d); 34 C.F.R. §
300.324.
This long-standing Third Circuit standard was confirmed by the United States
Supreme Court in Endrew F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct.
988 (2017). The Endrew case was the Court’s first consideration of the
substantive FAPE standard since Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Central
School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (1982).
In Rowley, the Court found that a LEA satisfies its FAPE obligation to a child
with a disability when “the individualized educational program developed
through the Act’s procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the child to
receive educational benefits.” Id at 3015.
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Third Circuit consistently interpreted Rowley to mean that the “benefits” to
the child must be meaningful, and the meaningfulness of the educational
benefit is relative to the child’s potential. See T.R. v. Kingwood Township
Board of Education, 205 F.3d 572 (3rd Cir 2000); Ridgewood Bd. of
Education v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238 (3rd Cir. 1999); S.H. v. Newark, 336 F.3d
260 (3rd Cir. 2003). In substance, the Endrew decision in no different.
A school district is not required to maximize a child’s opportunity; it must
provide a basic floor of opportunity. See, Lachman v. Illinois State Bd. of
Educ., 852 F.2d 290 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 925 (1988). However,
the meaningful benefit standard requires LEAs to provide more than “trivial”
or “de minimis” benefit. See Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit
16, 853 F.2d 171, 1179 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied 488 U.S. 1030 (1989).
See also Carlisle Area School v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 533-34 (3d Cir.
1995). It is well-established that an eligible student is not entitled to the
best possible program, to the type of program preferred by a parent, or to a
guaranteed outcome or a specific level of achievement. See, e.g., J.L. v.
North Penn School District, 2011 WL 601621 (E.D. Pa. 2011). Thus, what
the statute guarantees is an “appropriate” education, “not one that provides
everything that might be thought desirable by ‘loving parents.’” Tucker v.
Bayshore Union Free School District, 873 F.2d 563, 567 (2d Cir. 1989).
In Endrew, the Supreme Court effectively agreed with the Third Circuit by
rejecting a “merely more than de minimis” standard, holding instead that the
“IDEA demands more. It requires an educational program reasonably
calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the
child’s circumstances.” Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. 988, 1001 (2017). Appropriate
progress, in turn, must be “appropriately ambitious in light of [the child’s]
circumstances.” Id at 1000. In terms of academic progress, grade-to-grade
advancement may be “appropriately ambitious” for students capable of
grade-level work. Id. Education, however, encompasses much more than
academics. Grade-to-grade progression, therefore, is not an absolute
indication of progress. Rather, I must consider the totality of a child’s
circumstances to determine whether the LEA offered the child a FAPE.
In sum, the essence of the standard is that IDEA-eligible students must
receive specially designed instruction and related services, by and through
an IEP that is reasonably calculated at the time it is issued to offer an
appropriately ambitious education in light of the Student’s circumstances.
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Compensatory Education
Compensatory education is an appropriate remedy where a LEA knows, or
should know, that a child’s educational program is not appropriate or that he
or she is receiving only a trivial educational benefit, and the LEA fails to
remedy the problem. M.C. v. Central Regional Sch. District, 81 F.3d 389 (3d
Cir. 1996). Compensatory education is an equitable remedy. Lester H. v.
Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1990).
Courts in Pennsylvania have recognized two methods for calculating the
amount of compensatory education that should be awarded to remedy
substantive denials of FAPE. The first method is called the “hour-for-hour”
method. Under this method, students receive one hour of compensatory
education for each hour that FAPE was denied. M.C. v. Central Regional,
arguably, endorses this method.
The hour-for-hour method has come under considerable scrutiny. Some
courts outside of Pennsylvania have rejected the hour-for-hour method
outright. See Reid ex rel.Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 523
(D.D.C. 2005). In Reid, the court concluded that the amount and nature of a
compensatory education award must be crafted to put students in the
position that they would be in, but for the denial of FAPE. Reid remains the
leading case on this method of calculating compensatory education.
The more nuanced Reid method was endorsed by the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court in B.C. v. Penn Manor Sch. District, 906 A.2d 642,
650-51 (Pa. Commw. 2006) and the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania in Jana K. v. Annville Cleona Sch. Dist., 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114414 (M.D. Pa. 2014). It is arguable that the Third Circuit
also embraced the Reid method in Ferren C. v. Sch. District of Philadelphia,
612 F.3d 712, 718 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Reid to explain that
compensatory education “should aim to place disabled children in the same
position that the child would have occupied but for the school district’s
violations of the IDEA.”).
