Radnor Township School District | Case 23767-19-20 | 2020-12-21
Pennsylvania special education due-process decision
- Case number
- 23767-19-20
- Date
- 12/21/2020
- Parties / district (official listing)
- Radnor Township School District
- Hearing officer
- Brian Ford
- Issues (official listing)
- Compensatory Education Evaluation Eligibility Other Health Impairment
Open saved decision PDF · Official source
This page reproduces text extracted from the public decision. The saved PDF controls formatting and wording. No attorney-reviewed summary has been added.
Decision text
Page 1
This is a redacted version of the original decision. Select details have been removed from
the decision to preserve anonymity of the student. The redactions do not affect the
substance of the document.
Pennsylvania Special Education Due Process Hearing Officer
Final Decision and Order
Closed Hearing
ODR File Number
23767-1920-KE
Child’s Name
R.L.
Date of Birth
[redacted]
Parent(s)/Guardian(s)
[redacted]
Counsel for Parent(s)/Guardian(s)
Michael J. Connolly, Esq.
30 Cassatt Avenue
Berwyn, PA 19312
Local Educational Agency
Radnor Township School District
135 S. Wayne Avenue
Wayne, PA 19087
Counsel for LEA
Tracey D. Waldmann, Esq.
135 S. Wayne Avenue
Wayne, PA 19087
Hearing Officer
Brian Jason Ford, JD, CHO
Date of Decision
12/21/2020
Page 2
Introduction
This special education due process hearing concerns the educational rights of
a student (the Student).1 The Student is a former student of the Radnor
Township School District (the District). The Student’s parents (the Parents)
requested this hearing. The Parents allege that the District violated the
Student’s rights under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),
20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. by failing to provide a free appropriate public
education (FAPE) to the Student from February 17, 2018 through the
Student’s graduation at the end of the 2019-20 school year. The Parents
demand compensatory education to remedy the denial of FAPE.
There is no dispute that the Student has Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder (ADHD), a disability that is recognized by the IDEA. For the period
from February 17, 2018 through January 7, 2020, there is no dispute that
the Student required specially designed instruction (SDI). For this period of
time, the Student received accommodations pursuant to a series of
Individualized Education Programs (IEPs). The Parents claim that the IEPs
fell below the FAPE standard for the Student. The District claims that it
provided a FAPE during this time.
The District completed a Reevaluation Report on January 7, 2020 (the 2020
RR) and concluded that the Student continued to have ADHD but no longer
required SDI.
2 From this point forward, the parties dispute whether the
Student required special education. Despite this disagreement, the District
continued to provide accommodations to the Student pursuant to an IEP
1 Identifying information is omitted to the extent possible.
2 The District argues that the Parents took actions to delay the 2020 RR, and the Student’s
entitlement to special education may have ended before January 7, 2020. That claim, if
true, does not alter the outcome of this case.
Page 3
until the Student’s graduation (a statewide school shutdown in response to
COVID-19 notwithstanding). For this period of time, the Parents claim that
the Student still required special education and the District still did not
provide a FAPE. For this period of time, the District argues that the Student
was not entitled to a FAPE because the Student did not require SDI. In the
alternative, the District argues that the Student received a FAPE regardless
of the Student’s eligibility for special education.
The Parents originally brought a claim concerning the Student’s eligibility for
special education. The Parents no longer seek a determination that the
Student is eligible for special education because the Student graduated. The
District, however, raises the Student’s eligibly as part of its defense.
For reasons explained below, I find that the Student’s IEPs fell short of IDEA
mandates, resulting in a substantive denial of FAPE. I also find, however,
that the harm caused by the FAPE violation was specific and limited.
Accordingly, I craft a specific and limited remedy.
Issue
The issue presented in this hearing is: Did the District violate the Student’s
right to a FAPE from February 17, 2018, through the Student’s graduation at
the end of the 2019-20 school year?
Findings of Fact and Stipulations
The parties presented 23 item list of joint stipulations. As indicated on the
record, I adopt those stipulations as if they are my own findings and restate
them here with minor edits to protect the Student’s privacy or for clarity. I
Page 4
also reviewed the entire record of this hearing. I make findings of fact only
as necessary to resolve the issue before me. I make findings of fact about
events occurring before the period of time in question to provide background
and context. I find as follows:
1. At all times pertinent and prior to the Student’s graduation, the District
was the Student’s Local Educational Agency (LEA), the Student and
Parents resided within the District, and the District was a recipient of
federal funds. See Stipulations ¶ 2, 3.
2. The exact date that the District first found the Student eligible for
special education is not clear from the record of this hearing. The
totality of the record, however, indicates that the Student received an
IEP from the District long before the 2016-17 school year. See
Stipulation ¶ 4; NT 46-49.
The 2016-17 School Year (9
th Grade)
3. The 2016-17 school year was the Student’s 9th grade year. Passim.
4. The Student transferred from one of the District’s middle schools to its
high school for 9
th grade. Passim.
5. In August 2016, the Student was evaluated by a private psychologist.
The private psychologist wrote a report diagnosing the Student with
ADHD (predominantly inattentive type) and Disorder of Written
Expression (the 2016 Private Evaluation). Both diagnoses were made
using medical, as opposed to educational, criteria. The report included
Page 5
several educational recommendations, including direct instruction of
executive functioning skills. P-1.
6. The Parents sent a copy of the 2016 Private Evaluation to the District
shortly after the private psychologist issued that document. NT 51.
7. At the private psychologist’s recommendation, the Parents retained
another private psychologist to work with the Student and the Parents.
NT 52-53.
8. District reevaluated the Student during the 2016-17 school year. The
reevaluation was completed by a District-employed certified school
psychologist (CSP). The reevaluation was what the District describes
as a “standard evaluation”
3 that incorporated the 2016 Private
Evaluation and included a review of the Student’s records and
progress. The CSP drafted a reevaluation report dated May 4, 2017
(the May 2017 RR). Through the reevaluation, the District determined
that the Student continued to be a child with an OHI and continued to
need SDI. Stipulation ¶ 5; P-2; S-47.
9. The Student’s IEP team reconvened and revised the Student’s IEP
based on the 2017 RR.
4
3 There is no such thing as a “standard evaluation.” The IDEA sets procedural and
substantive standards for evaluations and reevaluations. An evaluation or reevaluation
either complies with those standards or it does not. The District’s use of District-specific
lingo does not alter its obligations.
4 A “clean” copy of the IEP immediately following the 2017 RR was not entered into
evidence. Based on the District’s evidence index, it appears that this document was
prepared as S-50 but was not offered. Rather, a copy of the Student’s IEP that was revised
several times was entered as P-4. The Parents point to P-4 when making arguments about
the IEP that immediately followed the 2017 RR, but it appears that document was first
generated on November 2, 2017. Regardless, there is little dispute about the goals or SDI in
the IEP that immediately followed the 2017 RR.
Page 6
10. During the 2016-17 school year, the Student was enrolled in an
Academic Success Center (ASC) class. P-23.
