Philadelphia City School District | Case 27500-22-23 | 2023-03-27
Pennsylvania special education due-process decision
- Case number
- 27500-22-23
- Date
- 03/27/2023
- Parties / district (official listing)
- Philadelphia City School District
- Hearing officer
- Joy Waters Fleming
- Issues (official listing)
- Transportation Free Appropriate Public Education Section 504
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Decision text
Page 1
This is a redacted version of the original decision. Select details have been removed from
the decision to preserve anonymity of the student. The redactions do not affect the
substance of the document.
Pennsylvania Special Education Due Process Hearing Officer
Final Decision and Order
Closed Hearing
ODR No. 27500-23-23
Child's Name:
E.I.
Date of Birth:
[redacted]
Parents:
[redacted]
Counsel for Parents
Benjamin Hinerfeld, Esq.
1528 Walnut St., Suite 1100
Philadelphia, PA19102
Local Education Agency:
Philadelphia City School District
440 N. Broad St., Suite 313
Philadelphia, PA 19130
Counsel for LEA
Emily M. Beck, Esq.
Wisler Pearlstine, LLP
460 Norristown Road, Suite 110
Blue Bell, Pennsylvania 19422-2323
Hearing Officer:
Joy Waters Fleming, Esq.
Date of Decision:
March 27, 2023
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INFORMATION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The student in this matter (Student)1 is a [redacted] student in the
(District) who is eligible for special education under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act as
a child with Autism.2 The Parent filed this due process Complaint on the
grounds that the District denied Student a FAPE when it failed to transport
the Student to and from school for a period of time during the 2022-2023
school year.
Although oral opening statements and written closing arguments were
submitted, counsel for the respective parties agreed to detailed factual
stipulations, reproduced below, that obviated the need for an evidentiary
hearing. As relief, the Parent sought compensatory education for the missed
instructional time of the Student as well as monetary damages for lost
wages.
For the following reasons, the relief requested by the Parent is denied.
ISSUES
1 In the interest of confidentiality and privacy, Student’s name and gender, and other
potentially identifiable information, are not used in the body of this decision, and will be
redacted from the cover page prior to posting on the website of the Office for Dispute
Resolution.
2 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 – 1482. The implementing federal regulations are found at 34 C.F.R. §§
300.1 – 300.818, and the state regulations are found at 22 Pa. Code §§ 14.101 – 14.163.
The federal regulations implementing Section 504 are set forth in 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.1 –
104.61. The applicable Pennsylvania regulations are set forth in 22 Pa. Code §§ 15.1 –
15.11 (Chapter 15).
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1. Whether the District denied the Student a FAPE under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. ("IDEA") and
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, when it
failed to provide transportation to Private School from January 3,
2023, through February 14, 2023?
2. Whether the District denied the Student a FAPE under the IDEA and
Section 504 when late transportation was provided on November 14,
2022; November 17, 2002; January 24, 2023; and February 8, 2023?
3. Whether the District engaged in conduct that was deliberately
indifferent to the Student in violation of the law when it provided late
or no transportation to Private School?
4. If FAPE denial is found, what, if any remedy is appropriate?
FINDINGS OF FACTS3
1. The Student [redacted] is a child with a disability residing in the
District.
2. [Redacted] is Student's Parent.
3. Student is eligible for special education and related services under
the category of Autism.
4. Student is nonverbal.
5. The District is a Local Education Agency under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act and a recipient of federal funds for purposes of
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
3 All findings of fact are joint stipulations submitted by counsel.
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6. The Parent requested transportation for Student to the Private
School, a parent-procured placement, for the 2022-2023 school year.
7. Student requires a 1:1 aide during transportation.
8. The Private School day lasts six hours, from 8:45 AM until 3:00 PM,
with dismissal beginning at approximately 2:50 PM.
9. Between the start of the District's 2022-2023 school year and the
end of the 2022 calendar year, the District provided Student with
transportation, with a 1:1 aide, through [redacted] (the transportation) a
private, third-party transportation company.
10. The transportation emailed the District on December 29, 2022,
when its offices were closed for winter break, and advised that Student's
assigned route would be without a driver when school resumed after break.
11. On Monday, January 2, 2023, the transportation notified the
Parent that it would no longer provide transportation for Student due to
staffing shortages.