Despite the clearly growing preference for the Reid method, that analysis
poses significant practical problems. In administrative due process hearings,
evidence is rarely presented to establish what position the student would be
in but for the denial of FAPE – or what amount or what type of compensatory
education is needed to put the student back into that position. Even cases
that express a strong preference for the Reid or “same position” method
recognize the importance of such evidence, and suggest that hour-for-hour
is the default when no such evidence is presented:
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“… the appropriate and reasonable level of reimbursement will
match the quantity of services improperly withheld throughout
that time period, unless the evidence shows that the child
requires more or less education to be placed in the position he or
she would have occupied absent the school district’s
deficiencies.”
Jana K. v. Annville-Cleona Sch. Dist., 39 F. Supp. 3d 584, 608 (M.D. Pa.
2014).
Finally, there are cases in which a denial of FAPE creates a harm that
permeates the entirety of a student’s school day. In such cases, “full days”
of compensatory education (meaning one hour of compensatory education
for each hour that school was in session) are warranted. Such awards are
fitting if the LEA’s “failure to provide specialized services permeated the
student’s education and resulted in a progressive and widespread decline in
[the Student’s] academic and emotional well-being” Jana K. v. Annville
Cleona Sch. Dist., 39 F. Supp. 3d 584, 609 (M.D. Pa. 2014). See also Tyler
W. ex rel. Daniel W. v. Upper Perkiomen Sch. Dist., 963 F. Supp. 2d 427,
438-39 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2013); Damian J. v. School Dist. of Phila., Civ. No.
06-3866, 2008 WL 191176, *7 n.16 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2008); Keystone
Cent. Sch. Dist. v. E.E. ex rel. H.E., 438 F. Supp. 2d 519, 526 (M.D. Pa.
2006); Penn Trafford Sch. Dist. v. C.F. ex rel. M.F., Civ. No. 04-1395, 2006
WL 840334, *9 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2006); M.L. v. Marple Newtown Sch.
Dist., ODR No. 3225-11-12-KE, at 20 (Dec. 1, 2012); L.B. v. Colonial Sch.
Dist., ODR No. 1631-1011AS, at 18-19 (Nov. 12, 2011).
Whatever the calculation, in all cases compensatory education begins to
accrue not at the moment a child stopped receiving a FAPE, but at the
moment that the LEA should have discovered the denial. M.C. v. Central
Regional Sch. District, 81 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 1996). Usually, this factor is
stated in the negative – the time reasonably required for a LEA to rectify the
problem is excluded from any compensatory education award. M.C. ex rel.
J.C. v. Central Regional Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 397 (3d Cir. N.J. 1996)
In sum, I subscribe to the logic articulated by Judge Rambo in Jana K. v.
Annville Cleona. If a denial of FAPE resulted in substantive harm, the
resulting compensatory education award must be crafted to place the
student in the position that the student would be in but for the denial.
However, in the absence of evidence establishing the position that the
student would be in but for the denial, or evidence establishing the amount
and type of compensatory education needed for remediation, the hour-for-
hour approach is a necessary default. Alternatively, full-day compensatory
education can also be an appropriate remedy if the full-day standard is met.
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In all cases, however, compensatory education is reduced by the amount of
time that it should have taken for the LEA to find and correct the problem.
Evaluation Criteria
The IDEA establishes requirements for evaluations. Substantively, those are
the same for initial evaluations and revaluations. 20 U.S.C. § 1414.
In substance, evaluations must “use a variety of assessment tools and
strategies to gather relevant functional, developmental, and academic
information, including information provided by the parent, that may assist in
determining” whether the child is a child with a disability and, if so, what
must be provided through the child’s IEP for the child to receive FAPE. 20
U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2)(A).
Further, the evaluation must “not use any single measure or assessment as
the sole criterion for determining whether a child is a child with a disability
or determining an appropriate educational program for the child” and must
“use technically sound instruments that may assess the relative contribution
of cognitive and behavioral factors, in addition to physical or developmental
factors”. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2)(B)-(C).
In addition, the District is obligated to ensure that:
assessments and other evaluation materials... (i) are selected
and administered so as not to be discriminatory on a racial or
cultural basis; (ii) are provided and administered in the language
and form most likely to yield accurate information on what the
child knows and can do academically, developmentally, and
functionally, unless it is not feasible to so provide or administer;
(iii) are used for purposes for which the assessments or
measures are valid and reliable; (iv) are administered by trained
and knowledgeable personnel; and (v) are administered in
accordance with any instructions provided by the producer of
such assessments.
20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(3)(A).
Finally, evaluations must assess “all areas of suspected disability”. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414(b)(3)(B).