11. The Student’s academic progress in the 2016-17 school year was
slightly variable quarter to quarter (Algebra was quite variable quarter
to quarter). The Student’s final grades for the 2016-17 school year
were:
a. ASC: Pass (the class was Pass/Fail)
b. Essentials of Writing: A-
c. Video Production and Broadcast Journalism: A+
d. Biology: B-
e. Essentials of Algebra I: A
f. Algebra I: C
g. Government & Economics: B
h. English 9 Literature and Composition: B-
i. 9
th Grade Wellness: A+
j. 9th Grade Health: A-
The 2017-18 School Year (10th Grade)
12. The 2017-18 school year was the Student’s 10th grade year. Passim.
13. The Student started the 2017-18 school year under an IEP that
contained two goals. The first goal was to identify and monitor
assignments and tests to estimate, manage and plan work effort. The
second goal was a written expression goal to write a 3-5 paragraph
essay earning points for organization, content, style, sentence
structure, style-word choice and conventions. Stipulation ¶ 6; S-41.
Page 7
14. During the 2017-18 school year, the Student again was enrolled in the
ASC class. Stipulation ¶ 7.
15. The District “reissued” the May 2017 RR on October 3, 2017 (the
October 2017 RR). The May 2017 RR and October 2017 RR are
identical except that the District did some additional testing for the
October 2017 RR. P-2; S-47.
16. More specifically, the October 2017 RR found that the Student’s
intellectual abilities and academic performance were all average to
above average (significantly above average in some writing domains),
but that the Student’s executive functioning, attention, and short-term
memory were impaired. P-2.
17. The District’s CSP accurately summarized the results of the October
2017 RR (which restated the May 2017 RR – which incorporated the
2016 Private evaluation) as follows (P-2 at 15):
[Student] demonstrates appropriate social and emotional
functioning. [Student] also demonstrates at least Average
verbal and nonverbal reasoning. [Student’s] academic
functioning is within the Average range and commensurate
with [Student’s] cognitive functioning. A learning disability
can be ruled out. [Student] demonstrates solid basic skills
for reading, writing and mathematics. [Student’s]
processing speed is well below age expectations. When
[Student] needs to perform academic tasks within a time
limit, [Student] often sacrifices speed for accuracy. This
Page 8
suggests [Student] needs extended time in order to create
a solid work product. [Student’s] attention deficit disorder
impacts [Student’s] ability to integrate large amounts of
information (for example, write an essay appropriately).
18. On November 2, 2017, the Student’s IEP team issued a new, annual
IEP for the Student. S-41.
19. The IEP team met again on February 1, 2018. The District updated the
present education levels in the IEP to reflect the Student’s grades for
the first marking period of the 2017-18 school year and the discussion
that occurred during the IEP team meeting and in emails the next day.
S-41 at 8-9. At this time, the Parents and District agreed to move the
Student from Advanced Chemistry to College Prep or CP Chemistry.
The IEP otherwise stayed the same. S-41.
20. By February 17, 2018 (the start of the period in question), the Student
was receiving accommodations pursuant to the February 2018 Revised
IEP. That IEP included two goals: the same two goals indicated in the
parties’ stipulation.
21. The February 2018 Revised IEP also included several program
modifications and accommodations in the SDI section of the IEP. These
included additional time for tests, assignments, and projects; various
methods of helping the Student break larger assignments into
manageable pieces; and check-ins with teachers and the Student’s
case manager to make sure that the Student was on track. S-41.
22. The February 2018 Revised IEP also included the following in the SDI
and modifications section (S-41 at 31):
Page 9
Participation in a structured study environment to focus on
studying, organizational skills, completion of assignments,
and provide assistance in creating manageable plans for
academic success.
23. I find that, by and through the above-quoted language, the IEP team
included the Student’s participation in the ASC class within the
Student’s IEP. However, this instruction was to take place in a regular
education classroom. This is because the ASC class was an elective
general education class available to all students regardless of
disability. See S-41 at 31.
24. The February 2018 Revised IEP did not explicitly include direct
instruction in executive functioning skills. However, as written in the
IEP, the Student’s participation in the ASC class targeted executive
functioning skills, which could then be measured through the IEP’s
goals. Said differently, the IEP team determined that the Student
should attend the general education ASC class to learn organization
and planning skills, and also drafted a goal to measure the Student’s
ability to plan academic work. See S-41.
25. On April 24, 2018, the Parents contacted the District to raise concerns
about the Student’s World Literature class. This prompted
conversations between the Parents, District, and Student about what
accommodations would help the Student in that class. S-36.
26. The IEP team met again on May 7, 2018, to formalize the additional
accommodations by placing them into the Student’s IEP (the May 2018
Page 10
Revised IEP). Under the revision, teachers would encourage the
Student to restate expectations and would provide supplemental notes
and example work product if available. The Student would have
seating to minimize distractions, and the Student’s testing
accommodations were spelled out in greater detail. S-36.
27. The District offered the May 2018 Revised IEP through a Notice of
Recommended Educational Placement (NOREP) sent on May 14, 2018.
The Parents rejected the NOREP on May 25, 2018, and the District
received the rejected NOREP on June 8, 2018. S-25.
28. On the NOREP, the Parents stated that their reason for rejecting the
May 2018 Revised IEP was that the accommodations provided therein
were not sufficiently individualized for the Student. The Parents stated
that the Student required individualized help with “project planning”
that was not provided through the ASC class. At the same time, the
Parents stated that extra time for assignments was “too specific”
because they targeted particular classes and depended upon the
Student’s request for more time. See S-35.
29. The Parents and District corresponded by email several times after the
Parents rejected the May 2018 NOREP. The Student’s private
psychologist (the psychologist that the Student started seeing after
the 2016 private evaluation) participated in these conversations. In
short, the Parents requested direct, one-on-one instruction from an
executive functioning coach. See, e.g. NT 80-83.
Page 11
30. As a result of those communications, the District offered a revised IEP
dated June 12, 2018 (the June 2018 Revised IEP). This revision added
two items to the May 2018 Revised IEP (P-6):
a. The Student’s present education levels were revised to
summarize the discussion between the Parents and District.
According to that summary, in response to the Parents’ request
that the Student receive direct instruction of executive
functioning skills, the District recommended that the Student
take an Essentials of Study Skills (ESS) class during the
upcoming 2018-19 school year. See P-6 at 8.
b. One item was added to the SDI and program modifications
section of the IEP: “Participation in a direct instruction study
skills elective to address skills such as (but not limited to) time
management, goal setting, planning long/short term
assignments, and test taking skills…” (P-6 at 33).
31. The District explicitly stated that new accommodation in the June 2018
Revised IEP was a reference to placement in the ESS class. The
District made this statement in the body of the June 2018 Revised IEP
itself within the statement added to the present education levels. See
P-6 at 8.
32. As with the ASC class, the ESS class was an elective general education
class available to all students in the District regardless of disability.
See P-6 at 33.