12. The transportation's email of December 29, 2022, was received
and responded to by the District's Director of Transportation on January 3,
2023, the day the District reopened after break, at 8:25 AM. The Director
advised the transportation that the District would be working to reassign
Student's route to another vendor.
13. Beginning on Tuesday, January 3, 2023, transportation stopped
providing Student transportation.
14. On twenty-two (22) school days (between January 3, 2023 and
February 14, 2023), The Parent drove Student to and from the Private
School twice daily (88 one-way trips).
15. Each one-way trip took 20-50 minutes depending on traffic.
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16. Each one-way trip was 7-8 miles depending on the route.
17. Student was late to school on the follow dates: 11/14/22,
11/17/22, 1/24/23, 2/8/23, and missed a total of 4 1/2 hours of instruction.
18. Between January 3, 2023, and February 14, 2023, the Parent
missed four overtime shifts because she had to drive Student to and from
the Private School. She lost $442.80 in earnings on each of her four missed
shifts.
19. Due to work commitments, the Parent could not drive Student to
or from the Private School on Fridays in January and early February 2023.
20. Lacking any transportation, Student missed school on five
consecutive Fridays in January and February 2023.
21. On January 19, 2023, the Parent filed this Due Process action.
22. On or about Tuesday, January 24, 2023, the District engaged a
new company, [redacted] Cab Company (Cab Company), to take Student to
and from the Private School.
23. On the morning of Tuesday, February 7, 2023, Student's cab
arrived without a 1:1 aide. The Parent reluctantly allowed Student to ride in
the cab to the Private School, but picked the Student up from school that
afternoon rather than allow the Student to ride again without an aide.
24. On Wednesday, February 8, 2023, Student was more than an hour
late for school.
25. On February 9, 2023, the District engaged [redacted] Car Care
(Car Care) to drive Student to and from the Private School, starting on
February 15, 2023.
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26. Car Care has transported Student to and from the Private School
appropriately (with a 1:1 aide) during the period February 14-15, 19-28,
2023.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
Applicable Legal Principles
The Burden of Proof
The burden of proof consists of two elements: the burden of
production and the burden of persuasion. In special education due process
hearings, the burden of persuasion lies with the party seeking relief.
Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005); L.E. v. Ramsey Board of
Education, 435 F.3d 384, 392 (3d Cir. 2006). The party seeking relief must
prove entitlement to its demand by preponderant evidence and cannot
prevail if the evidence rests in equipoise. See N.M., ex rel. M.M. v. The
School Dist. of Philadelphia, 394 Fed.Appx. 920, 922 (3rd Cir. 2010), citing
Shore Reg'l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir.
2004). In this particular case, the Parent is the party seeking relief and must
bear the burden of persuasion.
Witness Credibility
A special education hearing officer, who has the role of fact-finder, is
also tasked with the responsibility to make credibility determinations of the
witnesses who testify. See J. P. v. County School Board, 516 F.3d 254, 261
(4th Cir. Va. 2008); see also T.E. v. Cumberland Valley School District, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1471 *11-12 (M.D. Pa. 2014); A.S. v. Office for Dispute
Resolution (Quakertown Community School District), 88 A.3d 256, 266 (Pa.
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The IDEA requires the states to provide a "free appropriate public
education" to all students who qualify for special education services. 20
U.S.C. §1412. Local education agencies, including school districts, meet the
obligation of providing a FAPE to eligible students through development and
implementation of IEPs, which must be "‘calculated’ to enable the child to
receive ‘meaningful educational benefits’ in light of the student’s ‘intellectual
potential.’” Mary Courtney T. v. School District of Philadelphia, 575 F.3d 235,
240 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). Substantively, the IEP must be
responsive to each child’s individual educational needs. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d);
34 C.F.R. § 300.324. This long-standing Third Circuit standard was
confirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Endrew F. v. Douglas
Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017). The Endrew F. case was the
Court’s first consideration of the substantive FAPE standard since Board of
Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,
206-07, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (1982). In Rowley, the Court found that an LEA
satisfies its FAPE obligation to a child with a disability when “the
individualized educational program developed through the Act’s procedures
is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.”