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Discussion
The Prior Due Process Decision
Analysis of the issues presented in this matter necessary starts with Hearing
Officer Skidmore’s prior decision. Hearing Officer Skidmore determined that
the 2018 IEP was appropriate for the Student at the time it was offered. The
Parent did not appeal that decision, but also did not permit the District to
implement the 2018 IEP, choosing instead to homeschool the Student during
the 2018-19 school year. This contextualizes the District’s obligations to the
Student upon reenrollment at the end of the 2018-19 school year.
Families move, and so the IDEA and Pennsylvania regulations anticipate
students with disabilities moving from LEA to LEA both interstate and
intrastate. While the return to the District’s program from a year of
homeschooling is not technically a transfer, the circumstances are similar.
Were this an LEA-to-LEA transfer, the District would be obligated to
implement the Student’s IEP (or provide comprisable services) until it could
conduct its own evaluation and issue its own IEP. The District’s decision to
implement the 2019 IEP, which included summer ESY services, upon the
Student’s reenrollment is consistent with the IDEA.
2019 Summer ESY
The record reveals no dispute about the substantive appropriateness of the
District’s ESY program in the summer of 2019. Rather, the dispute concerns
the District’s alleged failure to provide appropriate related services to enable
the Student to attend the ESY program. Both transportation and
paraprofessional support are related services under the IDEA.
There is no doubt that this is an emotionally charged issue for the Parent.
The transportation incidents in the summer of 2019 were dangerous for the
Student and legitimately caused the Parent some amount of emotional
distress. That distress was exacerbated by the District’s lack of empathy in
response to what the Parent perceived as a crisis. The Parent may not have
trusted the District before this incident, but the Parent’s lack of trust was
nearly absolute from this point forward. Even so, the Parent’s mistrust and
the District’s empathy are not factors in my decision. Rather, I look to
determine whether the District offered a FAPE, and that analysis concerns
the Student’s needs and the District’s program.
It was appropriate for the District to provide transportation to and from the
ESY program in accordance with the 2018 IEP for the start of the program.
The Parent presents no argument that the transportation offered by the
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District is inconsistent with the 2018 IEP. However, an IEP that is reasonably
calculated to provide a FAPE when it is offered may still fail to work as
expected. When this happens, LEAs have an obligation fix the problem. This
is typically accomplished through a combination short-term, mutually
agreeable fixes, reevaluations, and IEP revisions. In this case, it was
immediately obvious that the District’s transportation to and from the 2019
ESY program was inappropriate for the Student at the time of
implementation, even if the 2018 IEP was appropriate when it was offered.
After the second day of the ESY program, the District is charged with
knowledge that the transportation services in place for the Student were
inappropriate. Even if the Student was adjusting to a significant change from
homeschooling in the 2018-19 school year, the District was still obligated to
work with the Parent to revise its transportation accommodations. The
District did not do this, and so the Student had no way to access the
District’s ESY program.
The Parent has proven by preponderant evidence that the District was
obligated to offer an ESY program to the Student in the summer of 2019,
and that the District failed to provide appropriate related services in the
domain of transportation so that the Student could receive a FAPE during the
ESY program.
The Parent’s demand for 54 hours of compensatory services to remedy this
violation is granted.
Parental Participation in IEP Development
There is no evidence whatsoever that the District violated the Parent’s right
to meaningfully participate in the development of the Student’s IEP. The
evidence is overwhelmingly to the contrary. Poor communication and
rescheduled meetings are simply not evidence of a violation of the Parent’s
right to participate. The record unambiguously establishes that the District
provided not only a forum for the Parent to speak, but that it listened to
what the Parent had to say. The District actively sought the Parent’s input
and used that input to design the Student’s special education program.
The Parent’s meaningful participation claim is denied and dismissed.
Early Dismissal – The 2019-20 School Year Through the COVID-19
Closure
The conflicting testimony concerning early dismissals between September 2,
2019, and March 12, 2020 – and my resolution of that conflict – is discussed
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above. Under a preponderance of evidence standard, the Parent has
established that the Student did not receive a full day of instruction during
the period in question, and that this diminution of educational benefit
happened consistently.
I accept the Parent’s calculation that this violation resulted in a loss of 81
instructional hours, and so the Parent’s demand for an additional 81 hours of
compensatory education is granted.
Provision of an AAC Device
Ignoring conflicts between the record and the Parent’s argument about when
the AAC device was damaged, I look to see if the absence of an AAC device
resulted in a denial of FAPE. The Parents have not proven that the brief time
that the Student did not have an AAC device in school resulted in
substantive educational harm. The record is silent as to the educational
impact of not having an AAC device in school within this narrow window (the
record is equally silent about the educational impact of the replacement flip
book that the District used during this time).