Page 12
33. With the exception of World Literature, the Student’s quarter grades
were fairly consistent throughout the school year. The Student’s
performance in World Literature fluctuated significantly (the lowest
point was an F in Q2 and the highest point was a B in Q4). The
Student’s final grades for the 2017-18 school year were:
a. Video Production and Broadcast Journalism: A
b. ASC: Pass
c. Geometry: C+
d. Film Analysis I: A
e. Spanish I: A
f. World Literature: C-
g. World Studies: B
h. Beginner Swimming: A+
i. 10
th Grade Health: A+
j. Chemistry CP5: B-
34. Although the Student was academically successful as measured by
report card grades, the Student completed one of two IEP goals:
a. The Student’s writing goal included a baseline stating that the
Student scored 3 out of 6 on each writing domain assessed by
the District’s rubric for a “wholistic score of 18/36.” That goal
remained unchanged through and included the June 2018
revised IEP. By June 15, 2018, the Student score was exactly
the same. The Student made no progress towards the writing
goal during the entire 2017-18 school year. C/f P-4 at 33, P-6 at
31, S-9 at 12.
5 CP is “college prep” – the level of the course.
Page 13
b. The Student’s assignment management goal (which the District
calls a self-advocacy goal in some documents) started with a
baseline of 35%. The Student’s progress towards this goal
steadily improved over the school year until the Student reached
83% by June 15, 2018 – three percent above the goal’s mastery
level. See s-28 at 7.
6
The 2018-19 School Year (11th Grade)
35. The 2018-19 school year was the Student’s 11th grade year. The
Student started 11th grade under the June 2018 Revised IEP. Passim.
36. Both the ASC and ESS class were available to the Student as general
education electives. Under District policy, the Parents could choose
whether or not to enroll the Student in the ASC and/or ESS classes.
For the 2018-19 school year, the Parents chose to not enroll the
Student in either the ASC or ESS classes. As a result, the Student did
not take the ASC or ESS classes. See, e.g. NT 80-85; see also
Stipulation ¶ 8.
37. On November 1, 2018, the Student’s IEP team reconvened and drafted
a new annual IEP for the Student (the November 2018 IEP). S-28.
38. The November 2018 IEP removed the Student’s writing goal and kept
the Student’s work planning goal. S-28. The work planning goal was
kept verbatim – including a statement that the Student’s baseline was
6 Concerns about the District’s conclusion that the Student mastered this goal are discussed
below.
Page 14
35%, despite the District’s progress monitoring showing 83% at the
end of the prior school year. As a result, the goal that the Student did
not make progress towards was removed while the mastered goal was
repeated. S-28.
39. The Student’s participation in the ASC and ESS classes were removed
from SDI and modification section of the IEP.
7 The SDI and
modifications provided through the November 2018 IEP were
otherwise similar to the prior Revised IEP. S-28.
40. In addition to the ASC and ESS classes, the District also offered an
Essentials for Life Strategies (ELS) class as a general education
elective. Stipulation ¶ 9.
41. On March 3, 2019, the IEP team met again at the Parents’ request.
The Parents reiterated their concerns that the Student required direct
instruction of executive functioning skills. They also expressed
concerns about the Student’s ability to communicate with teachers and
self-advocate (e.g., request extended time). S-23.
42. In response to the Parents’ concerns, the District recommended the
Student’s participation in the ASC and ESS classes. The Parents
declined that offer. S-23.
43. The District proposed a revised IEP dated March 3, 2019 (the March
2019 Revised IEP). Through that document, the District also proposed
7 For clarity, none of the Student’s IEPs explicitly referenced the ASC or ESS classes in the
SDI and modifications section. However, the IEPs prior to November 2018 included SDIs
that were an obvious reference to the ASC class and the June 2018 Revised IEP explicitly
states that the SDI added in that document is code for the ESS class.
Page 15
revisions to the SDI and modifications that are nearly identical to
those that it proposed in the May 2018 Revised IEP (which the Parents
rejected at that time). S-23.
44. The March 2019 Revised IEP did not include placement in the ASC or
ESS classes because the Parents declined those placements during the
IEP’s development. S-23.
45. The District offered the March 2019 Revised IEP through a NOREP
dated March 8, 2019. The Parents signed the NOREP on March 15,
2019, checking boxes to both approve and reject the IEP. Based on
those marks, and comments that the Parents wrote on the NOREP, I
find that the Parents gave the District consent to implement the March
3, 2019 Revised IEP without conceding that IEP was appropriate for
the Student.
8 The District received the NOREP on March 22, 2019. S-
22.
46. In addition to the ASC and ESS classes, the District also offered an
Essentials for Life Strategies (ELS) class as a general education
elective. Stipulation ¶ 9. The Student did not enroll in the ELS class.
47. Compared to 9
th and 10th grade, the Student’s quarter to quarter
grades during the 2018-19 school year were more consistent
throughout the year. The Student’s final grades for the 2018-19 school
year were (P-23):
a. Video Production and Broadcast Journalism II: A
8 As a matter of law, if the Parents had provided unqualified consent, the result would be
the same. Parental consent to an IEP (appropriate or inappropriate) does not alter a
student’s right to a FAPE.
Page 16
b. Physics CP: B-
c. Advanced Acting Honors: A
d. Physical Education: C
e. American Literature: C+
f. American Studies: B
g. Algebra II: B-
h. Spanish II: C
48. At some point before June 17, 2019, the Parents retained legal
counsel. On June 17, 2019, the Parents reached out to the District, via
counsel, to express concerns about the Student’s education and
request copies of the Student’s educational records. P-10.
49. On August 16, 2019, the District sought the Parent’s consent to
reevaluate the Student by sending the Parents a “Prior Written Notice
for a Reevaluation and Request for Consent Form” (the PTRE). S-9.
The Parents did not return the 2019 PTRE.
The 2019-20 School Year (12
th Grade)
50. The 2019-20 school year was the Student’s 12th grade year. Passim.
51. The Parents requested an IEP team meeting. The IEP team convened
on September 10, 2019. Stipulations ¶ 10.
52. During the IEP team meeting, the Parents reiterated their request for
direct instruction of executive functioning skills through a one-on-one
coach. In response, the District recommended the ASC class and after
school tutoring. The Parents declined both offers. The conversation
Page 17
was documented as a revision to the present education levels in the
Student’s IEP, which counts as another IEP revision (the September
2019 Revised IEP). See P-12.
53. The September 2019 Revised IEP also adds the following to the
modifications and SDI section of the Student’s IEP (P-12 at 23):
Participation in a structured study environment to focus
on studying, organizational skills, completion of
assignments, and provide assistance in creating
manageable plans for academic success
54. I find that the added language to the September 2019 Revised IEP is
code for the ASC class. Again, the ASC class is a general education
elective. The Student did not enroll or otherwise participate in the ASC
class after the September 2019 Revised IEP was issued.
55. During the September 10, 2019 IEP team meeting, the District re-
issued the PTRE. The Parents did not sign the PTRE at the meeting and
did not return the PTRE later. See P-12.
56. On September 13, 2019, the District offered the September 2019
Revised IEP via a NOREP. The Parents marked the NOREP as they did
the prior NOREP, consenting to the document without agreeing that it
constituted a FAPE. The District received the NOREP on September 23,
2019.
Page 18
57. On September 20, 2019, the District reissued the PTRE to the Parents.
The Parents did not return the PTRE. S-17.