Id. at 3015. Third Circuit consistently interpreted Rowley to mean that the
“benefits” to the child must be meaningful, and the meaningfulness of the
educational benefit is relative to the child’s potential. See T.R. v. Kingwood
Township Board of Education, 205 F.3d 572 (3rd Cir 2000); Ridgewood Bd.
of Education v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238 (3rd Cir. 1999); S.H. v. Newark, 336 F.3d
260 (3rd Cir. 2003). In substance, the Endrew F. decision is no different. A
Commw. 2014). In this case, counsel requested a resolution based on the
stipulated findings of fact. Counsel declined to offer testimony.
Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE)
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school district is not required to maximize a child’s opportunity; it must
provide a basic floor of opportunity. See, Lachman v. Illinois State Bd. of
Educ., 852 F.2d 290 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 925 (1988). However,
the meaningful benefit standard required LEAs to provide more than “trivial”
or “de minimis” benefit. See Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit
16, 853 F.2d 171, 1179 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied 488 U.S. 1030 (1989).
See also Carlisle Area School v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 533-34 (3d Cir.
1995).
Transportation
Pursuant to its obligation to offer and provide Student with a FAPE, the
state must ensure that a student receives both specially designed instruction
and related services that meet the above standards. 34 C.F.R. §300.17
(defining FAPE to consist of special education and related services). Related
services include transportation. 34 C.F.R. §300.34 . The IEP – and thus the
promise of related services, including transportation - must be reasonably
calculated to provide Student with progress appropriate in light of the child’s
circumstances. Endrew F. Therefore, when provided as a related service to
an eligible young child, transportation must remove a barrier to the child’s
receipt of FAPE. Conversely, it cannot be appropriate if it creates or permits
a barrier to the child’s educational progress; such a deficient service would
be the antithesis of FAPE.
General Section 504 Principles
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 requires schools to
provide a free appropriate public education to each qualified individual with a
disability. Under Section 504, “an appropriate education is the provision of
regular or special education and related aids and services that (i) are
designed to meet individual educational needs of handicapped persons as
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adequately as the needs of nonhandicapped persons are met and (ii) are
based upon adherence to procedures that satisfy the requirements of” the
related subsections of that chapter, 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.34, 104.35, and
104.36. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b). The obligation to provide FAPE is
substantively the same under Section 504 and the IDEA. Ridgewood, supra,
172 F.3d at 253; see also Lower Merion School District v. Doe, 878 A.2d 925
(Pa. Commw. 2005).
In order to establish a violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the
filing party must prove :
1. They are “disabled” as defined by the Act;
2.They are “otherwise qualified” to participate in school activities;
3. The school or the board of education receives federal financial
assistance; and
4. They were excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or
subject to discrimination at the school.
By contrast, intentional discrimination under Section 504 requires a
showing of deliberate indifference, which may be met by establishing “both
(1) knowledge that a federally protected right is substantially likely to be
violated … and (2) failure to act despite that knowledge.” S.H. v. Lower
Merion School District, 729 F.3d 248, 265 (3d Cir. 2013). However,
“deliberate choice, rather than negligence or bureaucratic inaction,” is
necessary to support such a claim. Id. at 263.
Parent’s Claims
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The first issue raised by the Parent is whether the District denied
Student a FAPE for its failure to provide consistent transportation, with a
one-to-one aide, to and from the Private School. Through its written closing,
the District countered that the Private School had the responsibility to
implement the IEP, and previously provided transportation occurred under
the provisions of the Pennsylvania School Code and not as a related service;
therefore, no FAPE denial occurred. Based upon the stipulated record, I
conclude that Parent has failed to establish that the District denied Student a
FAPE.
In the Complaint, the Parent alleged consistent, dependable
transportation to and from school did not occur, although a related service in
the Student’s IEP. The District did not submit an Answer to the Complaint.4
Although the Complaint alleged enrollment in the Private School occurred
through an agreement with the District, the jointly submitted factual
stipulations indicated the Student attended a “parent procured” placement
without additional detail regarding the placement circumstances, educational
programming and financial obligations of the respective parties. I must defer
to the factually minimal post-Complaint stipulations to resolve this matter.