The Parent’s demand for additional compensatory education for the District’s
failure to provide an AAC device is denied.
In-Home PCA – March 13, 2020, to End of 2019-20 School Year
The most challenging aspect of this case is whether the District can be held
liable for its failure to send a PCA into the Student’s home. Analysis for the
period from March 13, 2020, to the end of the 2019-20 school year is quite
different from analysis for the 2020-21 school year.
Described above, compensatory education is an equitable remedy. This is
part of the reason that the District is entitled to a reasonable rectification
period from the time that it knows a student is not receiving a FAPE to the
time that compensatory education begins to accrue.
In this case, the Student received remote education from the District at
home for the first time when schools closed. The District had information
from the Parent about the Student’s experience during homeschooling, but
remote instruction was entirely different. It was not possible for the District
to know exactly how the Student would respond to remote instruction, or
what related services the Student would need to benefit from remote
instruction. On top of that, the District had no way to know how long the
school closure would last when the Governor issued the closure order.
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The Parent has preponderantly proven that the District failed to implement
the Student’s IEP after the school closure. Under the unique, student-specific
facts of this case, I find it would not be equitable to award compensatory
education for this failure during the period of March 13, 2020, to the end of
the 2019-20 school year. The District’s time to assess the Student’s need for
related services at home, determine that a PCA remained a necessary
component of FAPE, and then retain a PCA qualified to work with the Student
all while all semblance of normality was upended mitigates against
compensatory education completely during this period.
Analysis for the 2020-21 school year, below, is different.
ESY 2020
The Parent did not meet their burden to establish that the District failed to
offer a FAPE for the Student in the summer of 2020. There is no
preponderance of evidence establishing what ESY services would have been
appropriate, whether the Parent accepted the District ESY offer (or what
conditions were placed on that acceptance), or how the ESY program may or
may not have been contingent upon the Parents acceptance of the District’s
second Affirmation.
The Parent’s demand for compensatory education to remedy a denial of
FAPE in the summer of 2020 is denied.
In-Home PCA – 2020-21 School Year
There is no question that the Student’s IEP required the District to provide
PCA support. Whatever reasonable rectification time the District had starting
on March 13, 2020, was over by the start of the 2020-21 school year.
The Parent is correct that the District substantively violated the Student’s
IEP per se. Both parties all but explicitly agree that the absence of a PCA in
the Student’s home during the 2020-21 school year (after the private PCA
resigned) had significant, adverse educational consequences for the Student.
And yet, the record also establishes that the District’s failure to provide a
PCA is directly attributable to the Parent’s refusal to sign the District’s
updated Affirmation and submit to an inspection of the area in which the
PCA would work.
There was nothing unreasonable about the District’s second Affirmation.
Moreover, the record establishes that the District did not take an absolutist
approach to the second Affirmation. Rather, it was willing to work with the
Parent to find compromises. The Parent’s refusal to sign the Affirmation and
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submit to the District’s minimal requirements – modified for the Parent – for
the protection of its staff was unreasonable.
The United States Department of Education under two administrations has
consistently taken the position that schools’ responses to COVID-19 in no
way abrogate the rights of children with disabilities. The Pennsylvania
Department of Education (PDE) has taken the same position. And even
though parents have substantive rights under the IDEA, the right to special
education belongs to the child. My choice, therefore, is to either punish a
child with disabilities for a parent’s unjustifiable obstinance or deplete the
resources of a public school that went out of its way to compromise and
cooperate. There are no good answers here.
In Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 127 S. Ct. 1994
(2007), the Supreme Court found that IDEA affords rights directly to
parents, not just students. Even so, the substantive, educational right to a
FAPE belongs to the child. When a child’s right to a FAPE is violated, a
remedy is owed to the child. That remedy, compensatory education, is
equitable in nature. Therefore, I take the Parent’s actions into consideration
when crafting the remedy.
There are some parental actions that negate a district’s obligation to provide
a FAPE or terminate a district’s liability for not providing a FAPE. See, e.g. 20
U.S.C. § 1414 (concerning consent for evaluations). None of those apply
here, and so the Parent’s actions cannot completely remove the District’s
liability after the rectification period ends. In this case, however, the Parent’s
actions significantly thwarted the District’s effort to educate the Student.