58. On September 25, 2019, the District reissued the PTRE to the Parents.
The Parents did not return the PTRE. S-16.
59. On October 9, 2019, the District sent a letter to the Parents explaining
that, in the absence of their consent, the District would conduct a
review of records and would issue behavior rating scales to the Parents
and teachers. See, e.g. S-6 at 2.
60. The District issued a reevaluation report on October 22, 2019.
Stipulations ¶ 11. The District called this a “standard” reevaluation.
9 A
copy of that reevaluation was not introduced into evidence, but the
report thereof is referenced in other documents. See, e.g. S-6 at 2.
61. The District convened the Student’s annual IEP meeting on October
31, 2019. S-14; Stipulations ¶ 12.
62. During the October 2019 IEP team meeting, the Parents expressed
concerns that the District evaluated the Student without their consent.
In response, during the meeting, the District – for the fifth time –
reissued the PTRE. S-13.
63. After the October 2019 IEP team meeting, the District issued a new
annual IEP for the Student dated October 31, 2019 (the October 2019
IEP). S-14.
9 Again, the law does not recognize anything called a “standard” evaluation or reevaluation.
An evaluation or reevaluation either complies with IDEA mandates or it does not. District-
specific nomenclature does not change those mandates.
Page 19
64. The October 2019 IEP included one goal: the work planning goal that
the Student had mastered by the end of 10th grade (the 2017-18
school year). Except for the baseline, that goal is repeated verbatim.
S-14 at 17.
65. Regarding the baseline, the District wrote: “This goal was mastered
and at this time will not be monitored.” (emphasis added).
Consequently, the October 2019 IEP included one goal that the District
would not monitor.
66. The Parents approved the October 2019 IEP via a NOREP. They noted
on the NOREP that an evaluation was pending. The District received
the NOREP on November 19, 2019. S-12.
67. Accommodations written into the SDI and modifications section of the
October 2019 IEP remained unchanged. As a result, the Student
continued to receive accommodations despite the fact that the
Student’s IEP, for all practical purposes, had no goal. S-14.
68. The Parents signed PTRE, providing consent for the District’s proposed
reevaluation. The District received the PTRE back from the Parents on
November 8, 2019. S-13, S-73, Stipulations ¶ 13.
69. The District performed additional assessments after it received
November 8, 2019 PTRE. Stipulations ¶ 14.
Page 20
70. On January 7, 2020, the District issued a reevaluation report (the
2020 RR). The District’s CSP who reevaluated the Student in 2017 was
the principal author of the 2020 RR. Stipulations ¶ 14; S-9.
71. The 2020 RR concluded that the Student had a disability but was no
longer in need of specially designed instruction and, therefore, was no
longer eligible for special education. The 2020 RR also concluded that
the Student would benefit from a Section 504 Service Plan. S-9; See
also Stipulations ¶ 15.
72. More specifically, the 2020 RR included a review of all prior evaluations
and records, teacher input, parent input, new standardized normative
assessments of the Student’s cognitive abilities and academic
achievement, and new assessments of the Student’s attention and
executive functioning. The Student’s assessed cognitive abilities and
academic performance, including writing, were all in the average
range.
10 S-9.
73. Regarding the Student’s executive functioning, the CSP analyzed
multiple rating scales and sub-tests to conclude that the Student’s
cognitive efficiency and processing speed were still areas of weakness.
As a result, the Student could become taxed in the classroom setting
and may learn new information at a slower rate. The Student’s ability
to organize and plan were still noted as a concern. S-9.
10 Some sub-tests produced results in the “high average” or “low average” range. One sub-
test, the Similarities sub-test that was part of the assessment of the Student’s cognitive
abilities, placed the Student in the “superior” range. That sub-test was part of a verbal
comprehension index, which was found to be in the high average range.
Page 21
74. On January 30, 2020, the District convened a Section 504 Meeting.
During or immediately after the meeting, the District proposed a
Section 504 Plan. S-7; see also Stipulations ¶ 16; S-7.
75. On February 7, 2020, the District issued a Notice of Recommended
Educational Placement (NOREP) proposing to exit the Student from
special education. S-6; see also Stipulation ¶ 16.
76. On February 14, 2020, the Parents signed and returned the NOREP
stating that they did not approve the District exiting the Student from
special education and were requesting a due process hearing. S-6;
Stipulations ¶ 17.
77. On February 17, 2020, the Parents filed a due process complaint.
Stipulations ¶ 18.
78. On February 28, 2020, the parties entered into a tolling agreement
whereby the Parents withdrew their due process complaint without
prejudice but agreed that the original fling date (02/17/2020) would
control for purposes of the IDEA’s statute of limitations if the Parents
refiled their complaint. Stipulations ¶ 19.
79. The Student’s IEP remained pendent during the tolling period.
Stipulations ¶ 19.
80. On March 13, 2020, Governor Wolf ordered that all Pennsylvania
schools close in an effort to mitigate the COVID-19 pandemic.
Ultimately, Governor Wolf extended the school closure through the end
of the 2019-20 school year. Stipulations ¶ 20.
Page 22
81. On April 3, 2020, the District provided a “COVID-19 Interim
Individualized Emergency Special Education Plan (IIESEP)” to the
Parents. S-5; Stipulations ¶ 21.
82. On May 29, 2020, the Parents reinstated their due process complaint.
The District filed its written Answer on June 6, 2020.
83. The Student’s academic performance as measured by report card
grades was somewhat variable throughout the school year. S-72. As
with prior years, some of that variability is partly attributable to
teachers posting quarter grades at a time when the Student received
no credit for late, outstanding assignments. Teachers gave the Student
full credit once the assignments were turned in, causing some part of
the quarter-to-quarter fluctuation. The Student’s final, senior year
grades were (S-72):
a. Video Production & Broadcast Journalism II: A-
b. Algebra 3 and Trigonometry CP: B+
c. Physical Education: B+
d. Psychology: B
e. Earth & Space Science: C-
f. Film Analysis II (a two semester course that convened in Q3 and
Q4): A-
g. British & Modern Literature: B
h. Spanish III: C+
84. The Student’s cumulative GPA at graduation was 3.0297. S-72.
Page 23
85. The Student was accepted to a competitive four-year undergraduate
program at a selective university.11 See, e.g. NT 130.
86. The Student graduated from the District’s high school on or about June
10, 2020. Stipulations ¶ 23.
Witness Credibility
During a due process hearing, the hearing officer is charged with the
responsibility of judging the credibility of witnesses, and must make
“express, qualitative determinations regarding the relative credibility and
persuasiveness of the witnesses.” Blount v. Lancaster-Lebanon Intermediate
Unit, 2003 LEXIS 21639 at *28 (2003). One purpose of an explicit credibility
determination is to give courts the information that they need in the event of
judicial review. See, D.K. v. Abington School District, 696 F.3d 233, 243 (3d
Cir. 2014) (“[Courts] must accept the state agency's credibility
determinations unless the non-testimonial extrinsic evidence in the record
would justify a contrary conclusion.”). See also, generally David G. v.