The facts are clear that this District transported this eligible Student to
and from the Private School accompanied by an aide from the first day of
the 2022-2023 school year until the end of December 2022. After the
District provided transportation stopped, the Parent drove the Student to
and from school for twenty-two days in January and February. During this
same period, the Student missed five days because the Parent could not
take the Student to school. The Student was also late for school for four
days between November and February. Equally clear, the transportation
4 34 C.F.R. §300.508
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ended not because the District asserted it did not have that responsibility
but halted because of difficulty finding a vendor. Transportation resumed
through a third vendor, a car service, mid-way through February 2023,
before this due process commenced and hopefully has continued.
The circumstances that preceded this child’s placement in the Private
School are unclear. The “parent procured” placement, as stipulated, may or
may not be the unilateral parental placement implied by the District in its
written closing statement.5 I cannot satisfactorily determine whether a
disagreement about FAPE resulted in this Parent finding (procuring) a
suitable private school with District assent and funding or different
circumstances resulted in this placement. The placement circumstances
dictate the obligations of the respective parties for purposes of determining
whether a denial of FAPE occurred. 6 Without more information, this
Student’s status as FAPE eligible does not automatically equate to an IDEA
obligation by this District to transport to and from school.
Based on the facts presented, I am unable to determine that the
District’s transportation of this eligible Student arose purely through an
obligation to provide FAPE-mandated services or only through requirements
under state law. Additionally, the stipulations did not offer information about
whether an IEP or services agreement existed, attendant programming
expectations, nor the source of the “required” one-to-one aide. Although the
5 The stipulations indicated the Student attended a “parentally procured” placement without
additional detail; however, the Complaint alleged enrollment was through an agreement
with the District. There is no mention of a one to one aide in the Complaint.
6 See, 34 C.F.R. 300.14 (LEA not required to pay for the cost of education, including special
education and related services, of a child with a disability at a private school or facility if
that agency made FAPE available to the child and the parents elected to place the child in a
private school or facility). (Emphasis added)
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IDEA does not mandate that a school district provide transportation from
home to school for parentally placed students in a private school, under
Pennsylvania law, this District was required to provide transportation
services to all students, including this one, parentally placed in a private
school, which it did.7 However, I cannot conclude that this Student was
entitled to District supplied transportation as a mandated related service. As
such, the Parent has not met their burden of proof that the District denied
Student a FAPE.
The next issue is whether the District acted with deliberate indifference
when it failed to provide consistent transportation to the Student. There is
insufficient information that the District’s delay in securing replacement
transportation was a product of any deliberate choice. The Parent contends
that on January 3, the District received notification of the cessation of
Student’s transportation from the first vendor but did not engage the second
vendor until January 24, after the due process Complaint was filed.
According to the Parent, this demonstrated a deliberate indifference by the
District that a protected right was being violated. I disagree. After the
original vendor notified the District that it would be unable to service the
Student’s transportation route, the Director of Transportation advised that
the District would work to reassign the Student’s route. Although
replacement transportation was not immediately secured, there is no
indication that the District failed to take immediate action to resolve this
issue. Although a few weeks elapsed before it was successful, the stipulated
facts do not address the District’s efforts or lack thereof to lead to the
conclusion that its actions were deliberate and resultant delay unreasonable.
7 24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 13-1361.
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On the contrary, after the District’s initial transportation vendor
abruptly stopped providing services, in an attempt to remedy the issue, the
District engaged the services of a cab company. After the cab arrived
without the Student’s one-to-one, the District took immediate action and
engaged the services of a car service the next day. I am unable to conclude
that the Parent has met the burden of establishing the District acted with
deliberate indifference toward this Student in violation of Section 504.
The Parent has not established the District denied Student a FAPE or
acted with deliberate indifference. Accordingly, no relief is due.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 27th day of March 2023, in accordance with the
foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby ORDERED as
follows.
1. The District did not deny Student a free appropriate public
education.
2. The District did not act with deliberate indifference under Section
504.
3. Nothing in this Order should be read to preclude the parties from
mutually agreeing to alter any of its terms.
It is FURTHER ORDERED that any claims not specifically addressed by
this decision and order are DENIED and DISMISSED.
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Joy Waters Fleming, Esq.
Joy Waters Fleming, Esq.
Special Education Hearing Officer
March 27, 2023
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