If the District had simply failed to provide a PCA to the Student, the Student
would be entitled to one hour of compensatory education for each hour that
the District provided instruction to all students during the 2020-21 school
year, starting the day after the private PCA quit. Although the Parent
prevented the District from providing a PCA, the result to the Student is the
same. The Student must have a remedy, but it is simply unfair to hold the
District completely liable when the violation of the Student’s right to a FAPE
is directly attributable to the Parent. To resolve this, I reduce the
compensatory education award by 75%.
The Student is entitled to compensatory education for the period from the
day after the private PCA resigned through the last day of the 2020-21
school year. For that time, the Student is owed 15 minutes of compensatory
education for each hour of instruction that the District provided to its non-
disabled students, through whatever means.
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Early Dismissal – The 2020-21 School Year
Based on the findings above, the Parent has not presented preponderant
evidence that the Student lost instructional time as the result of early
dismissal during the 2020-21 school year. The Parent’s demand for
additional compensatory education for this violation is denied.
ESY 2021
Analysis for ESY in the summer of 2021 is identical to analysis for ESY in the
summer of 2020. The Parent’s demand for additional compensatory
education for any violation of the Student’s right to a FAPE in the summer of
2020 is denied.
Independent Educational Evaluation
It is rare in a special education due process hearing to see so much evidence
put forth by an LEA of its dissatisfaction with its own evaluations. As with the
provision of PCA support, the District wanted to do more but was stopped by
the Parent; first by the Parent’s unresponsiveness and then by the Parent’s
refusal to make the Student available.
The Parent cannot refuse to take minimal measures to ensure the safety of
District staff in her home and then challenge the RR for its failure to include
an in-home observation.
Analysis is similar for the Parent’s refusal to make the Student available for
in-person testing after the District offered student-specific accommodations
to assuage health concerns. I do not fault the Parent for being cautious. But
there is a line between reasonable caution and obstinance for its own sake.
The Parent’s staunch refusal to consider the accommodations that the
District offered to enable in-person testing crossed that line.
A more complete evaluation is necessary, but the Parent has not established
entitlement to an IEE at public expense. An IEE at public expense is an
available remedy only upon a showing that the District’s RR was
inappropriate. Deficiencies in the District’s RR are attributable to the Parent’s
13
13 The same behavior is seen in the Parent’s responses to the District’s various efforts to
obtain consent for evaluations. At some point, the Parent must choose between battles over
the non-substantive minutia of the District’s forms and obtaining actionable information
about the Student.
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actions and inactions. The Parent cannot simultaneously stand in the way of
a complete evaluation and then challenge the evaluation for its
incompleteness.
I will order the District to (yet again) seek the Parent’s consent to reevaluate
the student, targeting any domain that the District was unable to assess
during its prior reevaluation. Should the Parent withhold consent, the
District’s options are spelled out by the IDEA itself. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414.
Use of Compensatory Education
The Parent may direct the use of the compensatory education awarded
herein for any appropriate developmental, remedial, or enriching educational
service, product, or device that furthers the Student’s educational and
related service needs. The compensatory education may not be used for
services, products, or devices that are primarily for leisure or recreation.
The compensatory education shall be in addition to, and shall not be used to
supplant, educational and related services that should appropriately be
provided by the District through the Student’s IEPs to assure meaningful
educational progress. Compensatory services may occur after school hours,
on weekends, and during the summer months when convenient for the
Student and the Parent.
Services and products funded by compensatory education must be acquired
at or below market rates in the District’s geographical area. Any
compensatory education not used before the end of the school year in which
the Student reaches 21 years old is forfeited.
ORDER
Now, March 25, 2022, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1. The District violated the Student’s right to a FAPE during the summer
of 2019. The Student is awarded 54 hours of compensatory education
as a remedy.
2. From September 2, 2019, through March 12, 2020, the Student lost
instructional time, and therefore educational benefits, because of
regular late school starts and early dismissals. The Student is awarded
an additional 81 hours of compensatory education as a remedy.
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3. During the entire 2020-21 school year, the District violated the
Student’s right to FAPE by failing to provide a PCA in the Student’s
home. I attribute 75% of that failure to the Parent’s unreasonable
actions and inactions. The Student is awarded 15 minutes of
compensatory education for each instructional hour of the 2020-21
school year.
4. All compensatory education awarded herein shall be used or forfeited
in accordance with the accompanying Decision.
5. Within 20 days of this Order, the District shall propose a special
education reevaluation of the Student, targeting any information that
the District was unable to obtain as part of its most recent re-
evaluation.
It is FURTHER ORDERED that any claim not specifically addressed in this
order is DENIED and DISMISSED.
/s/ Brian Jason Ford
HEARING OFFICER
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