Council Rock School District, 2009 WL 3064732 (E.D. Pa. 2009); T.E. v.
Cumberland Valley School District, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1471 *11-12 (M.D.
Pa. 2014); A.S. v. Office for Dispute Resolution (Quakertown Community
School District), 88 A.3d 256, 266 (Pa. Commw. 2014); Rylan M. v Dover
Area Sch. Dist., No. 1:16-CV-1260, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70265 (M.D. Pa.
May 9, 2017).
11 The name of the university appears in the record. I do not name the university here to
protect the Student’s privacy. The adjectives used in this finding are my own and are
intended to convey the type of college to which the Student was granted admission. Those
adjectives are not terms of art and in no way alter the outcome of this due process hearing.
Page 24
With one exception, I find no issue with any witnesses’ credibility as all
witnesses testified honestly and to the best of his or her ability. To the
extent any witnesses’ testimony conflicts with another’s, those witness
either recall events differently or have different opinions. To the extent that
my findings of fact depend on accepting one witnesses testimony over
another’s, I have accorded more weight to the witness based on the
witnesses’ testimony and the other evidence presented.
The sole exception to the above concerns the Student’s private psychologist.
The private psychologist testified with great certainty about why the
District’s proposed programs were not appropriate for the Student before
revealing that she had little to no information about those programs. The
private psychologist also relied heavily on the 2016 private evaluation to
draw conclusions about the Student’s current needs. This is not to say that
the private psychologist was disingenuous or purposefully misleading in any
way. Rather, I cannot give weight to opinions that are formed from outdated
information and assumptions.
Applicable Legal Principles
The Burden of Proof
The burden of proof, generally, consists of two elements: the burden of
production and the burden of persuasion. In special education due process
hearings, the burden of persuasion lies with the party seeking relief.
Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005); L.E. v. Ramsey Board of
Education, 435 F.3d 384, 392 (3d Cir. 2006). The party seeking relief must
prove entitlement to its demand by preponderant evidence and cannot
prevail if the evidence rests in equipoise. See N.M., ex rel. M.M. v. The
Page 25
School Dist. of Philadelphia, 394 Fed.Appx. 920, 922 (3rd Cir. 2010), citing
Shore Reg'l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir.
2004). In this particular case, the Parents are the party seeking relief and
must bear the burden of persuasion.
Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE)
The IDEA requires the states to provide a “free appropriate public education”
to all students who qualify for special education services. 20 U.S.C. §1412.
Local education agencies, including school districts, meet the obligation of
providing a FAPE to eligible students through development and
implementation of IEPs, which must be “‘reasonably calculated’ to enable the
child to receive ‘meaningful educational benefits’ in light of the student’s
‘intellectual potential.’” Mary Courtney T. v. School District of Philadelphia,
575 F.3d 235, 240 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). Substantively, the IEP
must be responsive to each child’s individual educational needs. 20 U.S.C. §
1414(d); 34 C.F.R. § 300.324.
This long-standing Third Circuit standard was confirmed by the United States
Supreme Court in Endrew F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct.
988 (2017). The Endrew F. case was the Court’s first consideration of the
substantive FAPE standard since Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Central
School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (1982).
In Rowley, the Court found that a LEA satisfies its FAPE obligation to a child
with a disability when “the individualized educational program developed
through the Act’s procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the child to
receive educational benefits.” Id at 3015.
Before Endrew, the Third Circuit interpreted Rowley to mean that the
“benefits” to the child must be meaningful, and the meaningfulness of the
Page 26
educational benefit must be relative to the child’s potential. See T.R. v.
Kingwood Township Board of Education, 205 F.3d 572 (3rd Cir
2000); Ridgewood Bd. of Education v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238 (3rd Cir.
1999); S.H. v. Newark, 336 F.3d 260 (3rd Cir. 2003). In substance, the
holding in Endrew F. is no different.
A school district is not required to maximize a child’s opportunity; it must
provide a basic floor of opportunity. See, Lachman v. Illinois State Bd. of
Educ., 852 F.2d 290 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 925 (1988). However,
the meaningful benefit standard required LEAs to provide more than “trivial”
or “de minimus” benefit. See Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit
16, 853 F.2d 171, 1179 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied 488 U.S. 1030
(1989). See also Carlisle Area School v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 533-34 (3d
Cir. 1995). It is well-established that an eligible student is not entitled to the
best possible program, to the type of program preferred by a parent, or to a
guaranteed outcome in terms of a specific level of achievement. See, e.g.,
J.L. v. North Penn School District, 2011 WL 601621 (E.D. Pa. 2011). Thus,
what the statute guarantees is an “appropriate” education, “not one that
provides everything that might be thought desirable by ‘loving
parents.’” Tucker v. Bayshore Union Free School District, 873 F.2d 563, 567
(2d Cir. 1989).
In Endrew F., the Supreme Court effectively agreed with the Third Circuit by
rejecting a “merely more than de minimus” standard, holding instead that
the “IDEA demands more. It requires an educational program reasonably
calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the
child’s circumstances.” Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. 988, 1001 (2017). Appropriate
progress, in turn, must be “appropriately ambitious in light of [the child’s]
circumstances.” Id at 1000. In terms of academic progress, grade-to-grade
advancement may be “appropriately ambitious” for students capable of
Page 27
grade-level work. Id. Education, however, encompasses much more than
academics. Grade-to-grade progression is not an absolute indication of
progress even for an academically strong child, depending on the child's
circumstances.
In sum, the essence of the standard is that IDEA-eligible students must
receive specially designed instruction and related services, by and through
an IEP that is reasonably calculated at the time it is issued to offer an
appropriately ambitious education in light of the Student’s circumstances.
Compensatory Education
Compensatory education is an appropriate remedy where a LEA knows, or
should know, that a child’s educational program is not appropriate or that he
or she is receiving only a trivial educational benefit, and the LEA fails to
remedy the problem. M.C. v. Central Regional Sch. District, 81 F.3d 389 (3d
Cir. 1996). Compensatory education is an equitable remedy. Lester H. v.
Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1990).
Courts in Pennsylvania have recognized two methods for calculating the
amount of compensatory education that should be awarded to remedy
substantive denials of FAPE. The first method is called the “hour-for-hour”
method. Under this method, students receive one hour of compensatory
education for each hour that FAPE was denied. M.C. v. Central Regional,
arguably, endorses this method.
The hour-for-hour method has come under considerable scrutiny. Some
courts outside of Pennsylvania have rejected the hour-for-hour method
outright. See Reid ex rel.Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 523
(D.D.C. 2005). In Reid, the court conclude that the amount and nature of a
compensatory education award must be crafted to put the student in the
Page 28
position that she or he would be in, but for the denial of FAPE. Reid is the
leading case on this method of calculating compensatory education, and the
method has become known as the Reid standard or Reid method.
The more nuanced Reid method was endorsed by the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court in B.C. v. Penn Manor Sch. District, 906 A.2d 642,
650-51 (Pa. Commw. 2006) and the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania in Jana K. v. Annville Cleona Sch. Dist., 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114414 (M.D. Pa. 2014). It is arguable that the Third Circuit
also has embraced this approach in Ferren C. v. Sch. District of Philadelphia,
612 F.3d 712, 718 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Reid and explaining that
compensatory education “should aim to place disabled children in the same
position that the child would have occupied but for the school district’s
violations of the IDEA.”).
Despite the clearly growing preference for the Reid method, that analysis
poses significant practical problems. In administrative due process hearings,
evidence is rarely presented to establish what position the student would be
in but for the denial of FAPE – or what amount or what type of compensatory
education is needed to put the student back into that position. Even cases
that express a strong preference for the “same position” method recognize
the importance of such evidence, and suggest that hour-for-hour is the
default when no such evidence is presented:
“… the appropriate and reasonable level of reimbursement will
match the quantity of services improperly withheld throughout
that time period, unless the evidence shows that the child
requires more or less education to be placed in the position he
or she would have occupied absent the school
district’s deficiencies.”
Page 29
Jana K. v. Annville Cleona Sch. Dist., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114414 at 36-
37.
Finally, there are cases in which a denial of FAPE creates a harm that
permeates the entirety of a student’s school day. In such cases, full days of
compensatory education (meaning one hour of compensatory education for
each hour that school was in session) are warranted. Such awards are fitting
if the LEA’s “failure to provide specialized services permeated the student’s
education and resulted in a progressive and widespread decline in [the
Student’s] academic and emotional well-being” Jana K. v. Annville Cleona
Sch. Dist., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114414 at 39. See also Tyler W. ex rel.
Daniel W. v. Upper Perkiomen Sch. Dist., 963 F. Supp. 2d 427, 438-39 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 6, 2013); Damian J. v. School Dist. of Phila., Civ. No. 06-3866,
2008 WL 191176, *7 n.16 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2008); Keystone Cent. Sch.
Dist. v. E.E. ex rel. H.E., 438 F. Supp. 2d 519, 526 (M.D. Pa. 2006); Penn
Trafford Sch. Dist. v. C.F. ex rel. M.F., Civ. No. 04-1395, 2006 WL 840334,
*9 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2006); M.L. v. Marple Newtown Sch. Dist., ODR No.
3225-11-12-KE, at 20 (Dec. 1, 2012); L.B. v. Colonial Sch. Dist., ODR No.
1631-1011AS, at 18-19 (Nov. 12, 2011).
Whatever the calculation, in all cases compensatory education begins to
accrue not at the moment a child stopped receiving a FAPE, but at the
moment that the LEA should have discovered the denial. M.C. v. Central
Regional Sch. District, 81 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 1996). Usually, this factor is
stated in the negative – the time reasonably required for a LEA to rectify the
problem is excluded from any compensatory education award. M.C. v.
Central Regional Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 397 (3d Cir. N.J. 1996)
In sum, I subscribe to the logic articulated by Judge Rambo in Jana K. v.
Annville Cleona. If a denial of FAPE resulted in substantive harm, the
resulting compensatory education award must be crafted to place the
Page 30
student in the position that the student would be in but for the denial.
However, in the absence of evidence to prove whether the type or amount of
compensatory education is needed to put the student in the position that the
student would be in but for the denial, the hour-for-hour approach is a
necessary default. Full-day compensatory education can also be awarded if
that standard is met. In any case, compensatory education is reduced by the
amount of time that it should have taken for the LEA to find and correct the
problem.
Evaluation Criteria
The IDEA establishes requirements for evaluations. Substantively, those are
the same for initial evaluations and revaluations. 20 U.S.C. § 1414.
In substance, evaluations must “use a variety of assessment tools and
strategies to gather relevant functional, developmental, and academic
information, including information provided by the parent, that may assist in
determining” whether the child is a child with a disability and, if so, what
must be provided through the child’s IEP in order for the child to receive
FAPE. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2)(A).
Further, the evaluation must “not use any single measure or assessment as
the sole criterion for determining whether a child is a child with a disability
or determining an appropriate educational program for the child” and must
“use technically sound instruments that may assess the relative contribution
of cognitive and behavioral factors, in addition to physical or developmental
factors”. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2)(B)-(C).
In addition, the LEAs are obligated to ensure that:
assessments and other evaluation materials... (i) are selected
and administered so as not to be discriminatory on a racial or
Page 31
cultural basis; (ii) are provided and administered in the language
and form most likely to yield accurate information on what the
child knows and can do academically, developmentally, and
functionally, unless it is not feasible to so provide or administer;
(iii) are used for purposes for which the assessments or
measures are valid and reliable; (iv) are administered by trained
and knowledgeable personnel; and (v) are administered in
accordance with any instructions provided by the producer of
such assessments.
20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(3)(A).
Finally, evaluations must assess “all areas of suspected disability”. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414(b)(3)(B).
Section 504/Chapter 15
At the outset, it must be noted that an LEA may completely discharge its
duties to a student under Section 504 by compliance with the IDEA.
Consequently, when a Student is IDEA-eligible, and the LEA satisfies its
obligations under the IDEA, no further analysis is necessary to conclude that
Section 504 is also satisfied. Conversely, all students who are IDEA-eligible
are protected from discrimination and must have access to school
programming in all of the ways that Section 504 ensures.
“Eligibility” under Section 504 is a colloquialism – the term does not appear
in the law. That term is used as shorthand for the question of whether a
person is protected by Section 504. Section 504 protects “handicapped
persons,” a term that is defined at 34 CFR § 104.3(j)(1):
Handicapped persons means any person who (i) has a physical
or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more
Page 32
major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or
(iii) is regarded as having such an impairment.
Chapter 15 applies Section 504 in schools to prohibit disability-based against
children who are "protected handicapped students." Chapter 15 defines a
“protected handicapped student” as a student who:
1. Is of an age at which public education is offered in that school district;
and
2. Has a physical or mental disability which substantially limits or
prohibits participation in or access to an aspect of the student’s school
program; and
3. Is not IDEA eligible.
See 22 Pa. Code § 15.2.
Section 504 and Chapter 15 prohibit schools from denying protected
handicapped students participation in, or the benefit of, regular
education. See 34 C.F.R. Part 104.4(a). Unlike the IDEA, which requires
schools to provide special education to qualifying students with disabilities,
Section 504 requires schools to provide accommodations so that students
with disabilities can access and benefit from regular education.
To accomplish this, a “school district shall provide each protected
handicapped student enrolled in the district, without cost to the student or
family, those related aids, services or accommodations which are needed to
afford the student equal opportunity to participate in and obtain the benefits
of the school program and extracurricular activities without discrimination
and to the maximum extent appropriate to the student’s abilities.” 22 Pa
Code § 15.3.
Page 33
Students are evaluated to determine what related aids, services, or
accommodations they need. Chapter 15 includes for conducting such
evaluations. 22 Pa. Code §§ 15.5, 15.6.
The related aids, services or accommodations required by Chapter 15 are
drafted into a service agreement. Chapter 15 defines a service agreement as
a “written agreement executed by a student’s parents and a school official
setting forth the specific related aids, services or accommodations to be
provided to a protected handicapped student.” 22 Pa. Code § 15.2. Service
agreements become operative when parents and schools agree to the
written document; oral agreements are prohibited. 22 Pa Code § 15.7(a).
For IDEA-eligible students, the substance of service agreements is
incorporated into IEPs. Schools do not issue separate service agreements for
IDEA-eligible students.
When parents and schools cannot reach an agreement, a number of dispute
resolution options are available, including formal due process hearings. 22
Pa Code §§ 15.7(b), 15.8(d).
Discussion and Legal Conclusions
There is no suggestion in any part of the record of this case that the
Student’s grades were anything but earned. Looking at report cards, the
Student performed well in most classes, graduated on the strength of that
performance, and was admitted to a prestigious university. There is,
therefore, considerable merit to the District’s theory of the case: the Student
is a success story. Despite having a disability, the Student successfully
accomplished what an overwhelming number of high school students seek to
accomplish: graduation and advancement to undergraduate studies. Further,
to the small extent that the Parents ask me to consider how much better the
Page 34
Student could have done had the Student received a FAPE, I reject such
speculation outright. Bluntly, I take the District’s point.
While the District’s theory is compelling, it is not the legal standard that
applies to this case. The Student’s actual progress may inform remedies but
is not a factor in the initial FAPE analysis. I must determine whether the IEPs
in question were reasonably calculated at the time they were issued to
provide a FAPE to the Student. Only after resolving whether the District
violated the Student’s right to a FAPE will I consider what harm any such
violation caused. I will, therefore, parse the alleged FAPE violation and the
demand for compensatory education separately.
FAPE Violations
IEP goals specify the amount of progress that a student is expected to make
during the term of the IEP. SDIs are the special education that schools
provide to enable students to achieve the goals. Modifications and
accommodations enable students to access education. In this way, SDIs and
accommodations are fundamentally different. Students with disabilities who
require accommodations but do not require specially designed instruction are
protected by Section 504, not the IDEA.
At the start of the period of time in question (February 17, 2018), the
Student’s IEP had two goals: a writing goal and a planning goal. Nothing
written in the SDI section of the IEP explains what special education the
District will provide to enable the Student to obtain the writing goal. The
only thing written in that section explaining what special education the
District will provide to enable the Student to achieve the planning goal was
the ASC placement. But even that statement is confounding. On its face, the
Page 35
IEP provides an elective, general education class to enable to the Student to
achieve a goal. Nothing in the SDI section of the Student’s IEP constitutes
specially designed instruction.
The IDEA requires more. Once an IEP team sets a goal, the team must also
say what special education the LEA will provide to enable the Student to
achieve that goal. The District did not do that in this case. Modifications and
accommodations are required by the IDEA but are not special education.
Giving the Student more time to take a test does not teach the Student the
skills that the Student needs to require less time to take the test.
Section 504 approaches the same distinction from a different perspective. If
the giving the Student more time to take a test will yield a score that reflects
the Student’s knowledge instead of the Student’s test-taking ability, a
Section 504 Plan can provide that accommodation/modification only because
extra time is not special education. In this case, the District concluded that
the Student required special education as a result of OHI (ADHD), and then
offered an IEP provided many modifications and accommodations but no
discernable special education. As such, the IEP in place on February 17,
2018 could not have been reasonably calculated to provide a FAPE at the
time it was offered.
The IEP in place on February 17, 2018 remained in place until the June 12,
2018 revision. That revision added the ESS class in the SDI and
modifications section of the IEP. Like the ASC class, the ESS class was a
general education elective and, therefore, cannot be special education. The
June 2018 Revised IEP could not have been reasonably calculated to provide
a FAPE for the same reason as its predecessor. While it provides substantial
modifications and accommodations, it provides no special education.
Page 36
The June 2018 Revised IEP remained in place until it was replaced by the
November 2018 IEP. That IEP is confounding. By this point in time, the
Student had mastered the planning goal but had made no progress towards
the writing goal (according to the District’s June 2018 progress monitoring).
Despite this, the District then continued the mastered planning goal and
removed the stagnant writing goal. The record provides no logical basis for
this decision.
At the same time, the District also removed references to the ASC and ESS
classes. Technically, neither of those classes constitute SDI and so their
removal does not render the November 2018 IEP any more or less
appropriate. But the elimination of services that the District touted as
responsive to the Parents’ concerns is striking. That those classes were
removed in acquiescence to parental demands is discussed below.
In sum, the November 2018 IEP could not be calculated to provide a FAPE at
the time it was issued because 1) it kept a mastered goal for no explicable
reason, 2) it discarded an unmet goal for no explicable reason, and 3) it
provided no discernable special education, relying instead on general
education modifications and accommodations. That sort of plan may be
appropriate for students with disabilities who do not require special
education. In fact, that sort of plan is the type of plan that Section 504
provides. Regardless, at the time that the District issued the November 2018
IEP, it had concluded that the Student was a child with a disability as defined
by the IDEA. As matter of law, the Student required specially designed
instruction. The District’s failure to provide SDI violated the Student’s right
to a FAPE.
Page 37
The November 2018 IEP remained in place until the Parents provided
consent for the District to implement the March 2019 Revised IEP. In this
document, the District provided a more detailed breakdown of how and
when the Student could obtain modifications and accommodations, most of
which were extended time for tests, assignments, and projects. Again, it is
notable that the District did not include regular education classes that it
believed to be beneficial because the Parents had rejected those classes.
While that speaks to the relationship between the parties, the inclusion of a
general education class in the Student’s IEP (or lack thereof) does not alter
the analysis. March 2019 Revised IEP is inappropriate for all of the same
reasons that the November 2018 IEP was inappropriate.
The March 2019 Revised IEP remained in place until the Parents provided
consent for the District to implement the September 2019 Revised IEP. In
substance, the only change was the inclusion of the ASC class in the SDI and
modifications section of the IEP. The addition of a regular education class to
an IEP is something other than the addition of special education to an IEP.
Moreover, the ASC class remained an elective that the Parents rejected. The
September 2019 Revised IEP continued to be inappropriate.
The September 2019 Revised IEP remained in place until the Parents
provided consent for the District to implement the October 2019 IEP. The
October 2019 IEP is baffling because, by any reasonable definition, it is not
an IEP. The October 2019 IEP contains one goal that the Student mastered
years ago. The District was explicit that it would not monitor that goal.
Functionally, the October 2019 IEP had no goal. Like its predecessors, the
October 2019 IEP also provided no special education. The many
modifications and accommodations in the October 2019 IEP do not amount
to SDI. An IEP that has no goals and provides no special education is an IEP
Page 38
in name only. The document has more in common with a Section 504 Plan
than anything else. That is problematic because the reevaluation report
concluding that the Student no longer required SDI had not been written at
this point in time. The October 2019 IEP was inappropriate.
In sum, the Student did not have an IEP that was reasonably calculated to
provide a FAPE at any point from February 17, 2018 through the Student’s
graduation.
Compensatory Education
The argument implicit in the District’s theory of the case is that whatever
flaws may be present in the Student’s IEP are harmless. The Student
graduated and went on to a prestigious university. Indeed, under Endrew,
supra, grade-to-grade progress for students capable of such work is a strong
indication that the child derived a meaningful benefit from his or her special
education. The challenge of this case is that most of the evidence establishes
that the Student derived a meaningful benefit from the District’s regular
education program in the absence of special education.
The Parents point to the Student’s report card grades and documented
difficulties completing work on time as evidence of the substantive harm that
the Student suffered. The report card grades do not establish substantive
harm. Rather, they establish that the Student was academically successful.
The Student’s academic progress also establishes that the Student was
capable of high-level academic work with only regular education
accommodations.
Beyond report cards and grade-to-grade advancement, the Student
mastered the planning goal. It is striking that the planning goal is not
Page 39
measured by the Student’s timely completion of assignments. Rather, the
goal was designed to track how frequently the Student used various
planning techniques (leading the District to describe the goal as a self-
advocacy goal in some documents). Progress, however, was sometimes
reported in terms of assignment completion per class. Such reports cannot
be measured against the IEP goal as written. C/f P-4 at 33, P-6 at 30, S-9 at
14. Such reports do, however, suggest that the Student had difficulty
managing assignments and projects. The Parents’ contemporaneously
reported concerns amplify the District’s own data in this regard. Further,
when the District reported progress in a way that aligns to the goal, the
source of the District’s data is not reported.
While I am left to wonder how the District calculated the Student’s progress
towards this goal, the burden of proof in this case rests with the Parents.
There is no preponderant evidence in the record to establish that the
District’s progress reporting was incorrect, invalid, or fraudulent. I must
conclude that the District’s progress reports are accurate.
The Student did not master the writing goal, which was removed without
explanation. Yet the record of this case does not establish what harm the
Student suffered as a result. There is no evidence in the record establishing
which, if any, of the Student’s classes were writing intensive. Even if I were
to make assumptions about which classes were writing intensive (something
I cannot do), there is no evidence establishing that the Student’s lower
grades in those classes were the result of the Student’s writing difficulties.
The clearest evidence that the Student suffered some substantive harm
comes from the Student’s consistent struggles with executive functioning
skills. There is preponderant evidence that the Student’s ability to plan out
Page 40
and manage assignments was a consistent problem during the entire period
of time in question. The District knew about this problem through the
Parents’ communications with District personnel. The Parents consistently
requested special education to address these problems. Difficulties with
panning and organization were also found thorough the District’s 2020 RR,
which also connects these problems to the Student’s disability.
As noted above, education encompasses more than academics. Up until the
2020 RR, the District had concluded that the Student had OHI (due to
ADHD) and, by reason thereof, required specially designed instruction. The
District was aware of the Student’s planning problems and wrote a goal to
address them. The Student mastered that goal but continued to exhibit the
same problems. The District did not offer special education to address the
Student’s executive functioning. Rather, the District provided general
education accommodations so that the Student would not be academically
penalized for having a disability. Although the Student did not suffer an
academic harm for the District’s failure to address executive functioning
needs, the Student did suffer an educational harm for the same reason.
In making this determination, I recognize the obviously contentious
relationship between the parties, and that the Parents rejected significant
general education programs that were designed to target the Student’s
executive functioning needs. Third Circuit has spoken about how the
relationship between parents and schools does not diminish the rights of
student. It its closing brief, the District expresses some frustration with that
jurisprudence. The District wrote:
When parents refuse recommendations, the school team is often
placed in a very difficult position. If they feel that an ASC class is
Page 41
required for FAPE, they must state in the NOREP that it is
required for FAPE, and if Parents disagree, advise them they
must either file for mediation or due process. This is easier said
than done. Teachers, trying to be cooperative and
nonconfrontational, sometimes acquiesce to parents’ demands.
Parents, however, can then turn around and file for due process
arguing that – yes, we insisted that the school team bend to our
will but now that they have done exactly what we insisted they
do, they have failed to provide FAPE and we now demand
compensatory education.
Its frustration notwithstanding, the District is correct. If the ASC placement
was a necessary component of FAPE, and the District removed the ASC
placement, then the Student received something less than a FAPE – even if
the ASC was removed at the Parents’ request. In this case, however, the
record establishes that the ASC was a regular education class available to all
students, regardless of disability. The ASC class cannot be SDI and is not
special education. Even if the Parents had agreed to keep the Student in the
ASC class, the District still would not have provided special education in
response to the Student’s executive functioning needs. Such special
education was necessary because, until the 2020 RR, there was no
disagreement about the Student’s eligibility for special education.
Having found substantive harm, it is still difficult to craft a remedy in this
case. A generic award of compensatory education is not equitable, given the
specific nature of the harm and the clear evidence that the impact of the
harm was not pervasive in that it did not spread into academic or social
domains. There is no preponderant evidence that the Parents’ preferred
configuration of direct instruction of executive functioning skills was the only
Page 42
configuration that could have constituted a FAPE for the Student. Moreover,
the Student is an undergraduate enrolled in a university outside of
Pennsylvania.
12 Nothing in the record establishes what executive functioning
instruction would be currently beneficial to the Student. Of equal
importance, nothing in the record establishes what type of instruction the
Student – who is an adult for nearly all purposes outside of this hearing –
would be amenable to.
Given these challenges, I find it equitable to award 15 hours of direct
instruction of executive functioning skills to the Student.
13 The District may
provide such instruction through its own personnel or may contract for those
services. Those services may be provided at any time mutually convenient to
the Student and District and may be provided through remote video
conferencing. Any hours not used by the end of the school year in which the
Student turns 21 years old are forfeited.
Miscellaneous
I find that the 2020 RR complied with all IDEA requirements described
above. I make no determination as to the propriety of the District’s ultimate
determination that the Student had a disability but no longer required SDI
because that issue is moot. The Parents withdrew claims concerning the
Student’s eligibility for special education, and the 2020 RR did not change
the services that the Student received.
12 I have no information about how the Student is attending university during the COVID-19
pandemic and make no finding as to whether the Student currently resides out of state.
13 The lack of evidence about the Student’s current needs as an undergraduate could justify
a complete denial of compensatory education under the unique facts of this case. On the
whole, I must conclude that some remedy is owed.
Page 43
I make no determination about the appropriateness of the Section 504 Plan
that the District offered after the 2020 RR for the same reasons, and
because that Plan was never implemented.
As the Student did not receive special education to address executive
functioning, the COVID-19 shutdown did not alter the Student’s receipt of
special education. The COVID-19 shutdown has no impact upon the remedy
that I award below.
ORDER
Now, December 21, 2020, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1. For reasons set forth in the accompany decision, none of the Student’s
IEPs during the period of time in question were reasonably calculated
to provide a FAPE at the time that they were issued. This order
constitutes declaratory relief of the same.
2. The Student is awarded fifteen (15) hours of compensatory education
in the form described in the accompanying decision. Any hours unused
at the end of the school year in which the Student turns twenty-one
(21) years old are forfeited.
It is FURTHER ORDERED that any claim not specifically addressed in this
order is DENIED and DISMISSED.
/s/ Brian Jason Ford
HEARING OFFICER
